>A realist interpretation of panpsychism would entail that consciousness
> should be an attribute of the fundamental objects that constitute a
> mind-independent 'reality' in the way that e.g. mass and electrical charge
> might be conceived to be (perhaps also admitting the possibility that
> some kinds of fundamental particle may be consciousness-neutral or
> zero-consciousness, though this might veer away from pure panpsychism).
>
> This seems to hold the promise that consciousness may become as
> much a part of science as are mass and charge, but mass and charge are
> ideas that have been abstracted from objective phenomena in the world
> whereas consciousness has no such provenance (recall that consciousness
> on this view is neither substance nor process, but the brute fact of the
> existence of a subjective perspective upon a world).
>
> I'm none too sure what kind of science can be done with a concept that
> is entirely devoid of empirical content. In order to become scientifically
> tractable, either consciousness must eventually be shown to have an
> objective effect in the world, else some presently inconceivable revision ...

> The "brute fact of a subjective perspective" is a fact like any
> other fact in the world, is not dependent on any single mind,
> and is therefore something that is, in principle, explainable by
> the science we have. No need to chuck the science; instead,
> refine the definition of consciousness as the investigations
> into how and where consciousness comes about proceed.

> "thinker" wrote:

>> The "brute fact of a subjective perspective" is a fact like any
>> other fact in the world, is not dependent on any single mind,
>> and is therefore something that is, in principle, explainable by
>> the science we have. No need to chuck the science; instead,
>> refine the definition of consciousness as the investigations
>> into how and where consciousness comes about proceed.

>
> Science requires public truth conditions, so perhaps you
> could start by identifying public truth conditions for a
> subjective perspective in, say, the chimpanzee.

> "andy-k" wrote:

>> Science requires public truth conditions, so perhaps
>> you could start by identifying public truth conditions
>> for a subjective perspective in, say, the chimpanzee.

>
> A chimp has a brain like we do, sense organs like we do, and
> behavior ssimilar to conscious creatures like us. Those are all
> the public truth conditions a scientist needs to get a running start.

>A realist interpretation of panpsychism would entail that consciousness
>should be an attribute of the fundamental objects that constitute a
>mind-independent 'reality' in the way that e.g. mass and electrical...

> "thinker" wrote:

>> "andy-k" wrote:

>>> Science requires public truth conditions, so perhaps
>>> you could start by identifying public truth conditions
>>> for a subjective perspective in, say, the chimpanzee.

>>
>> A chimp has a brain like we do, sense organs like we do, and
>> behavior ssimilar to conscious creatures like us. Those are all
>> the public truth conditions a scientist needs to get a running start.

>
> Those are facts of structure and function, and offer no empirical
> evidence of a subjective perspective. What public truth conditions
> can you identify for a *subjective perspective* in the chimpanzee?

> On Tue, 19 Feb 2008 06:06:41 GMT, "andy-k" wrote:
>

>>A realist interpretation of panpsychism would entail that consciousness
>>should be an attribute of the fundamental objects that constitute a
>>mind-independent 'reality' in the way that e.g. mass and electrical charge
>>might be conceived to be (perhaps also admitting the possibility that
>>some kinds of fundamental particle may be consciousness-neutral or
>>zero-consciousness, though this might veer away from pure panpsychism).
>>
>>This seems to hold the promise that consciousness may become as
>>much a part of science as are mass and charge, but mass and charge are
>>ideas that have been abstracted from objective phenomena in the world
>>whereas consciousness has no such provenance (recall that consciousness
>>on this view is neither substance nor process, but the brute fact of the
>>existence of a subjective perspective upon a world).
>>
>>I'm none too sure what kind of science can be done with a concept that
>>is entirely devoid of empirical content. In order to become scientifically ...

> "andy-k" wrote:

>> "thinker" wrote:

>>> A chimp has a brain like we do, sense organs like we do, and
>>> behavior ssimilar to conscious creatures like us. Those are all
>>> the public truth conditions a scientist needs to get a running start.

>>
>> Those are facts of structure and function, and offer no empirical
>> evidence of a subjective perspective. What public truth conditions
>> can you identify for a *subjective perspective* in the chimpanzee?

>
> The truth conditions that I offered.

> The extension to the chimp is an extension from our consideration
> of our own subjective perspective: that subjective perspectives
> exist in nature and under certain circumstance.

> "Art" wrote:

>> What's demonstrable is that minds and matter interact. A doctrine that
>> (passive) consciousness is "widespread" and a fundamental fact ..
>> alone ... is insufficient and actually lame. What's required is a
>> complete and convincing philosophy ... and someone respected
>> enough in the academic community to champion it. Do you know of
>> any?

>
> The division of the world into "mind" and "matter" as naming two different
> things or realms is suspect. I don't mean that there is only one or the
> other, but that the distinctions, bequeathed to us by Descartes, are
> suspect.