|
|
 Up |
|
|
  |
Author: turtoniturtoni Date: Oct 25, 2006 21:31
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks
conscious experience or qualia or sentience. When a zombie is poked
with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves
as if it does feel pain (it may say "Ouch!" and so forth), but it does
not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does.
The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly used in arguments (often
called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly
arguments against forms of physicalism or materialism-the view that
the universe is entirely physical. ("Physical" here is usually taken to
mean something along the lines of that which the language of physics
describes; however, the term can be used in several ways.)
Types of zombies
The notion of a philosophical zombie is widely used in thought
experiments, however the use is not always entirely uniform. There are,
in effect, different types of p-zombies. What differs...
|
| Show full article (9.41Kb) |
|
| | 19 Comments |
|
|
Author: Sir FrederickSir Frederick Date: Oct 25, 2006 21:48
Holism promotes organizing principles as manifests.
These organizing principles "explain" subjective experiences,
impersonally. Thus within holism, zombies become impossible unless the
normal human brain structures are "broken".
|
| |
|
| | 1 Comment |
|
|
Author: turtoniturtoni Date: Oct 25, 2006 22:25
Sir Frederick wrote:
> Holism promotes organizing principles as manifests.
> These organizing principles "explain" subjective experiences,
> impersonally. Thus within holism, zombies become impossible unless the
> normal human brain structures are "broken".
"Confirmation holism, also called epistemological holism is the claim
that a scientific theory cannot be tested in isolation; a test of one
theory always depends on other theories and hypotheses.
|
| Show full article (2.68Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: TruthSlaveTruthSlave Date: Oct 26, 2006 07:55
turtoni wrote:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
> indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks
> conscious experience or qualia or sentience. When a zombie is poked
> with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves
> as if it does feel pain (it may say "Ouch!" and so forth), but it does
> not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does.
>
> The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly used in arguments (often
> called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly
> arguments against forms of physicalism or materialism-the view that
> the universe is entirely physical. ("Physical" here is usually taken to
> mean something along the lines of that which the language of physics
> describes; however, the term can be used in several ways.)
>
> Types of zombies
> The notion of a philosophical zombie is widely used in thought
> experiments, however the use is not always entirely uniform. There are, ...
|
| Show full article (10.00Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: zinniczinnic Date: Oct 26, 2006 07:56
turtoni wrote:
Snip
> The argument is valid, in that if its premises are true, then the
> conclusion must be true. However, whether its premises are true is what
> philosophers dispute. For example, concerning premise two: Is such
> zombie world really possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems
> that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction
> in the description."[2] Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers
> claims, it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then
> physicalism is false. Chalmers agrees that such p-zombies are
> (probably) not naturally or physically possible, just logically or
> metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "Zombies are probably not
> naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its
> laws of nature."[3]
> Snip
> Thus, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.
|
| Show full article (1.69Kb) |
| 4 Comments |
|
|
Author: 9999 Date: Oct 26, 2006 09:42
>They argue that while consciousness qualia,
> subjective experiences, and so forth exist, in
> some sense, they are not as the zombie argument
> proponent claims they are; pain, for example, is
> not something that you can just strip off a
> person's mental life without any behavioral or
> physiological differences.
Yes, the very invention of a zombie argument relies upon brain
processes being affected by mental states. So if the latter could be
magically eliminated, the zombie's behavior would indeed change. It
would be about as competent at discussing philosophy of mind as a
person suffering from achromatopsia would be at discussing colors.
Also, if neural operations are completely accounted for by known
physical principles, this means that mental states really are the
complex relationships of one or more of those principles (like
electromagnetism).
99
|
| |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: ImmortalistImmortalist Date: Oct 26, 2006 10:12
turtoni wrote:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
> indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks
> conscious experience or qualia or sentience. When a zombie is poked
> with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves
> as if it does feel pain (it may say "Ouch!" and so forth), but it does
> not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does.
>
> The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly used in arguments (often
> called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly
> arguments against forms of physicalism or materialism-the view that
> the universe is entirely physical. ("Physical" here is usually taken to
> mean something along...
|
| Show full article (14.27Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: Brian FletcherBrian Fletcher Date: Oct 26, 2006 17:31
> turtoni wrote:
SNIP
>
> This reads like an elaborate philosophical joke. A way to evoke language
> for the situations where the exercise of philosophy is engaged without
> appreciation of its core values. That idea of a conscious experience could
> be taken as an illusion to truth.
We all have "conscious experiences" which affect our lives, only to find out
that we outgrow the resulting .Does that mean such experiences are
"illusions to truth"? No more than childhood could be seen as an illusion of
the truth of adulthood.
BOfL
|
| |
| 7 Comments |
|
|
Author: turtoniturtoni Date: Oct 26, 2006 21:18
>> Thus, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.
> zinnic wrote:
> Thanx. I enjoyed reading your highly informative discussion. However,
> it is difficult for me to understand how the zombie argument "remains
> vigorous in philosophy" Is this argument not a prime example of
> 'philosophy for philosophers'?.
>
> Surely, if the truth of the premises is arguable, the truth of the
> conclusion is irrelevant.
> The truth of the "zombie" is based on the suspect claim that 'if it is
> conceivable , it is possible'. This gets us no furthur than the
> conclusion that 'it is POSSIBLE that conciousness MAY exist
> independently of physicality. Is not this full circle?
> As a plain man, I cannot see how this has any more significance than
> the general trivial conclusion- one possibility begats another'!
"The zombie argument is difficult to assess, because it brings to light
fundamental disagreements that philosophers have about the method and
scope of philosophy itself. It gets to the core of disagreements about
the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis."
|
| Show full article (1.64Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
|
|
|
Author: TruthSlaveTruthSlave Date: Oct 26, 2006 22:27
Brian Fletcher wrote:
>> turtoni wrote:
>
> SNIP
>> This reads like an elaborate philosophical joke. A way to evoke language
>> for the situations where the exercise of philosophy is engaged without
>> appreciation of its core values. That idea of a conscious experience could
>> be taken as an illusion to truth.
>
> We all have "conscious experiences" which affect our lives, only to find out
> that we outgrow the resulting .Does that mean such experiences are
> "illusions to truth"? No more than childhood could be seen as an illusion of
> the truth of adulthood.
> ...
|
| Show full article (1.63Kb) |
| 6 Comments |
|
|
|
|
