Hi,
...
> You're too sensitive. I don't know that much philosophy-of-logic.
OK, so you were sincere.
No way of telling at first glance, in writing. Apologies.
...
>> Hmmm ... I could argue that the board is called sci.logic, and not
>> sci.formal.logic ... but I won't.
>
> This board is, de facto, heavily populated with mathematical
> propeller-heads. (This is not to suggest that they are
> philosophically unsophisticated in this subject matter.)
I'm flattered no end by your invitation to post to your board on philosophy
of logic.
I wouldn't want to misuse that.
....
>> "de rigeur", if that is not too french for you.
>> And it does not mean "It would just be nice if ...".
>
> Ouch, how mildly embarassing. I say "de rigeur" in a desire
> to spare you any more severe talking-to's.
Thx.
I have had a semester of university training in formal logic (even acquitted
myself with a laudabilis),
but unfortunately it is almost a decade ago, and furthermore a) within my
limitations, I recognize my limitations, and b) my interest simply isn't in
the "mechanical" working out of predetermined consequences of someones
bright ideas on logic. I'd rather experiment with the possibility of having
(for certain less-than-bright ) ideas myself, even if I only attain original
dimness (or should that be "dim originality"?).
(Not to detract from the gift, brilliance and achievement - way beyond
mine - of contributors in the technical field. Like I said: interest (+
limitations), not a judgement of value or any other kind.)
...
>
> Ok, interesting. The "three laws of logic" are really not given
> so much of a distinguished position these days;
> are based on more technically convenient propositions, from which the
> "three laws" are derived.
Which would that be?
As an advance quid pro quo, Schopenhauer claims that these three laws
basically state the same, namely that two concepts are either (wholly or
partially) connected or not; i.e., the (whole or partial) connection of two
concepts is what logic, fundamentally, is all about.
I'm sorry to go on about him, this is not meant as a lecture series on
rather outdated german idealism, but the way he is able to, and prone to,
give such very simple determinations of e.g. what logic is, has an
inexplicable appeal to me. I certainly missed it in my logic textbooks. The
simplicity of this conception is invaluable as a teaching tool - an
at-a-glance overview of the field of endeavour - and also, pardon me, to
such a degree unencumbered by technicality that it actually enables one to
reflect on the status of logic, its value, contribution, role, etc. without
losing oneself in secondary detail.
>
> The "principle of sufficient reason" I suppose I could google it
> but I await your no-doubt elegant re-statement
Flattery will get you. Anywhere.
>if it is germane to this thread.
And the judge of that is ....?
Leibniz?
(I did warn you.)
Leibniz is usually creditd with the discovery of this principle (historical
thread: Leibniz to Wolff to Kant; although, like all philosophical issues,
traceable to Aristocles; Leucippus and Democritus knew it, too), a
proposition which formulates the claim that "whatever is, is for a reason"
( lex rationis determinantis sive sufficientis; or, pardon my french,
"raison suffisante"). In his own writ: ""Im Sinne des zureichenden Grundes
finden wir, dass keine Tatsache als wahr oder existierend und keine Aussage
als wahr betrachtet werden kann, ohne dass ein zureichender Grund vorhanden
w
