"chazwin"
yahoo.com> wrote:
>On Feb 3, 12:31 pm, "George Dance" wrote:
>> On Jan 31, 6:30 pm, "chazwin"
yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> On Jan 31, 9:24 am, "George Dance" wrote:
>>
>>>> On Jan 30, 8:56 am, "chazwin"
yahoo.com> wrote:>>
>>>>> On Jan 30, 12:56 pm, "George Dance" wrote:
>>
>>>>>> On Jan 30, 4:12 am, "chazwin"
yahoo.com> wrote:>>
>>>>> I am not denying existence. We might even agree on cogito ergo sum.
>>>>> Because to say "objective" is to say that we can know the "world in
>>>>> itself" independant of the mind.
>>
>>>> What does that last sentence mean? That one cannot know anything
>>>> without using one's mind? That would be impossible, but it's not a
>>>> view I'd oppose. Nor does it imply the other reading - that one
>>>> cannot know anything except for the contents of one's mind - that I
>>>> think you do seem to keep going back to.
>>
>>> It means to point out the impossibility of the objective stance: we
>>> cannot know an object "in itself". The knowing of an object is to have
>>> an impression of a thing which exists. Having an impression is not the
>>> same as the object's thingness.
>>
>> To have an impression of an object - say, a door - is not to know that
>> there's a door. It could be a door, or could be a hallucination.
>>
>>>>> This is not possible as the external
>>>>> world is conceived within the mind. That is not the same as saying it
>>>>> is imaginary.
>>
>>>> Well, precisely what is the difference between 'conceived within the
>>>> mind' and 'imaginary'? Let me close my eyes and I conceive of a red
>>>> hippo in my mind, right now - ; then conceive it dancing - then
>>>> conceive it turning yellow; that was fun. How is any of that
>>>> different from imagining the same things?
>>
>>> For a thing that is purely imaginary there is no necessary connection
>>> to the outside world. Yet all we can know of this world is conceived
>>> within the mind.
>>
>> Yes, you've said that; that both the door and the dancing hippo are
>> both conceived in my mind.
>>
>>> Your yellow hippo is not resistant to your conception
>>> of it. But there are hippos that are resistant to your wishes. Despite
>>> the "real" hippos' existence your conception of the hippo may take the
>>> form of an image: that is not to confuse the normative definition of
>>> imaginary.
>>
>> To imagine something is to have a mental image of it. In this case I
>> have a mental image of both the door and the dancing hippo. Both
>> images are equally real in that repect; I really am imagining a hippo,
>> and I really am imagining the door.
>>
>>>>> It resists our wishes.
>>
>>>> What resists our wishes? The 'external world' that's merely a mental
>>>> construct?
>>
>>> DUh DUh Duh!!! Strawman. I never said the world was merely a mental
>>> construct and you damn well know that!
>>
>> OK, drop 'merely'. You're saying that both the door and the hippo are
>> mental constructs - though you don't like calling them 'imaginary' -
>> but not that they're 'merely' mental constructs.
>>
>>> I am saying making objective
>>> claims about the world is false, as the subject/object distinction is
>>> false.
>>
>> The objective claim that I'd make about the door is that it is not
>> merely a mental construct - besides the imagined door in my mind,
>> there's also a door in itself. Which you're telling me I don't and
>> can't know; just as I don't know whether there's a dancing hippo in
>> itself, or only an image in my mind.
>>
>>>> Or an external world that actually is external? I'd argue
>>>> the latter,
>>
>>> And that is EXACTLY what I argue in posting 1.
>>
>> No, in your first post you said that you weren't denying that there
>> was an external world; IOW that you're not denyng that there might be
>> not only the image of a door in my mind, but also a door in itself,
>> independent of my mind. However, you are telling me that, that all I
>> know about the door is that the mental image; that I don't know
>> whether the door is merely an image in my mind or not.
>
>No - I am saying that you can see a door (which is real) but cannot
>know the "door in itself" what you see is an impression of the thing
>in itself, but not a door in a pure objective reality. There is much
>you do not know about the door that it may be possible to find out
>about, such as the internal construction which you cannot see, the
>composition of the material from which it is made, the colour of the
>reverse side, the internal working of the lock ad infinitem. You have
>an impression of a real thing, not a full comprehensive objective
>door.
