Vide...@tcq.net wrote:

Where? Are you saying that "To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states,

bingo, there it is. it is just one of them. several states means the
states, and all added states. if commerce cross's the state lines, it
falls under federal jurisdiction.
otherwise if you bought a stock from a new york board and you live in
california. then do not expect to be protected by the sec.

and with the Indian tribes" along with
the other enumerated powers constitute "everything"?

do not take my poorly written words out of context.
commerce, and all that goes with it.

Maybe that's
where our misunderstanding is. What about article one section 9 which
specifically states parts of "everything" that they can't regulate?

some things do fall to the states and the people. till the feds get
involved. federal law trumps all state laws.

What opinion was that? Do you by any chance mean the Darby Case from
1941 that set the precedent for very broad interpretation of the
interstate commerce clause? If so, I would say that either you have a
rather pathetic understanding of "everything", or were overstating the
case.

now you are being the good old alexy the twister.
this article explains one of the most important decisions of 1938 on
regulating commerce.
there were other decisions in that year also covering labor and other
forms of commerce. but i guess this was one of the biggies.
just think, if the feds had not won it. today you might be feeding
your kid water that is artificially colored, taste, and textured like
milk. plus they could also make broad claims about the product legally
thus muddying the waters even more for the citizens of this country.
free market economics is the enemy of democracy, and all freedom
loving people world wide.
if you give the free market their LIBERTY, you will get the claim
that colored water is milk.

http://law.jrank.org/pages/13622/United-States-v-Carolene-Products-Company.html

United States v. Carolene Products Company

Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Carolene Products Company
Petitioner's Claim
That congressional legislation outlawing the shipment of adulterated
milk wasa constitutionally permissible regulation of interstate
commerce.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Homer S. Cummings, Brien McMahon
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
George N. Murdock
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Charles Evans
Hughes,Owen Josephus Roberts, Harlan Fiske Stone (writing for the
Court)
Justices Dissenting
James Clark McReynolds (Benjamin N. Cardozo and Stanley Forman Reed
did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 April 1938
Decision
Congressional regulation of "filled milk" was held to be
constitutionally permissible.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products
Company marked a significant change in its thinking about when and in
what typeof cases it would review the constitutionality of federal
legislation. What began as a spat over filled, or adulterated milk
became the occasion for a substantial rethinking of judicial review.
Justice Harlan Stone's famous footnote in this case has sparked
voluminous legal debate over the ensuing decades.
A Dispute over Filled Milk
In 1923, Congress passed the "Filled Milk Act," a law which banned the
shipment of "skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than
milk fat, so asto resemble milk or cream." It acted under its
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, in hopes of
preventing the distribution of whatit called an "adulterated article
of food, injurious to the public health." The Carolene Products
Company of Illinois was indicted under the law after itattempted to
market a product called "Milnut," a flavorful combination of condensed
skimmed milk and coconut oil designed to seem like condensed milk or
cream. The company protested the indictment, arguing that the Filled
Milk Actexceeded Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce
and deprived thecompany of its property without due process. The
District Court for SouthernIllinois ruled in favor of the Carolene
Products Company, prompting the United States to appeal the case to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
High Court Rules
On 25 April 1938, the Supreme Court issued its decision. By a vote of
6-1, with two justices not participating, the Court overturned the
lower court decision and ruled in favor of the United States. Justice
Stone delivered the opinion of the majority, with Justice James
McReynolds the lone dissenter.
In presenting his argument, Justice Stone first outlined the
parameters of Congress' ability to regulate interstate commerce.
Quoting an earlier case, Stone determined that that power is "complete
in itself, may be exercised to itsutmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed inthe Constitution." With
regard to the specifics of the case at hand, he concluded: "The
prohibition of the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerceis a
permissible regulation of commerce"--provided, in his view, that
FifthAmendment due process protections were observed.
Stone and his fellow justices found no violations of due process in
the Congress' actions. In fact, Stone concluded, the prerogatives of
due process had been scrupulously followed:
The Filled Milk Act was adopted by Congress after committee hearings,
in the course of which eminent scientists andhealth experts testified.
An extensive investigation was made of the commerce in milk compounds
in which vegetable oils have been substituted for naturalmilk fat, and
of the effect upon the public health of the use of such compounds as a
food substitute for milk.

