I think "atheists" are just as "ignorant" as "theists".... neither of
them are "certain" about what the heck they think they know...which is
why I call myself an "agnostic"....... Howdy, Chazwin...

I like William of Ockham.... Billy O..... as some of you may have
gathered.... The fellow makes eminent sense to me..... Here's a post
I
found on the internet that explains the parts of Billy O's notions
that I particularly like..... I will try to reproduce it entirely but
I will also include a link, if it is too long for this "thread-
format"...... I ask you, Archytas, Georges and you scientific
sorts...
how can you-all help but notice the evident groundwork and foundation
for the "scientific method" in what Billy O came up with.... I mean,
apart from the actual "experimentation" part of the exercise? And
einseele, Chazwin or you other more "cultural" sorts... can you not
see the "human" or "language" angle that Billy O also accounted for?
And finally, Greg or you religious sorts.... I hope you will notice
that Billy O also leaves some room for your own "beliefs" in God to
flourish, too....The gentleman who compiled the entry, below...Alex
Scott... did a very reputable job. I give him credit and I hope he
will not begrudge my "paste" of his work, with attribution to him.
nominal9

http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/ockham.html

William of Ockham, on the Difference between Intuitive and
Abstractive
Cognition

William of Ockham (c.1285-c.1349) was an English philosopher,
logician, and theologian. He was born in the village of Ockham,
county
of Surrey. He died in the city of Munich (in Bavaria). Ockham wrote
extensively on many subjects, including logic, epistemology, the
philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. His
philosophical writings included the Summa Logicae (Summa of Logic, c.
1328), the Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Exposition of
the Books of Physics of Aristotle, 1322-24), and the Tractatus de
praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus
(Treatise on Predestination and on God's Foreknowledge of Future
Contingents, 1321-24).

His theological works included: In Libros Sententiarum (Commentary on
the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 1317-18), and the Quodlibeta Septem
(Seven Quodlibets, 1322-25).

His political writings included: Dialogus Inter Magistrum et
Discipulum de potestate Papae et Imperatoris (Dialogue between Master
and Disciples on the Power of Emperors and Popes, 1334-47), and his
Octo quaestiones de potestate papae (Eight Questions on the Power of
the Pope, 1340-44).

In his approach to the philosophy of language, Ockham was an
important
proponent of nominalism, the doctrine that only particulars, and not
universals, are real. Ockham taught that universal terms are merely
names which are attached to particular things, and that universal
terms are merely linguistic devices which we use to try to understand
reality. In his approach to metaphysics and epistemology, Ockham used
a method of logical empiricism, asserting that intuitive knowledge is
prior to abstractive knowledge, and that abstractive knowledge must
be
based on intuitive knowledge. He thus had an important influence on
modern empiricist philosophy.

Ockham's theory of cognition is presented in works such as the Summa
Logicae, the Quodlibeta Septem, and the Prologue to the Ordinatio
(the
Commentary on the First Book of Sentences).

Ockham makes a basic distinction between the sentient and
intellective
soul. The sentient soul is extended and material, but the
intellective
soul is non-extended and non-material. The sentient soul is the type
of soul which belongs to a physical creature (such as an animal), but
the intellective or rational soul is the type of soul which belongs
to
a spiritual creature (such as an angel).1 A human soul is a composite
soul of sentient and intellective power and capability. The sentient
soul is capable of physical sensation, but the intellective soul is
not capable of physical sensation. In a human being, the sentient and
intellective activities of the soul may be in harmony with each
other,
or may be in conflict with each other. The appetites and desires of
the sentient soul may be accepted or rejected by the intellective
soul.

In Ockham's theory of the nature of human volition, the will is the
capacity of the intellective soul for acting, or not acting, upon the
desires of the sentient soul. The will may be active or passive.
While
the will may, or may not, act on the desires of the sentient soul,
the
intellective capacity for judgment or understanding may, or may not,
act on the desires of the will.