>
>
>>
>>> Your apprehension of; conception of, perception of, knowledge of,
>>> statements about; and facts concerning is 100%% dependant on your mind.
>>
>> So the only door I can have any perception of, knowledge of, and can
>> talk about, is the imagined door in my mind.
>
>No it is an impression of a real thing.
>
>>
>>> Whether or not the thing in itself is independant of your mind is
>>> quite frankly irrelevant though probably true. I am sure that most
>>> hippos are 100%% independant of your will. But you cannot have mind-
>>> independant knowledge about that hippo.
>>
>> Or about the door; the only knowledge I can have, and the only things
>> I can say, regarding doors refer to my mental images of doors.
>
>Yes
>
>>
>>>>> This is clearly incorrect! To say we can have reliable knowledge about
>>>>> the world does not necessitate either that "There is an objective
>>>>> world that we can always see as it is in itself. OR There is an
>>>>> objective world that we can sometimes see as it is in itself."
>>
>>>> Well, assume the contradictory: That there is no objective world that
>>>> we can ever see as it is in itself." Then, either there is no
>>>> objective world, or there is one that we can in no way sense.
>>
>>> Rubbish!
>>
>> "I can sometimes sense x" and "I can never sense x" look like
>> contradictories; one or the other has to be true, while both cannot.
>> If you have a third option, what is it?
>
>But I am not saynig that and you know it.
>
>>
>>>> Either
>>>> way, we cannot have any information about such a world. From which it
>>>> follows that we can never have any reliable knowledge of such a
>>>> world.
>>
>>> Utter rubbish!
>>
>> Explain your third alternative. If I can't have any knowledge of the
>> (hypothetical) door itself - the one independent of my mind - how
>> could I have any reliable knowledge of that door itself?
>
>There is no 3rd alternative, as the 2 you have offered me are yours
>and not mine.
>Information such as my body cannot simultaneaously co-exist with the
>subject of my impression which i call a door can be verified by
>attempting to occupy the same space.
>In this case we change our impression of the door to somthing which is
>also "hard" in inpenetrable. Our impression might get richer but is
>still not objective.
>
>>
>>> We can even verify the reliable information by experiment and
>>> repetition.
>>
>> If I can't see any door outside my mind, then what am I supposed to
>> experiment on? And what am I supposed to repeat? If I look, touch,
>> etc. the door, and it tells me nothing about the door itself, then
>> doing the same thing again will also tell me nothing.
>
>You see the door in your mind is not the same as saying "I can't see
>the door outside my mind". Your a priori categories of space/time
>supply you with the information that the door is nearby. This is
>achieved with a sense of parallax and stereoscopic vision. But the
>impression is not somehow beyond your mind: it is still firmly placed
>in you head in the form of verves and electo-chemical impulses. That
>the door is "nearby", you can test and verify by walking into it.
>
>>
>>>>> As all statments and knowledge about the world is mind dependant we
>>>>> have no grounds for insisting that we can ever perceive "a world in
>>>>> itself". We might get clues about how this might look but there is
>>>>> nowhere to stand from which to view this object.
>>
>>>> As you told me the last time you mentioned your 'no place to stand'
>>>> argument: "But how would we ever know?" We *might* get clues; but
>>>> how could anyone ever tell what was a clue, and what wasn't. If none
>>>> of my senses can tell me whether there's a wall in front of me, what
>>>> could possibly tell me what is or is not in front of me instead?
>>
>>> All we have to do is open our eyes George. We do it all the time.
>>
>> What my eyes tel me is that there's a door external to, and
>> independent of my mind; an objectively existing door. That's
>> precisely what you're telling me I do not know.
>
>In what way can it be said to exist objectively?
>The door is the subject of your thoughts.
>
>>
>>> So why not tell me how you get mind-independant knowedge from?
>>
>> Hold on; for this entire argument I haven't been able to assume the
>> mind-independence of anything. I can tell you, for example, that I
>> have a mental image of a - as that's a subjective or mind-dependent
>> fact - but not that there is anything there but that mental image.
