An evolutionary perspective leads one to view the mind as a crowded
zoo of evolved, domain-specific programs. Each is functionally
specialized for solving a different adaptive problem that arose during
hominid evolutionary history, such as face recognition, foraging, mate
choice, heart rate regulation, sleep management, or predator
vigilance, and each is activated by a different set of cues from the
environment. But the existence of all these microprograms itself
creates an adaptive problem: Programs that are individually designed
to solve specific adaptive problems could, if simultaneously
activated, deliver outputs that conflict with one another, interfering
with or nullifying each other's functional products. For example,
sleep and flight from a predator require mutually inconsistent
actions, computations, and physiological states. It is difficult to
sleep when your heart and mind are racing with fear, and this is no
accident: disastrous consequences would ensue if proprioceptive cues
were activating sleep programs at the same time that the sight of a
stalking lion was activating ones designed for predator evasion. To
avoid such consequences, the mind must be equipped with superordinate
programs that override some programs when others are activated (e.g.,
a program that deactivates sleep programs when predator evasion
subroutines are activated). Furthermore, many adaptive problems are
best solved by the simultaneous activation of many different
components of the cognitive architecture, such that each component
assumes one of several alternative states (e.g., predator avoidance
may require simultaneous shifts in both heart rate and auditory
acuity; see below). Again, a superordinate program is needed that
coordinates these components, snapping each into the right
configuration at the right time.
Emotions are such programs. To behave functionally according to
evolutionary standards, the mind's many subprograms need to be
orchestrated so that their joint product at any given time is
functionally coordinated, rather than cacophonous and self-defeating.
This coordination is accomplished by a set of superordinate programs -
the emotions. They are adaptations that have arisen in response to the
adaptive problem of mechanism orchestration (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a;
Tooby, 1985). In this view, the exploration of the statistical
structure of ancestral situations and their relationship to the mind's
battery of functionally specialized programs is central to mapping the
emotions. This is because the most useful (or least harmful)
deployment of programs at any given time will depend critically on the
exact nature of the confronting situation.
How did emotions arise and assume their distinctive structures?
Fighting, falling in love, escaping predators, confronting sexual
infidelity, experiencing a failure-driven loss in status, responding
to the death of a family member (and so on) each involved conditions,
contingencies, situations, or event-types that recurred innumerable
times in hominid evolutionary history. Repeated encounters with each
kind of situation selected for adaptations that guided information-
processing, behavior and the body adaptively through the clusters of
conditions, demands, and contingencies that characterized that
particular class of situation. This could be accomplished by
engineering superordinate programs, each of which jointly mobilizes a
subset of the psychological architecture's other programs in a
particular configuration. Each configuration would be selected to
deploy computational and physiological mechanisms in a way that, when
averaged over individuals and generations, would have led to the most
fitness-promoting subsequent lifetime outcome given that ancestral
situation-type.
This coordinated adjustment and entrainment of mechanisms is a mode of
operation for the entire psychological architecture, and serves as the
basis for a precise computational and functional definition of each
emotion state (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; Tooby, 1985). Each emotion
entrains various other adaptive programs - deactivating some,
activating others, and adjusting the modifiable parameters of still
others - so that the whole system operates in a particularly
harmonious and efficacious way when the individual is confronting
certain kinds of triggering conditions or situations. The conditions
or situations relevant to the emotions are those that (1) recurred
ancestrally; (2) could not be negotiated successfully unless there was
a superordinate level of program coordination (i.e., circumstances in
which the independent operation of programs caused no conflicts would
not have selected for an emotion program, and would lead to
emotionally neutral states of mind); (3) had a rich and reliable
repeated structure; (4) had recognizable cues signaling their
presence; and (5) in which an error would have resulted in large
fitness costs (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; Tooby, 1985). When a condition
or situation of an evolutionarily recognizable kind is detected, a
signal is sent out from the emotion program that activates the
specific constellation of subprograms appropriate to solving the type
of adaptive problems that were regularly embedded in that situation,
and deactivates programs whose operation might interfere with solving
those types of adaptive problem. Programs directed to remain active
may be cued to enter subroutines that are specific to that emotion
mode, and that were tailored by natural selection to solve the
problems inherent in the triggering situation with special efficiency.
According to this theoretical framework, an emotion is a superordinate
program whose function is to direct the activities and interactions of
the subprograms governing perception; attention; inference; learning;
memory; goal choice; motivational priorities; categorization and
conceptual frameworks; physiological reactions (such as heart rate,
endocrine function, immune function, gamete release); reflexes;
behavioral decision rules; motor systems; communication processes;
energy level and effort allocation; affective coloration of events and
stimuli; recalibration of probability estimates, situation
assessments, values, and regulatory variables (e.g., self-esteem,
estimations of relative formidability, relative value of alternative
goal states, efficacy discount rate); and so on. An emotion is not
reducible to any one category of effects, such as effects on
physiology, behavioral inclinations, cognitive appraisals, or feeling
states, because it involves evolved instructions for all of them
together, as well as other mechanisms distributed throughout the human
mental and physical architecture...
