Re: Darwinism Destroys Traditional Morality (Slavery, Genocide, Child Murder, Terror, etc.)
  Home FAQ Contact Sign in
alt.philosophy only
 
Advanced search
POPULAR GROUPS

more...

 Up
Re: Darwinism Destroys Traditional Morality (Slavery, Genocide, Child Murder, Terror, etc.)         

Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: Immortalist
Date: Sep 21, 2007 20:24

"*Anarcissie*" gmail.com> wrote in message news:
1190386096.300109.97630@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
> On Sep 20, 10:35 pm, Immortalist yahoo.com> wrote:
>> On Sep 20, 11:11 am, *Anarcissie* gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Sep 20, 12:30 am, Immortalist yahoo.com> wrote
>
>>>> Very interesting post and it would take some time to respond the main
>>>> points. The argument you base on slavery made me think of the quite
>>>> below. I want to reply to other parts later.
>>
>>>> On Human Nature - Edward O. Wilson 1978http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/067463442X/
>>
>>>> And more: individual human beings can be expected to resist too great
>>>> a divergence between the two evolutionary tracks. Somewhere in the
>>>> mind, as Lionel Trilling said in Beyond Culture, "there is a hard,
>>>> irreducible, stubborn core of biological urgency, and biological
>>>> necessity, and biological reason, that culture cannot reach and that
>>>> reserves the right, which sooner or later it will exercise, to judge
>>>> the culture and resist and revise it."
>>
>>>> Such biological refractoriness is illustrated by the failure of
>>>> slavery as a human institution.
>>
>>> E. O. Wilson is a curious bird. The argument below
>>> depends on the systematic recrudescence of slavery,
>>> so (in the argument) slavery is just as much a "success"
>>> as it is a "failure", and just as we could attribute the
>>> decline of slavery to biology, so we attribute its
>>> recurrence to the same cause.
>>
>>> Actually, the recurrence of advances and declines
>>> in slavery don't tell us about any "hard, irreducible,
>>> stubborn core of biological urgency, and biological
>>> necessity, and biological reason, that culture cannot
>>> reach." That's just more of the romantic hogwash of
>>> which E.O. was so fond. The appearance of
>>> slavery may well have to do with social and
>>> ecological factors for which there is no particular
>>> biological coding.
>>
>> You claim something Wilson says if romantic hogwash, care to give an
>> example?
>
> _Consilience_.
>

Isn't that book a thesis on Interdisciplinarity? Thats been around
much longer than Wilson's thesis. Mainly they have been able to be
found, in compilations of various authors from various disciplines
working upon agreed upon themes, at college libraries.

Interdisciplinarity is the act of drawing from two or more academic
disciplines and integrating their insights to work together in pursuit
of a common goal. "Interdisciplinary Studies", as they are called, use
interdisciplinarity to develop a greater understanding of a problem
that is too complex or wide-ranging (i.e. AIDS pandemic, global
warming) to be dealt with using the knowledge and methodology of just
one discipline.

Interdisciplinary programs sometimes arise from a shared conviction
that the traditional disciplines are unable or unwilling to address an
important problem. For example, social science disciplines such as
anthropology and sociology paid little attention to the social
analysis of technology throughout most of the twentieth century. As a
result, many social scientists with interests in technology have
joined science and technology studies programs, which are typically
staffed by scholars drawn from numerous disciplines (including
anthropology, history, philosophy, sociology, and women's studies).
They may also arise from new research developments, such as
nanotechnology, which cannot be addressed without combining the
approaches of two or more disciplines. Examples include quantum
information processing, which amalgamates elements of quantum physics
and computer science, and bioinformatics, which combines molecular
biology with computer science. In a sense, those who pursue
Interdisciplinary Studies degrees or practice interdisciplinarity in
their lives are seen as pioneers (and even risk-takers) at the cutting
edge of scholarship, science, and technology. In this way,
interdisciplinarians are able to acknowledge and combat the present
and future problems of humanity.

At another level, interdisciplinarity is seen as a remedy to the
intellectually deadening effects of excessive specialization. On some
views, however, interdisciplinarity is entirely indebted to those who
specialize in one field of study--that without specialists,
interdisciplinarians would have no information and no leading experts
to consult. Others place the focus of interdisciplinarity on the need
to transcend disciplines, viewing excessive specialization as
problematic both epistemologically and politically. When
interdisciplinary collaboration or research results in new solutions
to problems, much information is given back to the various disciplines
involved. Therefore, both disciplinarians and interdisciplinarians
must work complementary to each other in order to solve problems.

