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Author: jer0enjer0en Date: Jan 20, 2007 17:43
Different nations are involved in different stages of modern philosophical
development. English philosophy, among other, has a culmination point in
17th century philosophy, of which John Locke would be the most fruitful and
applicable still today. In the 19th century, philosophy was largely a German
affair, while the English were all writing prose and poetry. So I hope you
don't mind that I more or less internationalise your point by placing it in
a more up-to-date philosophical context, that of the subject/object model
introduced by (German) metaphysics, a model that is still used in 20th
century philosophy and better connects to non-European philosophies as well.
Using this model, what Locke describes to be "natural" versus "human", would
basicly be a subject/object matter, natural being...
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Author: jer0enjer0en Date: Jan 20, 2007 17:45
Throughout the history of science and of what is considered to
be its nursery, modern philosophy, people have postulated what
is basicly universal order, not to corroborate but to
legitimise the least common of ideas, dismissing anyone with a
more developed sense of proportion from the entire discussion,
and basicly from history itself.
Science is not so much a way as a style of reasoning that
claims its roots in classical retoric, but that is in fact the
dogmatic profession of a state of universal clarity that
anyone is able and expected to reach during his or her
lifetime, in order to be allowed to communicate their opinions
inside the scientific institution.
What more ingredients does a religion have? For you to have
credible things to discuss with society, surely the whole
universe wouldn't have to be in tune, utter correspondence and
agreement, unless you were willing to invite them all over to
our homes and breasts. Mjummy. I guess they all would like a
bite of that. What do you know, if not with life, space would
now be teeming with would-be mammels instead.
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Author: George DanceGeorge Dance Date: Jan 18, 2007 19:07
The idea of 'essences' has come up recently a number of times in the
group, with some posters insisting on their absolute reality and
knowability, and and others as stridently denying both. Meanwhile, the
abortion debate erupts off and on, here as elsewhere. Those interested
in the first debate rarely pay attention to the second or see its
relevance to their concerns (and vice versa I am sure). I have to
confess that I didn't until today, when, reading Locke's /Essay
Concerning Human Understanding/ (in abridged form in /The Age of
Enlightenment/ (Mentor, 1956) I came upon this argument for Locke's
account of 'essences':
"/14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence/. - Nor will
any one wonder when I say these essences, or abstract ideas (which are
the measures of name, and boundaries of species), are the workmanship...
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Author: ImmortalistImmortalist Date: Jan 19, 2007 10:34
George Dance wrote:
> The idea of 'essences' has come up recently a number of times in the
> group, with some posters insisting on their absolute reality and
> knowability, and and others as stridently denying both. Meanwhile, the
> abortion debate erupts off and on, here as elsewhere. Those interested
> in the first debate rarely pay attention to the second or see its
> relevance to their concerns (and vice versa I am sure). I have to
> confess that I didn't until today, when, reading Locke's /Essay
> Concerning Human Understanding/ (in abridged form in /The Age of
> Enlightenment/ (Mentor, 1956) I came upon this argument for Locke's
> account of 'essences':
>
> "/14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence/. - Nor will
> any one wonder when I say these essences, or abstract ideas (which are
> the measures of name, and boundaries of species), are the workmanship
> of the understanding, who considers that at least the complex ones are
> often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas;... even
> in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the
> things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no, not in that
> species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most ...
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Author: jer0enjer0en Date: Jan 20, 2007 11:45
> The idea of 'essences' has come up recently a number of times in the
> group, with some posters insisting on their absolute reality and
> knowability, and and others as stridently denying both. Meanwhile, the
> abortion debate erupts off and on, here as elsewhere. Those interested
> in the first debate rarely pay attention to the second or see its
> relevance to their concerns (and vice versa I am sure). I have to
> confess that I didn't until today, when, reading Locke's /Essay
> Concerning Human Understanding/ (in abridged form in /The Age of
> Enlightenment/ (Mentor, 1956) I came upon this argument for Locke's
> account of 'essences':
>
> "/14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence/. - Nor will
> any one wonder when I say these essences, or abstract ideas (which are
> the measures of name, and boundaries of species), are the workmanship
> of the understanding, who considers that at least the complex ones are
> often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas;... even
> in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the
> things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no, not in that ...
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Author: George DanceGeorge Dance Date: Jan 21, 2007 09:31
jer0en wrote:
>> reading Locke's /Essay
>> Concerning Human Understanding/ (in abridged form in /The Age of
>> Enlightenment/ (Mentor, 1956) I came upon this argument for Locke's
>> account of 'essences':
>>
>> "/14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence/. - Nor will
>> any one wonder when I say these essences, or abstract ideas (which are
>> the measures of name, and boundaries of species), are the workmanship
>> of the understanding, who considers that at least the complex ones are
>> often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas;... even
>> in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the
>> things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no, not in that
>> species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most
>> intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted whether
>> the foetus born of a woman were a man, even so far that it hath been
>> debated whether it were or were not to be nourished or baptized; which
>> could not be if the abstract idea or esence to which the name 'man' ...
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Author: BIG_ONEBIG_ONE Date: Jan 22, 2007 08:40
"George Dance" wrote:
>the
>abortion debate erupts off and on, here as elsewhere.
> Locke's /Essay
>Concerning Human Understanding
"a foetus in the mother's womb differs not much from the state of a
vegetable" Book 2 Chapter 1 section 21
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Author: jer0enjer0en Date: Jan 25, 2007 08:56
George Dance wrote:
> Modern philosophers are far more humble.
Not the ones who get their books published.
The humble ones are never heard from again.
And in the end there is a discrepancy between not being humble and being
wrong. In the case of science, not being humble is just a symptom of a
historical fallacy. By attacking the not humble I attack the fallacy.
Stricktly, there is no necessity for humbleness if you were to be right.
Though I doubt you would use the divinitous "tone of voice" science is
infamous for.
I understand you like to go moderate on judging all of science, or even all
of philosophy, but my point happens to be that all modern philosophers,
including metaphysici, have, in fact, the scientific fever. Admittingly that
they do, and not just occasionally, produce worth-wile reading (fi. Locke's
thoughts on the concept of property), they cannot seem to help themselves in
this.
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