> andy-k wrote:

>> "gibbs" wrote:

>>> I can see a person looking at a tree and I can see a tree. And I can
>>> see that that tree has nothing to do with that person and remains when
>>> that person walks away. The reason is simple. Because when I perceive
>>> I don't perceive concepts. Concepts illuminate my perceptions and allow
>>> me to designate a person and a tree.

>>
>> Perception and conception are just more concepts.

>
> That's your claim, but I've yet to see good grounds to think you are
> correct. Indeed, there are clear reasons to say that perception
> (specifically, the content of a perception) need not be based on the
> relevant concepts. Consider a child who has no concept whatsoever of
> "daffodil". We show her a daffodil. She looks at it and says something
> like: "pretty!". Now here's the question: does she see the daffodil? The
> answer seems to me to be very obviously, yes. Sure, she does not see it
> *as* a daffodil - how could she, she has no daffodil concept - but that is
> a different issue. She can see the daffodil as well as, perhaps even ...

> andy-k wrote:

>> "Goober" wrote:

>>> andy-k wrote:

>>>> I wasn't disagreeing with you, but rather saying that I view proper
>>>> names as labels for concepts.

>>>
>>> I think that is precisely what I was rejecting. Proper names are labels
>>> for things (or, if you prefer, sets of events). They aren't labels for
>>> concepts. Though, of course, I will likely associate the name with
>>> concepts.

>>
>> A thing is only the thing it is because it is conceived as that thing --
>> i.e. on the one hand there is a flux about which nothing can be said (not
>> even that is "exists"), and on the other hand "things" are carved out of
>> that flux and stand in contrast to the *conditions* in which they exist
>> (i.e. stand out). It is this process of "carving out" -- i.e. the
>> appearance of boundaries within the flux -- that I understand (perhaps
>> you might say misunderstand) as conception. "Things" are considered to
>> consist of sets of what are conceived to be their constituent properties, ...

> andy-k wrote:

>> "Reality", as I understand most people's use of the word, denotes the
>> self (as an organism in the world) along with the world it inhabits, in
>> contrast to "appearance" which denotes that self's mental representation
>> of the world. The point to note is that the concept of self (within the
>> conceptual framework) has the consequence that the whole conceptual
>> framework is conceived (i.e. represented within itself) as nothing more
>> than that self's "mental representation of reality". That is to say that
>> the concept of self causes the same data to be counted twice over --
>> regarded in one instance as part of "reality" and in another as part of
>> "appearance".

>
> Thanks for that. But there are several point at which I disagree.
>
> Firstly, "reality"...

> Ted King wrote:

>> Yeah, I think my flu-fever has amplified my tendency to mix things up.
>> There are similarities between what you an andy-k say, but andy-k's
>> statements tend to be more focused on what linguistic expressions are
>> about; i.e., whether or not we can meaningfully talk about anything other
>> than our conceptions. In retrospect I don't think "natural kinds" is a
>> central issue (although it probably enters the picture). IOW, I don't
>> think I said anything helpful, so there isn't any reason to consider my
>> comments farther.

>
> Well, from my point of view, whether there are natural kinds (natural
> distinctions between kinds of things out there in nature) is pretty
> central. Because it seems to me that the inference is being made from
> certain epistemic...

> "andy-k" wrote:

>> "Reality", as I understand most people's use of the word, denotes the
>> self (as an organism in the world) along with the world it inhabits, in
>> contrast to "appearance" which denotes that self's mental representation
>> of the world. The point to note is that the concept of self (within the
>> conceptual framework) has the consequence that the whole conceptual
>> framework is conceived (i.e. represented within itself) as nothing more
>> than that self's "mental representation of reality". That is to say that
>> the concept of self causes the same data to be counted twice over --
>> regarded in one instance as part of "reality" and in another as part of
>> "appearance".
>>
>> Now since the whole conceptual framework is conceived as nothing more
>> than that self's "mental representation of reality", this accounting
>> error has the unfortunate consequence of giving the impression that the
>> whole conceptual framework is mere "appearance" and that "reality" is
>> external to the conceptual framework. That external "reality" is then
>> posited as the explanation of why the conceptual framework takes the form
>> that it does. The idea that the conceptual framework stands in need of ...

> "gibbs" wrote:

>> "Ted King" wrote:

>>> I don't think that what I am looking for is an explanation of the
>>> conceptual framework....So, it isn't that I am looking for an
>>> explanation for the conceptual framework that leads me to assume an
>>> external "reality", it is that the conceptual framework - along with
>>> sensory impressions and other things - has a relationship with a part
>>> of reality independent of experience that forms at least a partial
>>> explanation for the nature of experience. Of course, that explanation
>>> could be partially or all wrong.

>>
>> I'd question the whole notion of "the conceptual framework" and how the
>> word "concept" is used. In an unsual way!

>
> I am not very confident that I have a grasp of what a conceptual
> framework or "the conceptual framework" is either. I do have a rough
> notion that I've been using so that I could delve into other matters -
> but perhaps doing that has been a mistake.
> ...

> There may be something to the part of what I said about andy-k thinking
> there are no natural distinctions. But I'm not sure that he thinks that
> way (or that "fuzzy edges" matter much) and it may very well be that the
> core of disagreement lies elsewhere - in fact, it could very well be
> that the reason he thinks there are not natural distinctions (assuming
> he does) is because he doesn't think we can say anything meaningful
> about the part of reality independent of cognition. I think andy-k would
> agree that there is part of reality independent of cognition (he said he
> is not a solipsist), but he has stated more than once that we cannot say
> anything about that part of reality.

> Ted King wrote:

>> "gibbs" wrote:

>>> "Ted King" wrote:

>>>> Of course philosophy is full of really hairy problems, but the issues
>>>> surrounding the notion of perception are about as woolly as any of
>>>> them. For example, what is an illusion? Is there a chain of causality
>>>> that leads to perception? If so, what are the particulars of the chain?
>>>> If there is no chain of causation then what is the nature of the
>>>> relationship between an "object" and its perception? Should "raw"
>>>> sensory information be considered part of perception? If not, what role
>>>> do they play in perception? Because of all those issues (and more) I
>>>> have a tendency to not talk about perception, but instead focus on what
>>>> seems to be raw sensory information that I consider to be "input" and
>>>> then say that that input gets processed. I imagine perception is "in"
>>>> there somewhere, it just isn't clear to me in what way it is.

>>>
>>> An illusion is a false perception. It is not a perception. An illusion
>>> can be corrected (a drug could wear off or you might get a better look).
>>> I don't think there is any mystery in that. ...

> "andy-k" wrote:

>> That external "reality" is then posited as the explanation of why the
>> conceptual framework takes the form that it does.

>
> Of course, the whole idea of "the conceptual framework" is suspect as a
> hypothesis or an explanation. There is no reality "posited" in
> experience. Reality is experienced. To claim that reality is posited is
> an abuse of language and the making up of definitions of words as you want
> them to be defined. Nor is reality inferred, whether it be the objects
> external to us, objects of thought (generalities or universals) that we
> can talk about that may or may not be instantiated in the world, or
> entirely private experiences (like what it feels like when someone aims a
> blowtorch at your foot).

> "The conceptual framework", whatever that means, itself doesn't have a
> basis in reality, except as it follows from a misuse, or a very peculiar
> use, of language.