However, French sociologist and interdisciplinary scholar, Mattei
Dogan has criticized the widely held view that interdisciplinarity,
despite its etymology, involves merging two traditional disciplines.
As demonstrated in his article "The New Social Sciences: Cracks in the
Disciplinary Walls," interdisciplinary research does not, in fact,
entail crossing whole disciplines, but in crossing specialties. In
Dogan's view, by attempting to cross disciplines so vast as political
science and sociology, for example, the research can only become lost
in an ocean of literature. In this sense, any researcher seeking to
cross whole disciplines is doomed from the outset. For him, the true
meaning of interdisciplinarity lies in crossing specialties within
disciplines, or the hybridization of disciplinary fragments

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interdisciplinarity
>> Please describe a counter-theory also.
>
> No counter-theory is necessary, since Wilson's view
> of the facts is blinkered, even in the light of common
> knowledge and common sense.
>

Do you mean there is no counter theory to interdiscipliarity generally
or just Wilson's take on it? I can think of many counter theories to
both.
> If Wilson said, "Human beings constantly seek to
> reduce others to slavery, and constantly seek to
> resist slavery for themselves," then he might be
> talking about the facts and then it might be
> worthwhile to compose theories to explain the
> facts, biological or otherwise. But Wilson is not
> in the realm of the factual, and I am not interested
> in making up theories about his fantasies.
>

Can you define this "realm of factual" with some examples of what is
factual and what is overly theoretical? Maybe your trying to say that
no theories from any social sciences shall be allowed, or perhaps your
requesting a rule that only Wilson's theories of social science shall
not be allowed. As for the "factual" don't a majority of scientists
claim that most things considered as laws of physics, such as the
theory of gravity, are just inductive theories based upon
explainations about observations? Are you supposing that the science
facts you accepts are deductive?
>> Normally I wouldn't
>> request such a thing but your language is getting close to an Appeal
>> to Ridicule fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for
>> evidence in an "argument."
>
> This case is particularly funny because Wilson,
> wishing Man to be Good, promotes a just-so
> story about Man constantly striving to overthrow
> slavery. But where did the slavery come from,
> and why does it recur so often and persist for so
> long in so many cases? Wilson looks the other
> way, because _that_ doesn't fit in with his fairy
> tale. I guess it was imposed by the Saturnian
> ant men.
>

The name calling seriously subtracts from your argument. In philosophy
it is always wise to let your facts and theories speak for themselves.
This ant man thing makes it appear that you need something other than
good science to make your case. It would also seem an irresponsible
act in a philosophy group to at least not to mention your error;

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/ad-hominem.html

In my opinion slavery probably comes from tribes having had taken
prisoners in wars for thousands of generations. Actually there is
probably an entire suite of human instincts involved in such social
trends. Ultimately it is probably some counter impulses to other
impulses, ultimately whos assembly was directed by the genes which
were selected for, for various reasons.

Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/

...genes and culture are held together by an elastic but unbreakable
leash. As culture surges forward by means of innovation and the
introduction of new ideas and artifacts from the outside, it is
constrained and directed to some extent by the genes. At the same
time, the pressure of cultural innovation affects the survival of the
genes and ultimately alters the strength and torque of the genetic
leash.

...Gene-culture coevolution is a radical process. The differences
among individuals made possible by higher intelligence and culture
enormously increase the potential for natural selection and genetic
evolution. No longer do the genes dictate one or a very few behaviors-
instead the mind intervenes decisively. Ranging widely, it creates a
much greater array of actions. It permits each combination of genes to
have multiple expressions and offers alternative solutions to most
problems within a single lifetime. Because the mind judges the
circumstances of the moment and reflects on the broader implications
of its own decisions, it can address the ordinary contingencies of
life with greater moment-to-moment competence than the tightly
programed responses of animals. In effect, the mutation rate of
behavioral responses is vastly increased, and the genes that
capacitated the responses are tested more rapidly than in ordinary,
instinct-guided species.

As a result, evolution is accelerated. The genes continue to hold
culture on a leash; in each generation the prevailing epigen-etic
rules of mental development affect which cultural innovations will be
invented and which will be adopted. Yet culture is not just a passive
entity. It is a force so powerful in its own right that it drags the
genes along. Working as a rapid mutator, it throws new variations into
the teeth of natural selection and changes the epigenetic rules across
generations.

