> On Aug 24, 7:26 am, "Tim" qwerty.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>

>> "Michael Gordge" xtra.co.nz> wrote in message

>

>>news:1187900188.429025.276320@z24g2000prh.googlegroups.com...

>

>>> On Aug 24, 3:11 am, "Tron" wrote:

>>>> Kant was the original logical positivist.

>

>>>> 1. First there were the rationalists, rebelling against religious dogma
>>>> to
>>>> put Reason on the intellectual throne.
>>>> To them (i.e. Descartes), the senses delivered unsorted raw material, to
>>>> be
>>>> sorted by reason.

>

>>>> 2. Then came the empiricists, proposing that there was no innate faculty
>>>> like reason - there was nothing in the mind that had not before been in
>>>> the
>>>> senses. The mind was a blank slate, where experience wrote its lessons.
>>>> The
>>>> obvious flaw was immediately pointed out by Leibniz: There is nothing in
>>>> the
>>>> mind that had not been in the senses - except the mind itself.

>

>>>> 3. Hume led empiricism ad absurdum by driving the program to its logical
>>>> conclusion, eliminating most possibilities of knowledge, including -
>>>> although he doesn't work this out himself - the premise of empiricism
>>>> itself, i.e. the causal processes of sensation, which can no longer be
>>>> upheld, since we cannot establish causality from experience.

>

>>>> 4. Along comes Kant, awakened by Hume, picking up Leibniz' clue, and
>>>> synthesizing rationalism and empiricism by asking: What is that slate,
>>>> and
>>>> how does it enable experience to write its lessons? What is the mind
>>>> before
>>>> it experiences? Is it really blank? Kant's conclusion is, as should be
>>>> known, that it isn't - the rest in KdrV.
>>>> However, he concluded that although we can create all sorts of concepts
>>>> by
>>>> reason alone, having these concepts doesn't constitute knowledge unless
>>>> the
>>>> concept is covered, in the banking sense, by a deposit of solid
>>>> experience.
>>>> And that's as far as we have come, although Wittgenstein, Russel, the
>>>> Vienna
>>>> Circle et al. have proposed refinements to the below excerpt of KdrV, and
>>>> although certain authoresses even have suggested that this is not what
>>>> Kant
>>>> originally pointed out.

>

>>>> Rivals include pragmatism in truth theory and constructivism in general
>>>> epistemology, and few others, AFAIK.

>

>>>>http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html
>>>> $22 The Category has no other Application in Knowledge than to Objects of
>>>> Experience To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means
>>>> the
>>>> same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through
>>>> which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the
>>>> intuition (perception), through which it is given. For if no intuition
>>>> (perception) could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept
>>>> would
>>>> still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be
>>>> without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by
>>>> means
>>>> of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be
>>>> nothing,
>>>> to which my thought could be applied. Now, as the Aesthetic has shown,
>>>> the
>>>> only intuition (perception) possible to us is sensible; consequently, the
>>>> thought of an object in general, by means of a pure concept of
>>>> understanding, can become knowledge for us only in so far as the concept
>>>> is
>>>> related to objects of the senses. Sensible intuition (perception) is
>>>> either
>>>> pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition (perception) of
>>>> that
>>>> which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space
>>>> and
>>>> time. Through the determination of pure intuition we can acquire a priori
>>>> knowledge of objects, as in mathematics, but only in regard to their
>>>> form,
>>>> as appearances; whether there can be things which must be intuited in
>>>> this
>>>> form, is still left undecided. Mathematical concepts are not, therefore,
>>>> by
>>>> themselves knowledge, except on the supposition that there are things
>>>> which
>>>> allow of being presented to us only in accordance with the form of that
>>>> pure
>>>> sensible intuition (perception). Now things in space and time are given
>>>> only
>>>> in so far as they are perceptions (that is, representations accompanied
>>>> by
>>>> sensation) -- therefore only through empirical representation.
>>>> Consequently,
>>>> the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to a
>>>> priori
>>>> intuitions (percepts) , as in mathematics, yield knowledge only in so far
>>>> as
>>>> these intuitions (percepts) -- and therefore indirectly by their means
>>>> the
>>>> pure concepts also -- can be applied to empirical intuitions (percepts) .
>>>> Even, therefore, with the aid of [pure] intuition, the categories do not
>>>> afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible
>>>> application to empirical intuition (perception). In other words, they
>>>> serve
>>>> only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is
>>>> what
>>>> we entitle experience. Our conclusion is therefore this: the categories,
>>>> as
>>>> yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in
>>>> regard to things which may be objects of possible experience.