Ockham distinguishes between apprehension and judgment as acts of the
intellective soul. Apprehension is an act whereby the intellect
becomes aware of an object. Apprehension may be of simple objects
(e.g. pleasure or pain) or of complex objects (e.g. sentences or
propositions). Acts of judgment, on the other hand, are only
concerned
with logical propositions (i.e. complex objects). A judgment is
expressed by an act of assenting to, or dissenting from, a
proposition. Ockham explains, in the Prologue to the Ordinatio, that
the act of judging a proposition presupposes an apprehension of that
proposition. Furthermore, the act of judging a proposition
presupposes
a non-complex cognition of the terms (or elements) of that
proposition.

According to Ockham, a proposition which has been apprehended may not
be judged if it is indifferent (i.e. if the intellect neither assents
to, nor dissents from, it). Moreover, if a proposition has been
frequently apprehended, then a 'habit' of apprehending or judging
that
proposition may develop, and this 'habit' may influence the intellect
toward an act of apprehension, or toward an act of judgment. A
'habit'
of apprehending or judging a proposition may also allow the intellect
to remember previous thoughts, judgments, or acts of willing.

Ockham claims that apprehension of simple objects may produce two
kinds of cognition: 1) intuitive and 2) abstractive. Intuitive
cognition may occur if an object is present for intuition.
Abstractive
cognition may occur if an object is no longer present for intuition.
Intuitive cognition provides knowledge of whether or not an object
exists. Abstractive cognition does not provide knowledge of whether
or
not an object exists. Intuitive cognition can only occur if an object
of intuition exists, but abstractive cognition can occur even if the
object of intuition no longer exists.

According to Ockham, intuitive cognitions are the original, primary
intuitions of singular objects. Abstractive cognitions of singular
objects occur secondarily after these objects have been apprehended
intuitively. Abstractive cognitions of singular objects cannot occur
without prior intuitions of the same objects. However, singular
objects which have ceased to exist for intuitive cognition may remain
objects of abstractive cognition.

Ockham argues that only by divine power can non-existing objects
become objects of intuitive cognition. Non-existing objects cannot
become objects of intuitive cognition by natural causes alone. If an
intuitive cognition is caused to exist, then there must have been an
object which caused it to exist. If we can actually see an object,
then there must be an object which can actually be seen. Intuitive
cognitions cannot be caused by objects which do not exist, unless
these cognitions are caused by God. The existence of an intuitive
cognition as an effect of an object implies that there was an
existing
object which caused the cognition to occur. However, God may freely
cause intuitive cognitions of non-existing objects.

Ockham contends that cognitions are caused by the combined operation
of the intellect and of the object of cognition. The intellect and
the
object of cognition combine to cause the act of cognition.

Ockham argues that intuitive cognition of non-existing objects is
possible for God, because God knows everything that exists, and
everything that does not exist. God's knowledge of everything that
exists and that does not exist is not caused by any existing or non-
existing object, because every object is ultimately caused to exist,
or not to exist, by the will of God. Ockham explains that this is not
contradictory to the existence of cause-and-effect relationships,
because any effect of an intermediary cause can be caused directly by
God, and because God does not determine that cause-and effect
relationships should be contradictory to each other. Furthermore, if
an intuitive cognition of the presence of God is caused to occur in
any human being, then this intuitive cognition cannot be caused to
occur without the actual presence of God.

According to Ockham, intuitive cognition enables us to apprehend the
existence, or non-existence, of an object, but abstractive cognition
does not enable us to apprehend the existence, or non-existence, of
an
object. Intuitive cognition provides knowledge of contingent truths,
but abstractive cognition does not provide knowledge of contingent
truths. Intuitive cognition is the basis of our empirical knowledge
of
the world.

Contingent truths may become evident by intuitive cognition. Evident
truths are knowable truths, of which we can have objective certainty.
Knowledge of contingent truths may be a means of knowing necessary
truths. Necessary truths may become evident by abstractive cognition.

Evident truths are known by either intuitive or abstractive
cognition.
Non-evident truths are not known by either intuitive or abstractive
cognition. Non-evident truths may become evident, if they become
known
by intuitive or abstractive cognition. Evident truths may become non-
evident if they are no longer knowable by intuitive or abstractive
cognition.

