On Sat, 2 Feb 2008 05:11:47 -0500, "Tim"
qwerty.com> wrote:
>> On Jan 31, 9:26 pm, Fred Weiss
papertig.com> wrote:
>>>>> "we can therefore have no knowledge
>>> of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an
>>> object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance -- all this is
>>> proved in the analytical part of the Critique. Thus it does in-
>>> deed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason
>>> is limited to mere objects of experience .
>>
>> In my interjection above I see that I have a typo which in this
>> instance is worth correcting, so that there is no possible
>> misunderstanding.
>>
>> In referring to Kant's phrase "mere objects of experience" my
>> interjection should read .
>>
>> Btw, the purpose of "mere" here an elsewhere in Kant is clear. It is
>> to further characterize "appearances" or "representations" or "objects
>> of experience", etc. (as he variously describes them) by way of
>> *diminishing* them further epistemologically - otherwise the
>> qualification is pointless. It is by way of him saying in effect,
>> "these insignificant mental events - insignificant because they are
>> not what "really is", i.e. things in themselves". They
>> are...well..."mere"...
>>
>
>No "mere" means pure and unmixed. You are...well...wrong, again.
>
>> Think by way of comparison to the expression, "we mere mortals", and
>> what it conveys.
>
>mere 1 [mIE] superlative merest adjective
>
>being nothing more than something specified
>
>she is a mere child
>
>[C15: from Latin merus pure, unmixed]
The Pluhar translation of the CPR translates the word from the German
as "nothing but."
As I stated before, NKS very much over-used the word "mere."
However, that being said, Kant did place ontological importance on
the thing-in-itself over its "mere" representation as appearance
(thing-for-us). If he had said "mere" thing-in-itself THEN the focus
of value would have been on consciousness OVER existence (to
use Rand's sloppy manner of expression).
But in the case where it is appearance that is "mere," then the
ontological emphasis is being placed on existence over consciousness.
"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be
awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses
partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse
the activity of our understanding to compare these
representations, and, by combining or separating them, work
up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that
knowledge of objects which is entitled experience?"
The faculty of knowledge first has to be awakened by the stimulation
of the senses from objects outside the conscious mind. The ontological
importance ("in the order of time") is placed on existence over
consciousness.
However, I'm not saying you're wrong in your definition. Appearance is
"nothing more than" representation (or to use Pluhar's more accurate
term, "presentation"). Appearance is a "mere" product of our ability
to represent things spatially, otherwise it would be to say that we
have perception without the ability to perceive.
>> As I said, nothing further needs to be said about this - except
>> perhaps to observe the spectacle of Kantians attempting to defend
>> this, assuming one's morbid curiosity goes in that direction.
>>
>> Fred Weiss
>
>As I said, you need to but a dictionary and introductory economics text
>book, then you need to read them.
>
>>
>
