>> Sounds reasonable to me.
Coherence theory: "An empirical belief is realatively true if and only
if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a
comprehensive account of reality."
Stephen J. Gould, the Harvard Paleontologist, offers this definition:
In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it
would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."
Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning.
An inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively
cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all
the competing hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true
on the basis of the evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept
a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, is
determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the
evidence, of all those with which it competes.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
C) New Knowledge as Undefeated Justification:
A Revisionist Alternative to the Skeptic
and the Epistemist
Let us reflect on the dispute between the skeptic and the epistemist.
The skeptic has proven that our perceptual beliefs and corrigible
beliefs generally are not completely justified in any way that
guarantees the truth of those beliefs and excludes all chance of
error. Must we concede the day to the skeptic? The arguments_of the
skeptic are formidable. What have we learned from her? We have learned
that all justification runs some risk of error. Any justification for
what we believe is fallible. When we seek a justification for what we
believe, the best we can find will inevitably fall short of
guaranteeing the truth of what we believe. Justification can aim at
truth but cannot eliminate the risk of error. If our search for
knowledge is the quest for complete justification and a guarantee of
truth, we must admit our ignorance and concede the day to the skeptic.
There is another way, however.
We can revise our conception of knowledge. We may redefine knowledge
without committing the redefinist fallacy by admitting that our new
conception is a revision. We can construct a new conception of
knowledge and make this new knowledge the object of our philosophical
quest. How can we do this? We begin by admitting that our
justification for what we believe remains fallibIe and falls short of
a complete justification. We continue by noting that the fallible
justification we do have tor our beliefs, the sort appealed to by the
internalist, for example, may prove a trustworthy and reliable guide
to truth. Such justification may lead us to truth without being based
on any false premise or assumption. These reflections show us how to
revise our conception of knowledge. The revisionist takes fallible
justification rather than complete justification as the basis of
knowledge, and affirms that when fallible justification for our
beliefs does not depend on error and leads us to truth, we attain a
new kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge based on fallible
justification becomes the legitimate object of philosophical and
scientific inquiry. In this way, revisionism transcends epistemism and
skepticism, combining the insights of both. We have not been able to
prove the skeptical hypotheses to be false. We believe, however, that
those hypotheses are fanciful, false constructions of the imagination,
rather than a truthful account of our world. We believe that our
perceptual beliefs about the objects we see, hear, and touch inform us
in a trustworthy way about the truth of those objects. We believe,
therefore, that beliefs that are justified by our internal standards
of justification, though those standards be fallible guides to truth,
are also externally connected with truth in a trustworthy and reliable
manner. We believe all this.
Suppose, in fact, that our fallible internal justification for our
perceptual beliefs and other corrigible beliefs does not rest on error
but instead leads us to truth in some trustworthy and reliable manner,
as the externalist maintains. Then a revised conception of knowledge
lies shining before us. One component is fallibilism, which we take
from the skeptic. Another component is internal justification, which
we take from the epistemist and the internalist. The final component,
which we take from the epistemist and the externalist, is that of
justification that is undefeated by error and that connects us with
truth in a trustworthy and reliable manner. It is easy to assemble the
components, as we have seen, to obtain a revised conception of
knowledge. Undefeated fallible justification is the new knowledge that
we seek.
It is the object of our inquiry. We cannot prove, as the skeptic has
taught us, that our justification is undefeated by error. We have
learned from her that some forms of error are invincible and beyond
detection. If some skeptical hypothesis of invincible deception is
true, then our justification is defeated and our perceptual beliefs
are errors. In that case, our situation is epistemically desperate,
and we must remain ignorant. If, however, we are right in thinking
that our perceptual beliefs will lead us to truth in a trustworthy
manner, as our internal standards of justification tell us, then our
fallible justification is undefeated, and we have new knowledge, If
there is an appropriate match between our beliefs about ourselves and
our perceptual relation to the external world, then internal
justification matches external justification, fallible justification
goes undefeated, and we obtain a new kind of knowledge.
We must, in conclusion, thank the skeptic for undermining our
dogmatism and our arrogance. She has shown us our fallibility. We may,
nevertheless, seek reasoning and justification that lead us to truth
in a reliable manner. The nobility of the goal of truth sustains the
undertaking. We enoble ourselves in seeking truth, even when we
realize that we may fail to obtain that noble objective. If the
justification we find does not rest on error and enables us to reach
the truth, we shall have attained our revised kind of knowledge. This
new knowledge is based on a fallible quest for truth without any
guarantee of sucess; we may attain it, though we cannot prove that we
will. To the skeptic who asks for proof that we shall succeed, we must
put our hands over our mouths in silence. We have no proof. We may,
however, invite her to join our quest for truth and the new kind of
knowledge we seek. Once we admit to the skeptic that she is right and
we have no guarantee of success, she, being a woman of insight and
character, who has, moreover, freed us of our dogmatism and arrogance,
may join as a sympathetic friend in our noble undertaking. We may say
to her, "Let us reason further with one another to find some fallible
justificafion to lead us to the truth in what interests us, concerning
freedom, mind, God and morals," and she, our brilliant adversary, will
become a friend to our philosophical undertaking. The modesty
resulting from a recognition of our own fallibility becomes us, opens
the road to inquiry and removes the roadblocks to understanding.
Revisionism combines the insights of skepticism and epistemism in
harmony.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