Stone then turned his attention to a consideration of when and how the
Courtought to review congressional laws like the one it had been asked
to rule onhere. In doing so, he acknowledged Congress' attempt to "red
flag" the issueof filled milk by defining it in the statute as a
threat to public health. But he declared that the Court would have
been inclined to find in its favor "even in the absence of such aids"
because
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
This doctrine gave Congress wide latitude to regulate in commerce
cases like the one at issue here.
Stone expanded on these ideas in a footnote to his opinion that has
become one of the hallmarks of modern American jurisprudence. In the
famous "footnotefour," Stone suggested that there may be circumstances
in which the Court must exercise a more rigorous form of judicial
review, known in legal circles as"strict scrutiny." He named three
specific types of cases in which this narrower presumption of
constitutionality should prevail. First, he urged specialjudicial
review in cases where "legislation appears on its face to be withina
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments." Second, he cited cases of "legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," such as voting
rights and freedom of assembly cases. Finally, and most importantly
for the course of American law, he called for heightened review of
cases where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" may
tend "to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities." In essence, Stone was
creatinga hierarchy of cases, each with its own standard of judicial
review. Commercial regulation cases would be viewed with the least
amount of scrutiny, because it was to be assumed that the legislators
were acting with good reason unless there was clear evidence to the
contrary. Cases involving the curtailmentof political liberties or
discrimination against religious or ethnic groups,values at the heart
of a democratic society, were accorded the most intense scrutiny the
Court could provide.
Debate and Dissent
Stone's doctrine came to be known as the "preferred freedoms" doctrine
and sparked much legal debate. Even among the justices there was
disagreement on both sides. Justice McReynolds dissented from the
opinion entirely, while Justice Black refused to concur in the
provisions of footnote four. He would havegone further than Stone in
presuming the constitutionality of all laws passedby Congress. Later
scholars debated the meaning of the phrase "discrete andinsular
minorities" and argued over whether whites, gays, and other groups
claiming discrimination could demand strict scrutiny under this
doctrine.
Impact
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Carolene Products Company went well beyond the regulation of an
obscure milk product. Stone's "preferred freedoms" doctrine
established new parameters for judicial review of federal legislation.
The Court continues to struggle with the question of when and with
what level of scrutiny to intervene in cases involving the lawmaking
power.
Related Cases

United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939).
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1972).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
Further Readings
Chandler, Ralph C. The Constitutional Law Dictionary. Santa Barbara,
CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1987.
Cushman, Robert Fairchild with Susan P. Koniak. Leading
ConstitutionalDecisions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1992.
Menez, Joseph Francis. Summaries of Leading Cases of the Constitution.
Savage, MD: Littlefield, Adams, 1990.

Examples?

read my response to publius on the constitution. its there.

That's because they cannot regulate everything.

you now know what i meant. but i did say the court can whittle away
at just about everything. but then congress can come back with
legislation.

By staying within the limits (not all-enclusive powers) set by the
constitution.

its all in how the ruling is interpreted.
and congress can still get around that with further legislation.

Yep. Wouldn't be much need for it if it just said the government can
regulate everything.

you will figure out what i meant someday.

I would be interested if you could find one that says it has the right
to regulate everything.

sigh, its getting old. but regulate they can. if they act on a states
rights issue, it becomes federal. so its a true statement, but not
meant to be taken so literally.

I imagine that could be legislated. But I wonder if limited liability
is overturned, if that would be the result absent legislation. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_and_several_liability

one never knows. and i would not just over turn limited liability.
like i said there would need to be much broader reforms to insure a
level playing field.