Reminds me of Hume's idea that, "...When we look about us towards
external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never
able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary
connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and
renders the one an infallible consequence of the other...." in that we
add alot to the events in the world and attribute these additions to
the world -itself-
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and
uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary
connection. ... When we look about us towards external objects, and
consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single
instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality,
which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible
consequence of the other.... Consequently, there is not, in any
single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can
suggest the idea of power or necessary connection. ...but the power or
force, which actuates the whole machine [the universe], is entirely
concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible
qualities of body.... It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of
power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single
instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any
power, which can be the original of this idea.
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term
is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we
need to enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?
And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our
suspicion. Now if we produce an idea, like power or necessary
connection, that we maintain is not derived from an antecedent
impression, it is not incumbent upon Hume to produce the impression or
abandon his empiricism. Instead. ...our idea is "without any meaning
or idea." And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared
to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion
seems to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all, and
that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed
either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary
transition of the imagination from one object to its ususal attendant,
is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or
necessary connection. Nothing farther is in the case.
Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but through
experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly
conjoined with one another. We tend to overlook this because most
ordinary causal judgments are so familiar; we've made them so many
times that our judgment seems immediate. But when we consider the
matter, we realize that "an (absolutely) unexperienced reasoner could
be no reasoner at all" (EHU, 45n). Even in applied mathematics, where
we use abstract reasoning and geometrical methods to apply principles
we regard as laws to particular cases in order to derive further
principles as consequences of these laws, the discovery of the
original law itself was due to experience and observation, not to a
priori reasoning.
The mental imagery and associations may reflect laws of motion and
sequence but to claim they internally cause each other doesn't mean my
mental activites causations reflect the causations of the observed
sequences of changing atomic configurations.
The Copy Principle accounts for the origins of our ideas. But our
ideas are also regularly connected. As Hume put the point in his
"Abstract" of the Treatise, "there is a secret tie or union among
particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more
frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance, introduce
the other".
A science of human nature should account for these connections.
Otherwise, we are stuck with an eidetic atomism -- a set of discrete,
independent ideas, unified only in that they are the contents of a
particular mind. Eidetic atomism thus fails to explain how ideas are
"bound together," and its inadequacy in this regard encourages us, as
Hume thought it encouraged Locke, to postulate theoretical notions --
power and substance being the most notorious -- to account for the
connections we find among our ideas. Eidetic atomism is thus a prime
source of the philosophical "hypotheses" Hume aims to eliminate.
The principles required for connecting our ideas aren't theoretical
and rational; they are natural operations of the mind, associations we
experience in "internal sensation." Hume's introduction of these
"principles of association" is the other distinctive feature of his
empiricism, so distinctive that in the Abstract he advertises it as
his most original contribution: "If any thing can intitle the author
to so glorious a name as that of an inventor, 'tis the use he makes of
the principle of the association of ideas".
Hume locates "three principles of connexion" or association:
resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Of the three, causation
is the only principle that takes us "beyond the evidence of our memory
and senses." It establishes a link or connection between past and
present experiences with events that we predict or explain, so that
"all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the
relation of cause and effect." But causation and the ideas closely
related to it also raise serious metaphysical problems: "there are no
ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than
those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion"
Hume wants to "fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms,
and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much
complained of in this species of philosophy". This project provides a
crucial experiment for Hume's metaphysical microscope, one designed to
prove the worth of his method, to provide a paradigm for investigating
problematic philosophical and theological notions, and to supply
valuable material for these inquiries.
What would be the "conditions" for solving this process bound
simulation and it's generality?
http://www.friesian.com/hume.htm
http://www.wutsamada.com/alma/modern/humepid.htm
