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Date: Jul 18, 2008 12:02
"Publius" wrote in message
news:Xns9AD29BB865E27mpubliusnospamcomcas@216.196.97.136...
> "andy-k" wrote:
>
> I read it; had not read it before. Thanks!
>
> But it has serious problems. T'would take a whole paper to deal with
> them properly, so I'll concentrate here on two.
>
> The first is Strawson's undefended reliance on metaphysical realism
> (MR). MR assumes that there is an "ultimate reality," distinct and
> independent of any conception we may have of it (which conception we
> take to represent it in some fashion), which has definite but largely
> unknown (and perhaps permanently unknowable) properties. Russell and
> Eddington, whom he quotes favorably, share that view. That leads them
> and Strawson to conclude, since we know so little about this ultimate ...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jul 18, 2008 20:20
"andy-k" wrote in
news:JM5gk.5368$A42.3679@newsfe14.ams2:
>> The first is Strawson's undefended reliance on metaphysical realism
>> (MR). MR assumes that there is an "ultimate reality," distinct and
>> independent of any conception we may have of it (which conception...
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Date: Jul 19, 2008 14:08
Publius wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Publius wrote:
>>> The first is Strawson's undefended reliance on metaphysical realism
>>> (MR). MR assumes that there is an "ultimate reality," distinct and
>>> independent of any conception we may have of it (which conception we
>>> take to represent it in some fashion), which has definite but
>>> largely unknown (and perhaps permanently unknowable) properties.
>>> Russell and Eddington, whom he quotes favorably, share that view.
>>> That leads them and Strawson to conclude, since we know so little
>>> about this ultimate reality, that it is presumptuous to declare
>>> that consciousness is not part of its "fundamental nature." Quoting
>>> Eddington, "Science has nothing to say about the intrinsic nature
>>> of the atom."
>>
>> Strawson admits that his appeal to realism is weak:
>>
>> "For the purposes of this paper I will _assume_ that any realistic
>> position does take it that there is non-mental or non-Experiential
>> being in addition to mental and Experiential being, for this ...
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Author: Burdock RootBurdock Root Date: Jul 20, 2008 12:09
A large forest can look like a solid green patch from orbit, so I take
even everyday objects to be the result of perceptual groupings of
smaller objects (or "whatever"). That is, there's a constructivism
behind the empirical world that precedes the constructivism of
abstract models. Therefore, I personally have no problem in counting
detectable atoms as a legitimate part of the phenomenal world like
tables and chairs.
At some point (maybe even at the everyday level occasionally), the
possible ways of conceptualizing matter and energy become
underdetermined, invariably realized, or might oppose each other as
antinomies -- like with the multiple realist models of quantum physics
and general relativity. Then it becomes questionable whether these
rival "reality-interpretations" qualify as being "concrete"-able as
tables and chairs. But atoms have become so crucial in applied scitech
that I believe they are conceptual groupings of wavicles (or
"whatever") that can be detected and mapped as "things", and thus are
a micro-continuation of the phenomenal world.
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jul 20, 2008 21:01
"andy-k" wrote in
news:SIsgk.12978$KW4.12287@newsfe16.ams2:
> What is this 'we' and in which of these three realities does it
> reside?
Wanted to get to this tonight, but not gonna happen. Tomorrow! Ditto
Burdock.
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jul 21, 2008 10:34
"andy-k" wrote in
news:SIsgk.12978$KW4.12287@newsfe16.ams2:
>> ER as a whole, on the other hand, is complex, and thus we can analyze
>> and describe it by setting forth the observed relationships among its
>> primary constituents, some of which are constant and...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jul 21, 2008 10:54
> A large forest can look like a solid green patch from orbit, so I take
> even everyday objects to be the result of perceptual groupings of
> smaller objects (or "whatever"). That is, there's a constructivism
> behind the empirical world that precedes the constructivism of
> abstract models. Therefore, I personally have no problem in counting
> detectable atoms as a legitimate part of the phenomenal world like
> tables and chairs.
I agree that (specific) tables and chairs, along with atoms, are both
constructs. But the former are empirical constructs, all of whose elements
are qualia and the relationships among them. Atoms, however, are not
constructed from qualia (nor are the *concepts* of a table or chair). Those
are higher-order (more abstract) constructs. I'd agree that they remain
part of the "phenomenal realm," since "thoughts," concepts, etc., are all
part of that realm, but the difference in their ontological orders is
fairly clear and important.
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Date: Jul 21, 2008 14:49
Publius wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Publius wrote:
>>> ER as a whole, on the other hand, is complex, and thus we can
>>> analyze and describe it by setting forth the observed relationships
>>> among its primary constituents, some of which are constant and
>>> others of which vary in regular (and therefore predictable) ways,
>>> over various intervals. I.e., we perceive (or superimpose) patterns
>>> on this flux. Those regularities and constants impel us to try to
>>> visualize some edifice, or machine, whose coherent structure and
>>> orderly functioning can explain the dynamics of ER. Thus we
>>> assemble CR, our constructed reality. Like all good engineers, we
>>> strive to build the most reliable and economical machine we can
>>> which accomplishes the tasks set for it --- we want it to have as
>>> simple a design and as few moving parts as possible.
>>
>> What is this 'we' and in which of these three realities does it
>> reside?
>
> The "we" resides in the CR. All of our concepts reside there (but not ...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jul 22, 2008 13:24
"andy-k" wrote in
news:Av7hk.17783$%%F3.12924@newsfe27.ams2:
>> The "we" resides in the CR. All of our concepts reside there (but not
>> our primary subjective states). One element of this edifice added
>> early on is the posit that other minds exist, more-or-less similar to
>> oneself, with whom one can compare notes.
> As a member of CR (i.e. a construct), has this 'we' constructed
> itself?
No. You have constructed it. The others comprising the "we", along with
yourself, are early elements of that construct. You create an external
world and place yourself within it. Then you, along with the others you
have constructed, add more storeys to the edifice.
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Date: Jul 22, 2008 16:25
Publius wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>>> The "we" resides in the CR. All of our concepts reside there (but
>>> not our primary subjective states). One element of this edifice
>>> added early on is the posit that other minds exist, more-or-less
>>> similar to oneself, with whom one can compare notes.
>
>> As a member of CR (i.e. a construct), has this 'we' constructed
>> itself?
>
> No. You have constructed it. The others comprising the "we", along
> with yourself, are early elements of that construct. You create an
> external world and place yourself within it. Then you, along with the
> others you have constructed, add more storeys to the edifice.
Then we go around again: What is this 'me' and in which of these
three realities does it reside? I anticipate your answer to be that
this 'me' resides in the CR, and my response would be that as a
member of CR (i.e. a construct), has this 'me' constructed itself?
What we have here is a chicken-and-egg problem.
>>> What we will be trying to explain will be patterns or relationships
>>> appearing among our primary subjective states which we have not
>>> observed previously. What we take to be the origin of that...
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