...Specialized inference: Research in evolutionary psychology has
shown "thinking" and reasoning is not a unitary category, but is
carried out by a variety of specialized mechanisms. So, instead of
emotion activating or depressing "thinking" in general, the specific
emotion program activated should selectively activate appropriate
specialized inferential systems, such as cheater detection (Cosmides
1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1989, 1992), bluff detection (Tooby & Cosmides,
1989), precaution detection (Fiddick, Cosmides & Tooby, in press),
attributions of blame and responsibility, and so on. We are presently
conducting research to see whether, as predicted, fear influences
precautionary reasoning, competitive loss regulates bluff detection,
and so on...
...Learning: Emotion mode is expected to regulate learning mechanisms.
What someone learns from stimuli will be greatly altered by emotion
mode, because of attentional allocation, motivation, situation-
specific inferential algorithms, and a host of other factors. Emotion
mode will cause the present context to be divided up into situation-
specific functionally appropriate categories so that the same stimuli
and the same environment may be interpreted in radically different
ways, depending on emotion state. For example, which stimuli are
considered similar should be different in different emotion states,
distorting the shape of the individual's psychological "similarity
space" (Shepard 1987). Highly specialized learning mechanisms might be
activated, such as those that control food aversions (Garcia, 1990) or
predator learning (Mineka & Cooke, 1985), or fear conditioning
(LeDoux, 1995). Happiness is expected to signal the energetic
opportunity for play, and allow other exploratory agendas to be
expressed (Frederickson, 1998)...
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/emotion.html
http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/teaching/philbiology/EvolutionaryTheoriesofEmotion...
http://www.brainandevolution.blogspot.com/2007/05/moral-emotions-vs-moral-reasoning...
http://www.flyfishingdevon.co.uk/salmon/year3/psy364emotions/psy364_emotions_evolutionary_psychobiolog...
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=limbic+system
Sounds like an automobile that can roll down the highway without
wheels, probably won't work. Emotions came before higher reasoning
skills, which were built on top of emotional centers of the brain,
which in turn evolved on top of a lizards brain; the brain stem.
Paul MacLean suggests that the human brain is actually three brains in
one. Each of the layers or "brains" were established successively in
response to evolutionary need. The three layers are the reptilian
system, or R-complex, the limbic system, and the neocortex. Each layer
is geared toward separate functions of the brain, but all three layers
interact substantially.
The Reptilian Complex - The R-complex consists of the brain stem and
the cerebellum. Its purpose is closely related to actual physical
survival and maintenance of the body. The cerebellum orchestrates
movement. Digestion, reproduction, circulation, breathing, and the
execution of the "fight or flight" response in stress are all housed
in the brain stem. Because the reptilian brain is primarily concerned
with physical survival, the behaviors it governs have much in common
with the survival behaviors of animals. It plays a crucial role in
establishing home territory, reproduction and social dominance. The
overriding characteristics of R-complex behaviors are that they are
automatic, have a ritualistic quality, and are highly resistant to
change.
The Limbic System - The limbic system, the second brain to evolve,
houses the primary centers of emotion. It includes the amygdala, which
is important in the association of events with emotion, and the
hippocampus, which is active in converting information into long term
memory and in memory recall. Repeated use of specialized nerve
networks in the hippocampus enhances memory storage, so this structure
is involved in learning from both commonplace experiences and
deliberate study. However, it is not necessary to retain every bit of
information one learns. Some neuroscientists believe that the
hippocampus helps select which memories are stored, perhaps by
attaching an "emotion marker" to some events so that they are likely
to be recalled. The amygdala comes into play in situations that arouse
feelings such as fear, pity, anger, or outrage. Damage to the amygdala
can abolish an emotion-charged memory. Because the limbic system links
emotions with behavior, it serves to inhibit the R-complex and its
preference for ritualistic, habitual ways of responding.
The limbic system is also involved in primal activities related to
food and sex, particularly having to do with our sense of smell and
bonding needs, and activities related to expression and mediation of
emotions and feelings, including emotions linked to attachment. These
protective, loving feelings become increasingly complex as the limbic
system and the neocortex link up.
The Neocortex - Also called the cerebral cortex, the neocortex
constitutes five-sixths of the human brain. It is the outer portion of
our brain, and is approximately the size of a newspaper page crumpled
together. The neocortex makes language, including speech and writing
possible. It renders logical and formal operational thinking possible
and allows us to see ahead and plan for the future. The neocortex also
contains two specialized regions, one dedicated to voluntary movement
and one to processing sensory information.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=triune+brain
