> "Fortunately, although we cannot argue directly from the unity of
> apperception to the unity of time (which would make the former a
> sufficient condition of the latter), we can make the reverse move from
> the *representation* of the unity of time to the unity of
> apperception, and by this means we can connect the transcendental
> synthesis of imagination with apperception and the categories. In
> order to do this, we need only combine the results of the first half
> of the Deduction with the doctrine that the unification or
> determination of time is produced by the transcendental synthesis of
> the imagination." (Allison [1986], 162.)
>
> I'm not so much interested in Allison's focus on the representation of
> the unity of time at the moment, as I am on the doctrine that the
> "unification or determination of time is produced by the
> transcendental synthesis of the imagination." This is the formal
> intuition (of time) mentioned by Kant in his famously obscure footnote
> at B162 n.
>
> Although in the Aesthetic Kant explored space and time as forms of
> intuition, this implies that space and time are already unities in and
> of themselves, a priori. This unity is produced by the transcendental
> synthesis of imagination, and is made possible by apperception and the
> category of unity applied to pure intuition via imagination. But what
> does "via imagination" really mean?
>
> Let's return to the previous item I put on hold. What does Allison
> mean by the representation of the unity of time? Beneath which faculty
> is it represented? It is represented in transcendental imagination. So
> it is not so much that the synthesis is simply brought to the
> intuition, and then somehow producing its formal unity, but this unity
> was made possible by its synthesis with apperception and the category
> of Unity via transcendental imagination.
>
> And so, for the purpose of all this. It was necessary, by the very
> terms of reasoning itself, for Kant to represent his entire argument
> in a temporal framework by imputation; for instance, when we say that
> the transcendental imagination "produces" this or that, "production"
> is possible only in time, or rather, the *representation* of time as
> pure in the formal discourse known as the Deduction of the Categories.
> But this imputation is only possible by using a kind of intellectual
> imagination: let's just say, for purposes of discussion, that
> experience itself is the result of some process having its own spatial
> and temporal scheme. Time is thus represented as pure because the
> discussion itself lies on a non-empirical plane of thought (but always
> presupposing or allowing for the possibiility of some empirical
> content). Representations themselves find their "place" in the various
> faculties - so this requires a formal representation of space by
> transcendental imagination. It is formal because none of its content
> is empirical but represents only the formal, intellectual possibility
> of empirical content. (One could almost say "symbolizes" instead of
> "represents," but this type of terminology could, I think, pose some
> hazards for the Deduction, as if the criticism against Kant that he
> was propounding some kind of representationalism wasn't bad enough.)
>
> Space and time, to wit, only represent by imagination, for purposes of
> transcendental discourse, the "places" in which the various
> representations "reside," and the "activity" of consciousness
> "generating" experience *as if* it were a temporal "process," although
> this is no more than the mere imputation of a temporal framework.
>
> This is NOT the context of empirical science which propounds its own
> version of space and time, or space/time depending upon need. Nor was
> it intended to be a replacement for science or a skepticism toward
> science. Nor, obviously, was it intended to dogmatically undergird
> Euclidean geometry which was in vogue at the time.
>
> The transcendental framework of intuition is not that which makes
> perception possible or actual - it is, rather, that which makes the
> very terminology of the Deduction possible. The so-called
> transcendental distinction is simply Kant's way of spelling out (but
> not proving, they're called Expositions after all) the framework for
> the discussion to come, as well as its unique transcendental logic
> which is not empirical, not Aristotlean; but it is Aristotle's logic
> "imagined" in, as it were, a transcendental level of discourse. It is
> within this framework that Kant can refer to 'production,'
> 'reproduction,' and 'activity,' where there is actually none to refer
> to but only, from our perspective, experience itself.
>
> It is within this framework that Kant can bring the discourse closer
> to a human form of understanding by making it intelligible through an
> interpretation in terms of intuition and categories, even though the
> "activities" are a priori to experience and are not properly
> understand in terms of experience, circularly. In order to acquire a
> proper understanding of this matter, that is, of the structures
> underlying consciousness itself, one would have to possess a God-like
> intelligence, capable of divining the mystery of consciousness from a
> higher level yet than rational consciousness. I will show that this
> reference to God and our inability to know is far from proposing some
> profound form of skepticism, just the opposite --
>
> Analogously with the terms of Kantian morality, just as we can never
> know if any deed of ours is pure or impure in intent, thus making
> practical reasoning possible, we also lack direct, intuitive knowledge
> of the mystery of consciousness itself. We must, instead, pose its
> "structure" (if any) in terms that make it more intelligible to us by
> imputation of empirical categories and logic into a "transcendental"
> level of discourse. And yet, although our reason is inadequate to the
> truth of the matter, this is reason's saving grace; for even if we did
> manage to arrive at a true understanding of consciousness from some
> meta-conscious perspective we would no longer need reason or any
> Deduction, or indeed any science at all. It is the very fact that we
> aren't spirit entities or gods that makes reason and science possible
> or necessary, just as it is the same intellectual lack or limitation
> that makes moral reasoning possible or necessary. In thus providing
> for the limitations of reason, Kant proposes, not a mind-deadening
> skepticism, but knowledge of how science itself is made possible as a
> rational pursuit.
> --
>
> " If I had remembered that the name 'Galt' appears
> in one of her books, I would have chosen a different
> name for my character."
>
> Stephen R. Donaldson, "Gradual Interview"