"andy-k" wrote in
news:SIsgk.12978$KW4.12287@newsfe16.ams2:
>> ER as a whole, on the other hand, is complex, and thus we can analyze
>> and describe it by setting forth the observed relationships among its
>> primary constituents, some of which are constant and others of which
>> vary in regular (and therefore predictable) ways, over various
>> intervals. I.e., we perceive (or superimpose) patterns on this flux.
>> Those regularities and constants impel us to try to visualize some
>> edifice, or machine, whose coherent structure and orderly functioning
>> can explain the dynamics of ER. Thus we assemble CR, our constructed
>> reality. Like all good engineers, we strive to build the most
>> reliable and economical machine we can which accomplishes the tasks
>> set for it --- we want it to have as simple a design and as few
>> moving parts as possible.
>
> What is this 'we' and in which of these three realities does it
> reside?
The "we" resides in the CR. All of our concepts reside there (but not
our primary subjective states). One element of this edifice added early
on is the posit that other minds exist, more-or-less similar to oneself,
with whom one can compare notes.
>> We can know all there is to know about the atom because it is our
>> invention. Like any other invention of ours, it can be modified,
>> customized, updated, and remodeled. But in between construction
>> projects it is complete. It will not have any hidden rooms or
>> invisible hallways. The demands placed upon it may eventually outgrow
>> the available space, at which time we can either tack on an addition
>> or tear it down and build anew. We will not find any hidden aspects
>> to the atom in the future. What we may find are previously unknown
>> phenomena which our current theory of the atom cannot accomodate.
>> We will then either try to "remodel" the atom to accomodate the new
>> phenomena (usually cheaper and quicker), or tear that building down
>> and start over from scratch.
> The *model* is complete until new evidence suggests that it must be
> revised or replaced. The question is whether we *discover* that new
> evidence or *invent* it.
What we will be trying to explain will be patterns or relationships
appearing among our primary subjective states which we have not observed
previously. What we take to be the origin of that new data will depend
upon the CR we have (tentatively) adopted, e.g., whether its origins are
due to some phenomenon in the "external world" (as posited by the CR),
or to our own subconscious imagination (as also posited by the CR). It
will have been discovered in either case ("discovery" meaning only that
it has come to our attention for the first time).
>> Our model of the atom is the only atom we know about and are entitled
>> to talk about.
> Did we know all there was to know about the earth when it was
> conceived as flat?
Our models of tangible physical objects (entities consisting of
characterizing sets of qualia occurring in more-or-less constant
relationships), e.g. specific trees, persons, cats, bricks, houses, and
the like, are always incomplete --- we expect those entities to reveal
new features or aspects (new qualia or new combinations of qualia) at
different times or under different conditions. Both models of the Earth
were conceived as incomplete in that sense (the flat-earthers, like
ourselves, presumed there were areas of the Earth which had not been
explored, and many others which had not been explored thoroughly).
(Using "qualia" there in the more restricted sense).
But defined entities such as triangles, numbers, atoms, EM fields, bits,
etc. (and also such things as the pieces in chess, the rules and
concepts of baseball, the elements of music, etc.), either have no
observable properties (qualia in ER associated with them in our model),
or specific, constant properties (such as the tone defining a musical
note). The properties defined into them are the only properties they
have. (We will not be "discovering" new properties of bits or middle-C).
>> We can't make any negative claims about UR. Nor any positive claims.
>> As W said, "About that of which we cannot speak we must pass over in
>> silence." We can't speak about UR or subjective states. All we can
>> speak about is CR, and try to make sure that what we say about it
>> serves the purpose for which we constructed it, i.e., to explain and
>> predict ER, in as economical a way as possible.
> The purpose for which CR is constructed is to explain ER,
> and all the better for CR if it also makes testable predictions.
Well, as we discussed before, unless some component of CR generates
testable predictions, then it is at best an EF (explanation-formation).