Ockham says that matters of faith cannot be proved evidently.2 Thus,
many complex propositions (e.g. regarding the existence of God) may,
or may not, be able to be proved evidently, depending on whether they
are considered to be matters of reason or matters of faith.

Ockham contends that singular things, and not universals, are the
original objects of cognition. Intuitive cognition of a singular
object is required for abstractive cognition of that same object.
Abstractive cognition of a singular object presupposes an intuitive
cognition of that same object.3 Intuitive cognition of a singular
object does not presuppose an abstractive cognition of that same
object.

Ockham explains that simple, primary cognitions which are 'proper' to
singular objects are intuitive. Simple, primary cognitions which are
'proper' to more than one object are abstractive. A concept which is
'proper' to a singular thing refers only to that singular thing. A
'common' concept is not 'proper' to a singular thing, but refers to
more than one thing. A 'proper' concept is also a 'non-common'
concept, i.e. a concept which refers only to one thing and not to
more
than one thing or to what more than one thing have in common.

Ockham also says that a simple cognition of a singular thing does not
cause a first, simple, and 'proper' cognition of another thing. A
first, intuitive cognition of a singular thing is 'immediately'
caused
by the thing itself, unless the cognition is 'immediately' caused by
God.4

A cognition is 'proper' to a singular thing if it is 'immediately'
caused by that thing, and not by any other thing. Thus, a 'proper'
and
simple cognition of any singular thing can only occur if cognition
can
yield specific knowledge of that thing.5

A singular thing is not only numerically single, but is specifically
single, in that it is not a signifier of other things. A universal is
a numerically singular thing, in that it refers to a singular quality
which may be predicated of many things, but it is not a specifically
singular thing, in that it is a signifier of, and may be predicated
of, many things.

According to Ockham, a universal is not something which exists
outside
the mind. There is no universal substance existing outside of the
mind.
6 Every substance existing outside the mind has a particular nature
and a particular form. Universals are only concepts, or thought-
objects, and have no reality outside the mind. Universals are mental
representations of the real world.

Ockham describes the relation of a simple intuitive cognition to its
object as a relation of 'first intention.' The relation of an
abstractive cognition to an object which is no longer present for
intuition is a relation of 'second intention.' First intentions
correspond to an external reality. Second intentions are merely
thought-objects, and have no reality outside the mind.7

'Ockham's razor' is a principle of conciseness and precision in
reasoning, which asserts that abstractions and generalities should be
reduced to a minimum. 'Ockham's razor' is the principle that
'plurality should not be posited unless there is a necessity to do
so.' 'Proper' concepts of singular things should not be expanded
needlessly, since abstract concepts or universals may not correspond
with any existing reality.

Intuitive or abstractive cognitions may be simple, composite, or
complex. A simple intuitive cognition is an intuitive cognition of a
singular thing. A simple abstractive cognition is an abstractive
cognition of more than one thing, and thus is not 'proper' to a
singular thing. A composite abstractive cognition may be 'proper' to
a
singular thing. A composite intuitive cognition of a singular thing
may include multiple intuitions of that thing, and thus may also be
'proper' to a singular thing.

Intuitive or abstractive knowledge may be clear or unclear, specific
or non-specific, definite or indefinite. In some cases, intuitive
cognition may only be able to establish the existence of an object,
without providing specific information about the nature of the
object.
Further inquiry concerning the nature of the object may occur by
means
of abstractive cognition. In other cases, intuitive cognition may not
only be able to establish the existence of an object, but may be able
to provide specific knowledge about the nature of the object.

In Ockham's theory of knowledge, it is possible by means of
reflection
to have an intuitive cognition of an existing abstractive cognition,
or to have an abstractive cognition of an intuitive cognition. The
intellect may know its own acts intuitively or abstractively. Thus,
Ockham distinguishes between direct and reflexive acts of the
intellect. A direct act apprehends an object, while a reflexive act
apprehends a direct act. Reflection enables the intellect to
apprehend
its own acts, and to make judgments about them.