...do moral codes exist in the absence of organic evolution? If there
are such guideposts, the is/ought distinction is preserved. What the
human species is at each stage in its evolution cannot be confused
with what it ought to be. But if there are no such guideposts, the
distinction does not exist.

A few modern philosophers, in recognizing this dilemma, have argued
that the evolutionary explanation of human ethical values cannot by
itself disprove the existence of absolute values outside the mind.
Human beings may well be in the process of tracking the external
truths by both genetic and cultural means. Just as a primitive ability
to count objects and form abstract concepts has led to the discovery
of elaborate mathematical theorems far beyond the needs of human
survival, further moral reasoning could uncover ethical precepts that
hold true for any genetic constitution that the human species may
choose for itself in future generations. Once discovered, such
adamantine truths can then serve as the lodestar of further cultural
and genetic change.

But the philosophers and theologians have not yet shown us how the
final ethical truths will be recognized as things apart from the
idiosyncratic development of the human mind. In the meantime, by
appealing to the core principles of neurobiology, evolutionary theory,
and cognitive science, practitioners of a new human science can reach
a deeper understanding of why we feel certain courses of action to be
intrinsically correct. They can help us to understand why we have
moral feelings. For now, though, the scientists can offer no guidance
on whether we are really correct in making certain decisions, because
no way is known to define what is correct without total reference to
the moral feelings under scrutiny. Perhaps this is the ultimate burden
of the free will bequeathed to us by our genes: in the final analysis,
even when we know what we are likely to do and why, each of us must
still choose.

The challenge to science and philosophy to solve this dilemma is very
great-in our opinion, there is none greater. Society, through its laws
and institutions, already regulates behavior. But it does so in
virtual blind ignorance of the deep reaches of human nature. By
relying on moral intuition, on those satisfying visceral feelings of
right and wrong, people remain enslaved by their genes and culture.
Their minds develop along the channels set by the hereditary
epigenetic rules, and while they exercise free will in moment-by-
moment choices, this faculty remains superficial and its value to the
individual is largely illusory. Only by penetrating to the physical
basis of moral thought and considering its evolutionary meaning will
people have the power to control their own lives. They will then be in
a better position to choose ethical precepts and the forms of social
regulation needed to maintain the precepts.

Social engineering has the potential of profoundly altering every part
of human behavior. It will not always affirm the status quo, as in the
case of incest avoidance. Some very human propensities, which may have
been of great adaptive value in the stone age, are now largely self-
destructive. The most virulent of these, aggression and xenophobia,
can be blunted. Other equally human propensities for altruism and
cooperation might be enhanced. The value of institutions and forms of
government can be more accurately judged, alternative procedures laid
out, and steps cautiously suggested. Economists and corporate
planners, once aware of the facts of human nature and measuring more
than material transactions, should be able to devise more effective
policies.

Close self-examination and the planned manipulation of values can be a
distasteful exercise. But in a world growing steadily more complicated
and dangerous, the alternatives are not promising. A society that
chooses to ignore the existence of the innate epigenetic rules will
nevertheless continue to navigate by them and at each moment of
decision yield to their dictates by default. Economic policy, moral
tenets, the practices of child-rearing, and almost every other social
activity will be guided by inner feelings whose origins are beyond
comprehension. Such a society cannot effectively challenge the ancient
hereditary oracle dwelling within the epigenetic rules. It will
continue to live by the "conscience" of its members and by "God's
will." Such an archaic procedure just might, by fantastic good
fortune, lead in the most direct and untroubled manner to a stable and
wholly benevolent world. More likely, it will perpetuate conflict and
continue to drag humanity relentlessly along what is at best a
tortuous and agonizing path.

On the other hand, the deep scientific study of the epigenetic rules
will call the oracle to account and translate its commands into a
precise language that can be understood and debated. People who know
human nature in this way are more likely to agree on universal goals
within the constraints of that nature and recognize absolute ethical
truths, if such can be shown to exist. And though societies cannot
escape the inborn rules of epigen-esis, and would lose the very
essence of humanness if they even came close to succeeding, they can
employ knowledge of the rules to guide individual behavior and
cultural evolution to the ends on which their members may someday
agree.

Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/

...by appealing to the core principles of neurobiology, evolutionary
theory, and cognitive science, practitioners of a new human science
can reach a deeper understanding of why we feel certain courses of
action to be intrinsically correct. They can help us to understand why
we have moral feelings. For now, though, the scientists can offer no
guidance on whether we are really correct in making certain decisions,
because no way is known to define what is correct without total
reference to the moral feelings under scrutiny. Perhaps this is the
ultimate burden of the free will bequeathed to us by our genes: in the
final analysis, even when we know what we are likely to do and why,
each of us must still choose.

The challenge to science and philosophy to solve this dilemma is very
great-in our opinion, there is none greater. Society, through its laws
and institutions, already regulates behavior. But it does so in
virtual blind ignorance of the deep reaches of human nature. By
relying on moral intuition, on those satisfying visceral feelings of
right and wrong, people remain enslaved by their genes and culture.
Their minds develop along the channels set by the hereditary
epigenetic rules, and while they exercise free will in moment-by-
moment choices, this faculty remains superficial and its value to the
individual is largely illusory. Only by penetrating to the physical
basis of moral thought and considering its evolutionary meaning will
people have the power to control their own lives. They will then be in
a better position to choose ethical precepts and the forms of social
regulation needed to maintain the precepts.

Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/
> You want me to take this sort of thing seriously?
>
> Anyway, what does it have to do with an article
> in which, once again, religious fanatics once
> again prove that they can't distinguish science
> from religion, ethics, and so on? Is it that
> Wilson, like the religious fanatics, thinks that
> if he wants something to be so, it must be so?
>

I was responding to one specific paragraph of Trumpets post. Sorry if
it appeared off topic. The text I pasted was not meant to be final or
conclusive but merely to show that there are other theories out there
that don't agree with what he said.

he said;
> at best Darwinism can only report our natural ambivalence with regard
> to slavery without giving us any compelling reason to either choose or
> reject it... in light of the ambivalence of our natural desires, both
> slavery and freedom are in some sense natural.... A moral theory that
> cannot persuasively condemn slavery cannot, of course, repudiate any
> less extreme forms of injustice or tyranny, whether perpetrated by
> majorities, minorities, or individual despotic rulers. [p. 95]

Did you miss that in my last response or do you like to get people to
answer the same question twice?
> Ridicule? We are surrounded by fools and
> charlatans. A majority of our fellow citizens
> believe in flying saucers, astrology, and
> Creationism. Surely we can allow ourselves
> a little mockery.
>

X = an attempt to justify ridicule because others do it.

The Appeal to Popularity has the following form:

Most people approve of X (have favorable emotions towards X).

Therefore X is true.

The basic idea is that a claim is accepted as being true simply
because most people are favorably inclined towards the claim. More
formally, the fact that most people have favorable emotions associated
with the claim is substituted in place of actual evidence for the
claim. A person falls prey to this fallacy if he accepts a claim as
being true simply because most other people approve of the claim.

It is clearly fallacious to accept the approval of the majority as
evidence for a claim. For example, suppose that a skilled speaker
managed to get most people to absolutely love the claim that 1+1=3. It
would still not be rational to accept this claim simply because most
people approved of it. After all, mere approval is no substitute for a
mathematical proof. At one time people approved of claims such as "the
world is flat", "humans cannot survive at speeds greater than 25 miles
per hour", "the sun revolves around the earth" but all these claims
turned out to be false.

This sort of "reasoning" is quite common and can be quite an effective
persusasive device. Since most humans tend to conform with the views
of the majority, convincing a person that the majority approves of a
claim is often an effective way to get him to accept it. Advertisers
often use this tactic when they attempt to sell products by claiming
that everyone uses and loves their products. In such cases they hope
that people will accept the (purported) approval of others as a good
reason to buy the product.

This fallacy is vaguely similar to such fallacies as Appeal to Belief
and Appeal to Common Practice. However, in the case of an Ad Populum
the appeal is to the fact that most people approve of a claim. In the
case of an Appeal to Belief, the appeal is to the fact that most
people believe a claim. In the case of an Appeal to Common Practice,
the appeal is to the fact that many people take the action in
question.

This fallacy is closely related to the Appeal to Emotion fallacy, as
discussed in the entry for that fallacy.

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-popularity.html
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html
>
>
>
>
>
no comments
diggit! del.icio.us! reddit!