If it is incapable of making testable predictions in principle, then we
leave it out of CR, for reasons of parsimony. It would add a complexity
and cause distraction without accomplishing anything useful.
(I need to know more about your concept of "explanation". You seem to
find some value in at least some non-predictive EFs. I'd like to know
where that value lies).
>> Consciousness, however, is not a logical property, nor are atoms
>> logical entities, like numbers. They are assigned the properties they
>> have in order to account for (predict) empirical phenomena. Assigning
>> the atom the property of protoconsciousness does not help in the
>> least in explaining (predicting), by logical derivation, which
>> complex systems will have subjective states and which won't, and it
>> certainly won't generate descriptions of subjective states (because
>> no theory can generate those). Assigning such a property allows us to
>> derive nothing logically which we didn't already know via
>> observation. Any puzzles we may have had remain just as puzzling.
> The puzzle of consciousness remains, nonetheless, and it cannot be
> evaded by defining consciousness in such a way as to circumvent the
> enigma. Logical arguments may still be made in the absence of
> empirical evidence, permitting us to eliminate illogical scenarios.
> Whatever arguments remain may be eliminated only by virtue of
> prejudice.
EF's may not be eliminated on grounds of parsimony? If an EF does not
unravel the puzzle ("the puzzle remains"), then why are we keeping it?
>>> Physical theory is incomplete, *not* because it fails to describe
>>> subjective states, but because it *omits* them.
>>
>> Do you think the theory I've been peddling in this discussion omits
>> subjective states?
> You have been evading the enigma of the existence of a first-person
> subjective perspective upon a world.
Gets back to a point addressed below.
>>> And we can't take
>>> refuge in the fact that what can't be described can't be explained,
>>> as if that somehow gives us license to pretend they aren't there.
>> What cannot be described can certainly not be explained. But who is
>> pretending they are not there (except Deneett)?
> Then the enigma remains despite all attempts to eliminate it on
> grounds that it does not admit of testable predictions.
Well, I don't think we're eliminating, or trying to eliminate, any
enigma. What we are eliminating are EF's which fail to explain the
enigma.
> I don't think anybody is "accusing" physics of incompleteness, but
> simply *acknowledging* that there are things not within its purview.
I think everyone accepts that. What we disagree about is whether
consciousness falls within its purview. I claim it does, and that it can
be explained with physical theory, to the extent that it can be
explained at all. There are aspects to it, however, such as the nature
of subjective states, which cannot be explained at all. For those, if we
can explain why they cannot be explained, then we have done all that is
possible.
Physical theory also cannot answer the question "Why does anything
exist?" Nor can it answer the question, "Why do I (this ER that I
am/experience) exist?", if that question is asked in same sense or
spirit as the first question.
There is a point in every line of inquiry where questions must end,
where the only remaining answer is, "That is just the way things are."
Q: Why does the sun shine?
A: Because nuclear reactions in its core generate heat, and the heat
excites the atoms of gases in its atmosphere, which energy the atoms re-
radiate as photons of various wavelengths, which our eyes perceive as
light.
Q: But why should heat excite atoms? Why shouldn't it just cause the
atoms to feel warmer? Why should excited atoms emit photons? Why don't
they emit baby atoms or strawberries instead? Why do our eyes detect
photons as light? Why don't they feel them as pinpricks instead?
All those questions amount to, "Why are the laws of physics as they are?
Why isn't the universe governed by a different set of rules instead? Why
is the gravitational constant G, instead of 2G?"
I realize the futility of such questions does not deter people from
asking them. Our innate pattern generator seems to recognize no limits.
:-)
We have explained consciousness when we can describe how to assemble a
system which begins to behave in the ways which subjective states would
help explain and predict, just as we have explained photons when we can
cobble together a device that can generate light and predict its
properties. We are mystified because we ourselves are devices of the
type which can have subjective states, and because we directly
experience those states. But that is just what our theory predicts: that
a system having subjective states will experience them.
That is just the way things are.
:-)
