Logic must "look after itself", or so Wittgenstein tells us...

A PROPOSAL

Logic borrows a number of ideas from our dealings with the world which,
if stripped of their original metaphysical and metaphorical intent,
leave us with objects that alone can express a logic that can "look
after itself".

DISCUSSION

Accordingly, "P" ought to say no more than P; here, we might say,
nothing is hidden and logic "look(s) after itself". In respect of that,
we would not expect "P" to entail P and Q. Yet, I argue, by assumptively
lumbering logic with a world baggage, we demand that P should indeed
entail Q. I list these instances:

On Sep 2, 4:36 pm, John Jones aol.com> wrote:

If you strip away the concepts that justify the procedures of
establishing logical truths, then those truths may set there with no
interpretation at all, no meaning will be left since that comes from
the interplay of concepts and procedures.

On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 00:36:00 +0100, John Jones wrote:

'Bring'? This process of 'bringing' seems to be the hard part. Why do
objects have to 'bring' anything? Bring to what and why?

It implies some other thing.

"Accordingly, "P" ought to say no more than P".

'P' only says 'P'. The observer or endeavor may say Q. 'P' as only 'P'
says nothing. The endeavor speaks, without it very little speech indeed.

Logic lumbers maybe as baggage in some circumstances but in others it is
the only ticket.

Immortalist wrote:

I'm wondering just how far we can go with it.