Ockham contends that the intellective soul which is capable of acts
of
willing may be both active and passive in causing its own acts. Acts
of will may be interior or exterior to the intellective soul. An
exterior act may, or may not, conform to an interior act. Good or
evil
may belong to an interior act or exterior act. Both the exterior act
and interior act may have their own 'proper' goodness or badness. The
goodness which belongs to an exterior act may depend on whether it
conforms to an interior act of will, and whether the interior act was
good. The goodness which belongs to an interior act may depend on the
reasons and motives for the act. An act which is under the control of
the will may not have the same moral quality as an act which is not
under the control of the will.

Ockham claims that repeated acts of willing may generate a 'habit.' A
'habit' is a tendency to repeat the same acts of apprehending,
judging, or willing. Thus, virtue may be a 'habit' of the will.
'Habits' may be good, bad, or indifferent. The moral quality of a
'habit' may depend on whether the 'habit' is voluntary or
involuntary.
'Habits' may be as different as the acts which generate them.

In some cases, the intellect may not be able to perform an act unless
it has acquired a 'habit' of performing that act. If the intellect
loses the 'habit' of performing an act, the intellect may sometimes
lose the ability to perform that act. Thus, a 'habit' may be an
'efficient' cause of an act. Every 'habit' is caused by an act, but
not every act is caused by a 'habit.'

Ockham accepts Aristotle's doctrine of the Four Causes, which
describes the basic principles by which things come into being. All
things have: 1) a 'material' cause, 2) a 'formal' cause, 3) an
'efficient' cause, and 4) a 'final' cause. A 'material' cause is the
material (or substance) out of which a thing comes into being. A
'formal' cause is the shape (or form) into which a thing comes into
being. An 'efficient' cause is the agent by which a thing comes into
being. A 'final' cause is the reason for which a thing comes into
being.

A cause of an effect may be 'mediate' (indirect) or
'immediate' (direct), 'total' or 'partial,' 'proximate' or 'remote,'
'potential' or 'actual.' Ockham argues that the 'final' cause of an
effect may not always be distinct from the 'efficient' cause of the
same effect (Quodlibeta, IV, Q. i). For example, God may be both the
'efficient' and 'final' cause of the same effect.

Ockham rejects the view of John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) that
universals have a formal existence outside the mind, and that
universals correspond to real things in the empirical world. Ockham
argues that, according to this view, singulars and universals are
formally distinct, but not really distinct. Ockham contends that
individual difference cannot be the same as common nature, and that
singulars and universals are really distinct and different things.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------­-----

FOOTNOTES

1Elizabeth Karger, "Ockham's Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and
Abstractive Cognition," in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited
by Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
p. 205.
2William of Ockham, "First Quodlibet, Question 1," in Quodlibetal
Questions, Volume I, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E.
Kelley (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) p. 5.
3Ockham, "First Quodlibet, Question 13," ibid., p.65.
4Ockham, "Fourth Quodlibet, Question 17," ibid., p. 315.
5Ockham, "First Quodlibet, Question 13," ibid., p. 65.
6Ockham, "Summa totius logicae, I, c.xv" in Philosophical Writings: A
Selection, translated by Philotheus Boehner (Indianopolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1990), o. 35.
7Ockham, "Ordinatio, D. II, Q. viii, prima redactio," ibid., p. 43.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Karger, Elizabeth. "Ockham's Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and
Abstractive Cognition," in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed.by
Paul Vincent Spade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999),
pp.
204-226.

Moody, Ernest A. "William of Ockham," in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards. New York: Crowell, Collier and
MacMillan (1967), pp. 306-317.

Ockham, William of. Quodlibetal Questions, Volumes 1 and 2.
Translated
by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1991.

Ockham, William of. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Translated
by
Philotheus Boehner. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990.

Copywright(c) 2003 Alex Scott

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On Feb 3, 8:30 pm, RaaN hotmail.com> wrote: