Re: rationality
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Re: rationality         

Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: Immortalist
Date: May 22, 2007 09:52

On May 22, 6:53 am, "Phil Roberts, Jr." ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> from my website
> after many years of thinking and many rewrites
> any comments or criticisms would be greatly appreciated
>
> Rationality
>
> I am assuming the term, "rationality", refers to the cognitive map
> we carry in our heads and in which the amount or degree of
> cognitive rationality correlates with the extent to which this map
> is comprised of beliefs that accurately and coherently represent
> reality including, among other things, beliefs about how to acquire
> beliefs that accurately and coherently represent reality (epistemics).
> I am also assuming that when we refer to an individual as "rational"
> or "irrational" that we are simply expressing an appraisal of how
> this individual's cognitive map compares to the norm in this regard
> including, among other things, beliefs related to the use or abuse
> of logic.
>

I really like where you are going with all this @ your webPage. The
evolution of logical reasoning and inferencial abilities. I think that
this area will really produce results for society and blast upon some
cherished but wrong myths, or as Fred might say "stories," stories
which serve an evolutionary purpose with a higher priority than
understanding the origins of mammilian inference neurons.

I noticed this at your main page;
> 2. The identification of a theoretical anomaly
> ('feelings of worthlessness') in a pre-existing
> scientific theory (evolutionary theory) as explained
> in 'Rehabilitating Introspection' ('Higher Emotion')
> resulting, not from the development of a more powerful
> telescope or precise measuring instrument, but rather
> from the abandonment of a mistaken assumption
> ('Rehabilitating Introspection' - first paragraph).
>
> The assumption that the aforementioned anomaly can
> be plausibly addressed by assuming that 'feelings of
> worthlessness' are a maladaptive byproduct of the
> evolution of rationality ('Feelings of Worthlessness').
>

Do you think evolution don't use anomolies, if that is the right way
to define "social instincts?"

RANK THEORY from
Evolutionary Psychology
(2nd edition 2001)
by Anthony Stevens & John Price
http://www.huxley.net/rankmood/

"...rank theory proposes that depression is an adaptive response to
losing rank and conceiving of oneself as a loser. The adaptive
function of the depression, according to rank theory, is to facilitate
losing and to promote accommodation to the fact that one has lost. In
other words, the depressive state evolved to promote the acceptance of
the subordinate role and the loss of resources which can only be
secured by holding higher rank in the dominance hierarchy. The
function of this depressive adaptation is to prevent the loser in a
status conflict from suffering further injury and to preserve the
stability and competitive efficiency of the group by maintaining
social homeostasis.

In circumstances of defeat and enforced subordination, an internal
inhibitory process comes into operation which causes the individual to
cease competing and reduce his level of aspiration. This inhibitory
process is involuntary and results in the loss of energy, depressed
mood, sleep disturbance, poor appetite, retarded movements, and loss
of confidence which are typical characteristics of depression.

The selective advantage of an evolved capacity for the recognition and
acceptance of rank difference in social groups is that it reduces
aggressiveness and establishes precedence in granting rights of access
to indispensable resources such as territory, food, and potential
mates. It follows that gaining rank is associated with elevated mood
and losing rank with depressed mood. The evolutionary advantage of
living in groups is the protection it provides from predators. For
Homo sapiens it also afforded protection from other hominid groups.
Living in a group became crucial for safety, for access to resources,
for co-operative hunting of large game, and for reproductive success.
A sense of belonging has thus become indispensable to our physical and
mental security. To be popular and hold rank within a group are
immensely desirable accomplishments; to perceive oneself as unpopular
and without rank are causes of misery and unhappiness; while to be
rejected from the group altogether is one of life's greatest
disasters. It is in terms of these factors that joy and sorrow, mania
and depression, contentment and anxiety can be most readily
understood.

One important contribution of rank theory is that it has proposes a
hypothesis of how depression actually evolved: it emerged as the
yielding component of ritual agonistic conflict. This has been called
the yielding subroutine (Price and Sloman, 1987). The adaptive
function of the yielding subroutine is twofold: first, it ensures that
the yielder truly yields and does not attempt to make a comeback, and,
second, the yielder reassures the winner that yielding has truly taken
place, so that the conflict ends, with no further damage to the
yielder. Relative social harmony is then restored.

Similarly, we may offer the hypothesis that mania evolved as the
winning component of ritual agonistic behaviour: the winning
subroutine. Here again, the adaptive function is twofold: first, it
ensures that the winner truly wins and makes clear that any attempt at
a comeback by the yielder will be successfully resisted, and, second,
it ensures that should the yielder attempt to reopen the conflict, the
winner will have such resources of confidence, determination,
strength, and energy that he will force the yielder to yield for good
and all.

