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Author: George DanceGeorge Dance Date: Dec 24, 2006 11:56
When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?
Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?
Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'
1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)
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Author: SphereSphere Date: Dec 24, 2006 12:23
George Dance wrote:
> When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
> one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?
>
> Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
> the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
> case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
> without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
> Huxley's principle?
>
> Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
> either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
> believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
This assumes that there is such a thing as an
atomic predicate. I don't believe there are
any atomic predicates, and that both A and ~A
are always ill defined.
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Author: zinniczinnic Date: Dec 25, 2006 07:23
George Dance wrote:
> Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
> either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
> believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
> believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
> option.'
>
> 1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
> reason.
> 2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
> 3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
> 4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
> 5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
> 6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)
>
The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.
This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason.
This is 'unreasonable! Good example of how language is used to pervert ...
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Author: JoelKatzJoelKatz Date: Dec 29, 2006 12:08
Publius wrote:
>>> True --- it was a conversion to a form which renders the proposition
>>> coherent and cognitive. The existence of the last digit is implied by
>>> assigning it a value. The conversion thus makes explicit what was
>>> implicit.
>> Right. If you had to convert it into a proposition, it wasn't one
>> before. Similarly, "propositions" about god require such conversion.
>> The conversion *changes* the claim.
> The conversion was not from a non-proposition to a proposition, but from an
> ill-formed (hidden assumption) proposition to one that is well-formed.
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Author: JoelKatzJoelKatz Date: Dec 30, 2006 11:19
Publius wrote:
> It is not an "error" if the translation is acceptable to the speaker. If it
> is not, then you can ask him to rephrase his utterance in such a way that
> it becomes susceptible to evaluation. Are we trying to discern the
> speaker's intent here, or gloat over his infelicity with words?
I don't accept this argument at all. Human beings do *not* assert
formal logical propositions and it's an error to try to force them to
do so. When Jack says, "your wife is cheating on you", his claim is
*not* identical to any formal logical proposition. He is *vouching* for
the truth of a claim, and there is nothing in formal logic even
remotely analogous to vouching.
You can get people to say something else that might be a logical
proposition. But then you are analyzing something *else*.
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Author: JoelKatzJoelKatz Date: Dec 31, 2006 09:53
Publius wrote:
>> I don't accept this argument at all. Human beings do *not* assert
>> formal logical propositions and it's an error to try to force them to
>> do so. When Jack says, "your wife is cheating on you", his claim is
>> *not* identical to any formal logical proposition. He is *vouching* for
>> the truth of a claim, and there is nothing in formal logic even
>> remotely analogous to vouching.
> I'm afraid I'm having difficulty grasping the point you seem to be trying to
> make. Jack's assertion is indeed not (strictly) identical with any
> particular proposition. It is a communicative act on Jack's part, having an
> intention and a purpose. The proposition --- a particular form of words or
> symbols --- is the tool he uses to carry out that communicative act.
It is simply the form of the communicative act. One which can be
*modeled* in a system of formal logic, but the model is not identical
to Jack's communication.
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Author: JoelKatzJoelKatz Date: Jan 2, 2007 11:27
Publius wrote:
>>> I'm afraid I'm having difficulty grasping the point you seem to be
>>> trying to make. Jack's assertion is indeed not (strictly) identical
>>> with any particular proposition. It is a communicative act on Jack's
>>> part, having an intention and a purpose. The proposition --- a
>>> particular form of words or symbols --- is the tool he uses to carry
>>> out that communicative act.
>
>> It is simply the form of the communicative act. One which can be
>> *modeled* in a system of formal logic, but the model is not identical
>> to Jack's communication.
>
> Well, no. Logical systems do not model communicative acts.
Yes, they do.
> They are not
> modeling schemes for speech acts.
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Author: JoelKatzJoelKatz Date: Jan 3, 2007 17:39
Let's start over. I'm trying to make a very simple point that you seem
to misunderstand every time I make it. Suppose we have two people, John
and Jack. Jack says, "John, your wife is cheating on you".
Now, we can look at the words he chose to utter and we can look at the
idea he was trying to convey. The words he chose are likely to be the
ones most convenient for the idea he was trying to express, given that
his choice of language is constrained to be one Jack and John have in
common.
Now, just from what I've already said, we can't know precisely what
idea Jack was trying to express. Perhaps they have some private code
between the two of them, and "John, your wife is cheating on you"
actually means that it's time for lunch.
Jack will try to choose those words that most efficiently communicate
the idea he wants to communicate. If, for example, Jack has acquired
evidence sufficient to make him believe that John's wife is cheating on
him, he can say:
1) John, your wife is cheating on you.
2) I have acquired sufficient evidence to convince me that your wife is
cheating on you.
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Author: George DanceGeorge Dance Date: Jan 5, 2007 16:49
> George Dance wrote:
>
>>>> 1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
>>>> reason.
>>>> 2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
>>>> 3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
>>>> 4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
>>>> 5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
>>>> 6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)
>>>>
>>> The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.
>>
>> Yes it is. That method of proof is called reductio ad absurdum;
>> showing that a proposition is false because it implies an absurd
>> (self-contradictory conclusion).
>>
>>> This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
>>> prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
>>> between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason. ...
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Author: RichoRicho Date: Jan 5, 2007 17:01
George Dance wrote:
> When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
> one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?
>
> Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
> the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
> case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
> without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
> Huxley's principle?
>
> Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
> either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
> believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
> believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
> option.'
>
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