To answer that question in the title, I assume in the first instance
that logic is a posteriori or world-dependent. I begin by arguing for a
particular distinction between logic and informal description:

A (formal) logic always reflects the worldy objects and behaviours that
our informal descriptions have traditionally presented to us. That is,
logic is a posteriori - world-dependent. A distinction here is that in a
formal logic the multiplicity of contexts found in informal descriptions
is reduced to a general case. This allows logic to be represented
through syntax alone.

However, neither a formal symbolism nor the employment of general cases
can bring us the hoped-for elimination of informal vaguary that a formal
logic has always seemed to promise us. Indeed, the claim of logic
'clearing up' informal description fails to recognise the distinctions
between formal logic and informal descriptions that I argue for here.

On Sep 5, 5:31 pm, John Jones aol.com> wrote:

This debate always seems like the first cause argument and
foundationalists seem to resort to it alot. But priori simply means,
"with no reference to empirical data from the senses. Who cares how
the memories of sense data got in the head, apriori means simply logic
in the head alone by adding concepts to memories with no reference to
incoming signals for justification.

On Sat, 06 Sep 2008 01:31:29 +0100, John Jones wrote:

Conceptual clarity is usually attached to the physical, I think.

'Action' is a means by which clarity develops. Clarity, in relative
terms, then is directly proportional to the physical or that which is
thought different from thought. Mind as opposed to matter, as the
possibly very mistaken saying goes.

I don't get the "priori and not a posteriori" question exactly. If an
example where given, it would help me out anyway.