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Date: Feb 24, 2008 04:30
Given the ineliminable possibility that there is nothing devoid of
consciousness, the further step may be entertained that things have
no existence apart from their appearance within each other's
"consciousnesses" -- i.e. that their existence consists of nothing more
than their "mutual immanence" (to steal a phrase from Whitehead).
Objects are only objects "for each other" and not "in themselves"
(or to put it another way, they have no existence "from their own side").
What does the postulation of non-conscious (or 'vacuous') matter
*explain*? It might be argued that the world "looks like it corresponds
with some mind-independent 'real' world", but what would it look like
if the above anti-realist scenario were correct? I submit that it would
look no different at all. The realist postulate therefore falls to Occam's
Razor -- i.e. the idea of a mind-independent 'reality' is redundant.
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Author: zinniczinnic Date: Feb 24, 2008 06:40
On Feb 24, 6:30 am, "andy-k" wrote:
> Given the ineliminable possibility that there is nothing devoid of
> consciousness, the further step may be entertained that things have
> no existence apart from their appearance within each other's
> "consciousnesses" -- i.e. that their existence consists of nothing more
> than their "mutual immanence" (to steal a phrase from Whitehead).
> Objects are only objects "for each other" and not "in themselves"
> (or to put it another way, they have no existence "from their own side").
>
> What does the postulation of non-conscious (or 'vacuous') matter
> *explain*? It might be argued that the world "looks like it corresponds
> with some mind-independent 'real' world", but what would it look like
> if the above anti-realist scenario were correct...
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Date: Feb 24, 2008 08:00
"zinnic" wrote:
> How could a 'mind' come to any other conclusion?
Imagination.
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Author: knucmoknucmo Date: Feb 24, 2008 09:40
On Sun, 24 Feb 2008 12:30:09 GMT, "andy-k" wrote:
>Given the ineliminable possibility that there is nothing devoid of
>consciousness, the further step may be entertained that things have
>no existence apart from their appearance within each other's
>"consciousnesses"...
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Date: Feb 24, 2008 09:45
"knucmo" wrote:
> The separation of 'mind' and 'body' violates Occam's Razor too,
> which your argument depends upon. Why should anyone believe
> in both a mind and a brain when it is possible to explain the events
> and properties in terms of one entity alone.
What is that one entity?
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Author: EdEd Date: Feb 24, 2008 10:10
On Feb 24, 7:30 am, "andy-k" wrote:
> Given the ineliminable possibility that there is nothing devoid of
> consciousness, the further step may be entertained that things have
> no existence apart from their appearance within each other's
> "consciousnesses" -- i.e. that their existence consists of nothing more
> than their "mutual immanence" (to steal a phrase from Whitehead).
> Objects are only objects "for each other" and not "in themselves"
> (or to put it another way, they have no existence "from their own side").
>
But we know there are things devoid of consciousness. An anesthetized
human being is devoid of consciousness, for one. If there can be one
there is an ineliminable possibility that there are more. This leads
to a scenario where there are some things that are devoid of
consciousness and some that are not, a more complex situation.
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Date: Feb 24, 2008 11:20
"Ed" wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Given the ineliminable possibility that there is nothing
>> devoid of consciousness,
> But we know there are things devoid of consciousness.
news:8ABpj.1064$QE3.767@ newsfe4-gui.ntli.net...
There are no public truth conditions for the statements "this object has a
subjective perspective" and "that object does not have a subjective
perspective". This being the case, we cannot know that there are things
devoid of subjectivity.
> An anesthetized human being is devoid of consciousness, for one.
An anesthetized human being is described in common speech and in medical
terminology as 'unconscious', but in the absence of public truth conditions
for a *subjective perspective* (described in philosophical terminology as
'consciousness'), there are no grounds for claiming that the human being is
devoid of consciousness.
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Author: knucmoknucmo Date: Feb 24, 2008 11:24
On Sun, 24 Feb 2008 17:45:15 GMT, "andy-k" wrote:
>"knucmo" wrote:
>> The separation of 'mind' and 'body' violates Occam's Razor too,
>> which your argument depends upon. Why should anyone believe
>> in both a mind and a brain when it is possible to explain the events
>> and properties in terms of one entity alone.
>
>What is that one entity?
Brain. Even if dualism and materialism (cited as an example of a
theory which denies dualism) are equally consistent with the facts,
materialism has the edge due to its simplicity and explanatory value.
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Date: Feb 24, 2008 12:27
"knucmo" wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>>"knucmo" wrote:
>>> The separation of 'mind' and 'body' violates Occam's Razor too,
>>> which your argument depends upon. Why should anyone believe
>>> in both a mind and a brain when it is possible to explain the events
>>> and properties in terms of one entity alone.
>>
>>What is that one entity?
>
> Brain. Even if dualism and materialism (cited as an example of a
> theory which denies dualism) are equally consistent with the facts,
> materialism has the edge due to its simplicity and explanatory value.
I'm no substance dualist, and I'm no eliminativist either -- I have a
subjective perspective on a world, and I assume that you do too.
The first problem for the materialist is that physical properties
do not logically entail this subjective perspective.
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Author: zinniczinnic Date: Feb 25, 2008 06:24
On Feb 24, 2:27 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
> "knucmo" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote:
>>>"knucmo" wrote:
>>>> The separation of 'mind' and 'body' violates Occam's Razor too,
>>>> which your argument depends upon. Why should anyone believe
>>>> in both a mind and a brain when it is possible to explain the events
>>>> and properties in terms of one entity alone.
>
>>>What is that one entity?
>
>> Brain. Even if dualism and materialism (cited as an example of a
>> theory which denies dualism) are equally consistent with the facts,
>> materialism has the edge due to its simplicity and explanatory value.
>
> I'm no substance dualist, and I'm no eliminativist either -- I have a
> subjective perspective on a world, and I assume that you do too.
>
> The first problem for the materialist is that physical properties
> do not logically entail this subjective perspective. ...
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