> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is variable)
> by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
> with consciousness.  Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
> consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
> like").
>
> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but multiple
> interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
> eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it feels like
> mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the world (common
> sense dualism).  In short, consciousness is a physiological process found in
> the biological world and might even eventually be artificially created.
>
> Whaddya think?
>
> http://www.mindscience.org/documents/ProgressinBrainResearch.pdf ...

>In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
>Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
>consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since...

> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is
> variable)
> by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
> with consciousness. Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
> consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
> like").
>
> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but
> multiple
> interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
> eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it feels like
> mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the world (common
> sense dualism). In short, consciousness is a physiological process found
> in ...

> On Tue, 25 Dec 2007 11:40:52 -0500, "thinker" notreal.com>
> wrote:
>

>>In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
>>Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
>>consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is
>>variable)
>>by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
>>with consciousness. Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
>>consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
>>like").
>>
>>I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
>>Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but
>>multiple
>>interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
>>eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it feels like
>>mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the world (common ...

> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is
> variable) by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain
> correlated with consciousness. Greenfield doesn't claim that such
> quantification of consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects
> (so-called "what it feels like").
>
> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but
> multiple interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other
> that will eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it
> feels like mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the
> world (common sense dualism). In short, consciousness is a physiological
> process found in the biological world and might even eventually be
> artificially created.
>
> Whaddya think? ...

>
> sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
> news:611996ee-eeb8-40d8-aba3-81806e0079df@i29g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
> On Dec 25, 8:40 am, "thinker" notreal.com> wrote:

>> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
>> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount
>> of
>> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is
>> variable)
>> by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain
>> correlated
>> with consciousness. Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
>> consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
>> like").
>>
>> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
>> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but
>> multiple ...

> On Tue, 25 Dec 2007 11:40:52 -0500, "thinker" notreal.com>
> wrote:
>

>>In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
>>Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
>>consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is
>>variable)
>>by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
>>with consciousness. Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
>>consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
>>like").
>>
>>I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
>>Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but
>>multiple
>>interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
>>eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it feels like
>>mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the world (common ...

> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is variable)
> by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
> with consciousness.  Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
> consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
> like").
>
> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but multiple
> interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
> eventually explain the subjectivity of experience...

> On Dec 25, 11:40 am, "thinker" notreal.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>

>> In her paper, "A neuroscientific approach to consciousness" (Progress in
>> Brain Research, vol 150, 2005), Susan Greenfield argues that the amount of
>> consciousness is potentially quantifiable (since consciousness is variable)
>> by the measuring the size of assemblies of neurons in the brain correlated
>> with consciousness.  Greenfield doesn't claim that such quantification of
>> consciousness explains its phenonmenal aspects (so-called "what it feels
>> like").

>

>> I like Greenfield's idea of assemblies of neurons and, against Daniel
>> Dennet, think that not only is there a "theater" in the brain, but multiple
>> interacting theaters of neuron clusters monitoring each other that will
>> eventually explain the subjectivity of experience and why it feels like
>> mental activities cannot be like the physical stuff of the world (common ...