>

>>>> $23 The above proposition is of the greatest importance; for it
>>>> determines
>>>> the limits of the employment of the pure concepts of understanding in
>>>> regard
>>>> to objects, just as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the limits of
>>>> the employment of the pure form of our sensible intuition (perception).
>>>> Space and time, as conditions under which alone objects can possibly be
>>>> given to us, are valid no further than for objects of the senses, and
>>>> therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent
>>>> nothing;
>>>> for they are only in the senses, and beyond them have no reality. The
>>>> pure
>>>> concepts of understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to
>>>> objects of intuition (perception) in general, be the intuition
>>>> (perception)
>>>> like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual. But
>>>> this
>>>> extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition (perception) is of no
>>>> advantage to us. For as concepts of objects they are then empty, and do
>>>> not
>>>> even enable us to judge of their objects whether or not they are
>>>> possible.
>>>> They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, since we have
>>>> no
>>>> intuition (perception) at hand to which the synthetic unity of
>>>> apperception,
>>>> which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and
>>>> in
>>>> being so applied determine an object. Only our sensible and empirical
>>>> intuition (perception) can give to them body and meaning. If we suppose
>>>> an
>>>> object of a non-sensible intuition to be given, we can indeed represent
>>>> it
>>>> through all the predicates which are implied in the presupposition that
>>>> it
>>>> has none of the characteristics proper to sensible intuition
>>>> (perception);
>>>> that it is not extended or in space, that its duration is not a time,
>>>> that
>>>> no change (succession of determinations in time) is to be met with in it,
>>>> etc. But there is no proper knowledge if I thus merely indicate what the
>>>> intuition (perception) of an object is not, without being able to say
>>>> what
>>>> it is that is contained in the intuition (perception). For I have not
>>>> then
>>>> shown that the object which I am thinking through my pure concept is even
>>>> so
>>>> much as possible, not being in a position to give any intuition
>>>> (perception)
>>>> corresponding to the concept, and being able only to say that our
>>>> intuition
>>>> (perception) is not applicable to it. But what has chiefly to be noted is
>>>> this, that to such a something [in general] not a single one of all the
>>>> categories could be applied. We could not, for instance, apply to it the
>>>> concept of substance, meaning something which can exist as subject and
>>>> never
>>>> as mere predicate. For save in so far as empirical intuition (perception)
>>>> provides the instance to which to apply it, I do not know whether there
>>>> can
>>>> be anything that corresponds to such a form of thought. But of this more
>>>> hereafter.

>

>>>> T

>

>>> And the only possible reason ewe did not mention Rand once in your
>>> idiotic Kantian piffle, even though the title suggests you would, just
>>> shows how fucking desperate ewes need to get, how fucking dishonest
>>> ewes need to be and how fucking ignorant ewes Kantian sheeple are of
>>> Rand.

>

>>> Fuck off ewe despeate knuckle-dragging commie cunt.

>

>>> Michael Gordge

>

>> This from the same turd who yammers on incessantly about Kant and in so
>> doing does nothing except demonstrate his ignorance of the subject.- Hide quoted text -

>

>> - Show quoted text -

>
> Baaaaaaa Baaaaaaa Baaaaa black sheeeeeeple
>
> ewes have lots of fucking wool over your fucking eyes, in your fucking
> ears and up your fucking nose.
>
> Go away ewe idiot chazzzzzzim.
>
> chazzzzzim is a chazzzzz Tim combo, it describes the only true
> wilderness, the void existing betweeen their fucking Kantain wool
> filled ears.
>
> Michael Gordge- Hide quoted text -
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> - Show quoted text -