>> Neither you not I can assume that there is any mind-independent door,
>> as the point in question is precisely whether I can know such thing.
>> I'd have mind-independent knowledge of the door only if (1) there was
>> a door independent of my mind (which we're neither assuming or
>> denying),
>
>No I am assuming it (that there is a door), and the means by which I
>know that depends on my mind. I see no problem here.
>
>(2) there are some facts about that mind-independent or
>> objective door (also neither beng assumed or denied) and (3) I can
>> sense some of those facts.
>
>Where do the facts exist George??
>Answer in your head!
>
>
>>
>>>> OK; but I'm not trying to define cat or cup, just list the type of
>>>> things I perceive as being in the external world, in themselves rather
>>>> than in my mind.
>>
>>> Everything you perceive is in you head George. That is the whole
>>> point.
>>
>> So for me to 'perceiving' the door, because I have a mental image of
>> it. Similarly, I have a mental image of a yellow dancing hippo, so I'm
>> 'perceiving' it as well. The only difference is that I think that
>> there's no dancing hippo in itself, but only the mental image, but
>> that there is a door in itself, independent of my mind, as well.
>> Though, you're telling me, that difference is also solely in my mind;
>> objectively (ie, independently of my thoughts), in your view there's
>> no difference. .
>
>I am not telling you anything of the sort. Most of us know the
>difference between perceiving and imagining.
>
>>
>>>> And they're irrelevant; while it's obfvious that I'd need language to
>>>> tell you what I perceive, it's not at all obvious how much, if any,
>>>> language I'd need in order to perceive any of it.
>>
>>> You seems to be creeping towards my point.
>>> But you are missing the point.
>>> Language is the means by which "objectivists" make their "objective"
>>> claims. If language is faulty, as you suggest, then their statements
>>> are also faulty.
>>
>> I'm not saying that language is faulty, but that language communicates
>> ideas and concepts, which are subjective. It's faulty only if what's
>> being communicated isn't so; for instance, if I tell you there's a
>> door outside my mind, and there isn't, but only an image of a door in
>> my mind.
>
>You are offering a priori objective reality: the subject ofour
>discussion.
>There is s door in your mind casued by a door outside your mind. The
>two things are different, they are not identical. They are neither of
>them subjective nor are they objective as this distinction is not
>helpful in our understanding of how we process the world in which we
>live.
>
>>
>>>> But again, all my experience with these allegedly mind-independent
>>>> things is that they restrict, limit, and even impose on me - unlike
>>>> the dancing hippo, which I could do whatever I wanted with by will
>>>> alone - and my inference from that is that they're qualitatively
>>>> different; the difference consisting precisely in their being outside,
>>>> and independent, of my mind.
>>
>>> You are falsely representing my argument to make a contradictory
>>> point. I am not stupid George.
>>
>> Well, maybe I'm the "stupid" one. As I see it, you're telling me
>> quite clearly that I don't, because I can't, know whether there is
>> anything objective - anything external to, and therefore independent
>> of, my mind.
>
>That is not the argument I am making. I AM saying that we have only a
>partial impression of those things that we perceive to be in the
>external world, and we can never have a complete knowledge of those
>things.
>
> You're not denying that there is; in fact, you seem to
>> be saying that you can 'just open your eyes' and thereby learn some
>> 'reliable' facts about those mind-independent existents; but that I
>> cannot.
>
>No, George you can do it too! And all this reliablity relies on your
>mind and its ability to process the information. Unless you have
>ultimate cogntive power you will never have the ability to see the
>whole picture.
Howdy. I'm new here.
The subject line is interesting. I'd agree with it as a broad
statement. Sanity is a voting matter and all that.
This door you guys are talking about. It sounds like you're assuming
a physical reality within which it exists. Suppose that physical
reality isn't the thing that gave rise to the door which you are
perceiving? Suppose instead that physical reality is generated by
perceiving it? What then? Or is injecting that question a
threadjack, I dunno. It just seems to me that your arguments are
pretty straight-up but your underlying assumptions aren't the same as
mine.
--
Anybody seen my tinfoil hat?