Both yielding and winning subroutines thus ensure that social change
is accomplished relatively quickly without too much disruption of
group activities and that once it has occurred it will prove lasting.
The object of the losing strategy is damage limitation, that of the
winning strategy is status preservation. Inevitably, such subroutines
carry greater significance among group-living species than among those
living a solitary existence. A solitary animal fights for possession
of a territory. If he loses a contest for one territory, then he must
be able to withdraw and move on to fight for another. Yielding should
involve only a brief "disappointment" on the basis that he who fights
and runs away live to fight another day. Group-living individuals, on
the other hand, require more prolonged and complex winning and losing
subroutines, for a loser may have to give up a position in the
hierarchy that he has held for many years. Should he not greatly
modify his behaviour he could be expelled from the group. Chance's
concept of "reverted escape" becomes relevant here.

That the incidence of depression is higher and its course longer than
hypomania suggest that natural selection has favoured the prolonged
yielding subroutine over its winning equivalent. This could reflect
the evident fact that in any asymmetrical society there are
potentially more losers than winners..."

RANK THEORY from
Evolutionary Psychology
(2nd edition 2001)
by Anthony Stevens & John Price
http://www.huxley.net/rankmood/

The Evolution of Depression - Does it Have a Role?
Saturday 3 April 2004

Major and minor depression, even post partum depression - could they
serve an important evolutionary function? Is depression a biological
pathology or an adaptation, critical to our reproductive success and
survival as a species? This week, Natasha Mitchell is joined by two
evolutionary biologists who argue that our capacity to be depressed
has evolved over millennia to help us respond to and cope with
difficult social circumstances. It's a deeply controversial thesis
that, they argue, could have implications for how we read and treat
depression in a therapeutic setting. But critics are concerned about
what these implications might be.

Transcript

Relevant links and references at the end of the transcript

Natasha Mitchell: And hello, welcome to All in the Mind, Natasha
Mitchell joining you once again. This week a controversial discussion
that's sure to provoke - depression, could it in fact serve an
important evolutionary function? Is it an illness or a biological
adaptation critical to our reproductive success and survival as a
species?

Ed Hagen: I actually suspect that it's not an illness and so I decided
to pursue an alternative theory that depression actually serves a
useful function, or at least did serve a useful function for our
ancestors over evolutionary time. This is a very radical proposal that
goes against virtually everything that psychiatry believes and it may
well be wrong but I think it's something that's worth considering.

Paul Watson: : People who are invested in the disease model of
depression have been studying it for a long, long time. I think a lot
of them would admit that they still don't understand what depression
is. Certainly it's a state of mind that causes great misery, is very
painful.

Natasha Mitchell: And suicide in some cases.

Paul Watson: : And suicide, but that does not mean there is not a set
of adaptations working in the mind that are trying to further the
person's life at least from a biological perspective. Within the next
50 - 100 - 200 years, it doesn't really matter, the pharmaceutical
industry is going to have our neurochemistry down to the point where
they will be able to save us from having any adversive experience
whatsoever, no matter how our life is actually going. Before we start
turning off all these unpleasant experiences, we need to know what
those unpleasant experiences are for - to understand what the
potential function of depression is in human life.

Natasha Mitchell: Evolutionary biologists Drs Edward Hagen and Paul
Watson. The World Health Organisation has predicted that by the year
2020 unipolar depression will account for the second largest burden of
disease. Which is a staggering statistic and one that makes the
suggestion that depression might have an evolutionary purpose
understandably implausible. After all how could an experience that
makes us feel so bad sometimes for so long, be good for the species?
What use might our ancestral mind have had for depression?

Dr Daniel Nettle is Lecturer in Psychology at the University of
Newcastle upon Tyne and author of Strong Imagination: Madness,
Creativity and Human Nature.

Daniel Nettle: Darwin of course is best remembered for the Origin of
Species in which he said that things that animal species have are
there because they've helped them to survive and reproduce. But he
also wrote another wonderful book called the Expressions of the
Emotions in Man and Animals in which he said that maybe some of the
patterns of behaviour we have represent sort of solutions to the
problem of how to survive and reproduce under a particular
circumstance, just like having gills or having swim fins does on a
fish. So for example he thinks of things like cats arching their back
and sticking their hair on end when they're frightened. And he says,
well this is to maybe to make them look bigger and so on. And in that
sense there are adaptations.

They're ways of getting us through a particular situation so that we
can continue to survive and reproduce...

More here;
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/stories/s1077027.htm

An Evolutionary Adaptationist Theory of Unipolar Depression:
Depression as an adaptation for social navigation, especially for
overcoming costly contractual constraints of the individual's social
niche

Dr. Paul J. Watson

http://biology.unm.edu/Biology/pwatson/public_html/dp1.htm
> Although there are a number of reasons why I am interpreting this
> attribute or concept in this fashion, suffice it to say that the
> only justification I deem necessary is that this is not incompatible
> with our common sense understanding of what rationality "is". In
> this respect, I all but invariably visualize a follow-the-dots
> diagram in which the amount or degree of cognitive rationality
> correlates with the extent to which the lines have been connected
> correctly and completely and in which cohering lines (coherent beliefs)
> count for more than dispersed lines in terms of the ability to "see"
> what the diagram represents. For various reasons, I visualize value
> in terms of the lightness or darkness of the lines (e.g., regions of
> the diagram that represent valued objectives, individuals, etc.).
>
> --
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr.http://www.rationology.net
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