Re: Explanation Of Space And Time Without Using Sensory Existent Examples
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Re: Explanation Of Space And Time Without Using Sensory Existent Examples         

Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: Immortalist
Date: Jan 8, 2007 12:06

mikegordge@xtra.co.nz wrote:
> I challenged Kantian Knucmo, as I have many other Kantians now at this
> forum, to give an example of any idea, any concept, and or any theory
> of man's knowledge which can not be directly linked to, or which can
> not be reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
> perception.
>
> Kantian Knucmo has claimed, in his so called *refutation of Michael
> Gordge's doctrine*, that space and time are two such examples of man's
> concepts, used in the quest of man's knowledge, which are not directly
> linked to, which are not derived from, which can not be reduced right
> back down to an irreducible and sensory level of perception, he claims
> space and time exist as concepts not linked directly to sensory
> evidence / matter.
>
> Now, given also that Kantian Knucmo likes to consider himself a bit of
> a whizkid at things logical, he should therefore have no problem
> explaining the meaning of both space and time without resorting to any
> sensory evidence and examples.
>
> His challenge is to explain *10 minutes ago* and to do so, without
> resorting to any sensory evidence.
>

EXAMPLE: I seem to be having a memory, and memories seem logically to
require a time to happen in and a space to happen in. This seems to be
the best theory we can come up with and the strongest defensible
inductive conclusion. See, I have not resorted to sensory information
but to internal memories, but memories that probably formed 10 minutes
before as an interaction of self and it's space.

Back to 1771 for the immortal words of (Kant);

If we remove from our empirical concept of a body, one by one, every
feature in it which is [merely] empirical, the colour, the hardness or
softness, the weight, even the impenetrability, there still remains the
space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied, and this cannot
be removed. Again, if we remove from our empirical concept of any
object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience has
taught us, we yet cannot take away that property through which the
object is thought as substance or as inhering in a substance (although
this concept of substance is more determinate than that of an object in
general). Owing, therefore, to the necessity with which this concept of
substance forces itself upon us, we have no option save to admit that
it has its seat in our faculty of a priori knowledge.

Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any
experience. For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come
within our perception, if the representation of time were not
presupposed as underlying them a priori. Only on the presupposition of
time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at
one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times
(successively).

Time is a necessary representation that underlies all [A31/P075]
intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove
time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of
appearances. Time is, therefore, given a priori. In it alone is
actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may, one and all,
vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their possibility)
cannot itself be removed.

Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time. The
concept of time thus presupposes the perception of something existing
and of the succession of its determinations; that is to say, it
presupposes experience.

http://www.bright.net/~jclarke/kant/index.html
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html

http://www.4literature.net/Immanuel_Kant/Critique_of_Pure_Reason/

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/reason/ch01.htm

That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only
conditions of the existence of things as appearances; that, moreover,
we have no concepts of understanding, and consequently no elements for
the knowledge of things, save in so far as intuition can be given
corresponding to these concepts; and that we can therefore have no
knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is
an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance...Thus it does
indeed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason is
limited to mere objects of experience. ...though We cannot know these
objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to
think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in
the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything
that appears.
>
> Michael Gordge
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