> I found this interesting comparison of Kantianism and constructivism
> in Michael Devitt's "Naturalistic Defence of Realism" (Hales, ed. /
> Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth 1999, 95). It should
> shed some insight into the Kantian/constructivist debate going on in a
> few other threads.
>
>
> "Kant is responsible for another traditional idealist response to the
> skeptical challenge. Kant's way of saving knowledge is very different
> from foundationalism's. He closes the gap between the knowing mind
> and the object known with his view that the object is partly
> constituted by the cognitive activities of the mind. He distinguished
> objects as we know them - stones, trees, cats, and so on - from
> objects as they are independent of our knowledge. Kant called the
> former "appearances" and the latter "things-in-themselves."
> Appearances are obtained by our imposition of a priori concepts; for
> example, causality, time and the Euclidean principles of spatial
> relationships. Only things-in-themselves, forever beyond our ken,
> have the objectivity and independence required by Realism. ...

> ". . . . Kant, of course, does not see the process of synthesis
> producing anything relativistic or subjectivist: the realism of
> phenomena is fully meant. The knock-offs of Kant are rarely realistic...

> I found this interesting comparison of Kantianism and constructivism
> in Michael Devitt's "Naturalistic Defence of Realism" (Hales, ed. /
> Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth 1999, 95). It should
> shed some insight into the Kantian/constructivist debate going on in a
> few other threads.
>
>
> "Kant is responsible for another traditional idealist response to the
> skeptical challenge. Kant's way of saving knowledge is very different
> from foundationalism's. He closes the gap between the knowing mind
> and the object known with his view that the object is partly
> constituted by the cognitive activities of the mind. He distinguished
> objects as we know them - stones, trees, cats, and so on - from
> objects as they are independent of our knowledge. Kant called the
> former "appearances" and the latter "things-in-themselves."
> Appearances are obtained by our imposition of a priori concepts; for
> example, causality, time and the Euclidean principles of spatial
> relationships. Only things-in-themselves, forever beyond our ken,
> have the objectivity and independence required by Realism. ...

> On Jan 30, 10:34 am, malen...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
>
>

>> On Jan 29, 1:23 pm, "George Dance" wrote:> I found this interesting comparison of Kantianism and constructivism

>>> in Michael Devitt's "Naturalistic Defence of Realism" (Hales, ed. /
>>> Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth 1999, 95). It should
>>> shed some insight into the Kantian/constructivist debate going on in a
>>> few other threads.

>

>>>

>

>> "Kantis responsible for another traditional idealist response to the
>> skeptical challenge."

>

>> Lol.Kantis nothing like a traditionalist, either as idealist or as a
>> "Weak Realist" (ahem). His was a Copernican Revolution - well,
>> I'll admit that as Copernican Revolutions go,Kant'swasn't very
>> unique after all, right? It was just another ho-hum, hum-drum ...

> On Jan 29, 1:23 pm, "George Dance" wrote:
>
>
>
>
>

>> I found this interesting comparison of Kantianism and constructivism
>> in Michael Devitt's "Naturalistic Defence of Realism" (Hales, ed. /
>> Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth 1999, 95). It should
>> shed some insight into the Kantian/constructivist debate going on in a
>> few other threads.

>

>>
>> "Kant is responsible for another traditional idealist response to the
>> skeptical challenge. Kant's way of saving knowledge is very different
>> from foundationalism's. He closes the gap between the knowing mind
>> and the object known with his view that the object is partly
>> constituted by the cognitive activities of the mind. He distinguished
>> objects as we know them - stones, trees, cats, and so on - from ...

> Lol. Kant is nothing like a traditionalist, either as idealist or as a
> "Weak Realist" (ahem). His was aCopernicanRevolution - well,
> I'll admit that asCopernicanRevolutions go, Kant's wasn't very
> unique after all, right?