On 28 Apr, 20:29, "Don H" bigpond.com> wrote:
> "someone2"
btinternet.com> wrote in message
>
> news:9ab22a94-a599-4d3a-9484-c37d6a84d870@w74g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
> On 25 Apr, 22:04, "Don H" bigpond.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>> "someone2" btinternet.com> wrote in message
>
>
>>> Video, ergo "ego" sum. (I see, therefore "I" am.)
>>> Australia, having developed a bionic ear, is now attempting a bionic
> eye.
>>> This might link in with giving computers eyes.
>>> At present, computers have no way of knowing they are entities distinct
>>> from their environment.
>>> Some robots might be given eyes or other sensory devices, such that a
>>> mobile robot can avoid obstacles.
>>> But with miniaturisation of computer "brains" comes the possibility of
>>> androids, fully-equipped with sensory organs, and thus ability to become
>>> self-aware. "I. robot"....
>>> Indeed, a Deterministic view of our Material Universe, can, conversely,
>>> picture us Humans as essentially robotic - all our thoughts and actions
>> are
>>> "programmed" from past causal events. That I am typing this post on an
> NG
>>> today, is entirely due to causal factors. But that I am aware I am doing
>> so
>>> is due to a sensory distinction between "myself" and my computer, etc.
>>> When I die, my communal cell-structure will disintegrate, and "I" shall
>>> cease to function and thus exist. "Nothing of my ego will remain"
>> (Bertrand
>>> Russell). You can have a brain without a mind (human "vegetable"), but
> not
>>> a mind without a brain - religious "spiritualism" notwithstanding.
>>> An Android is a possibility, and that it will be self-aware is quite
>>> likely. But sensory organs are necessary.
>
>> When you say self aware, are you suggesting that the robot might have
>> a first person perspective similar to something like that shown in the
>> terminator movie, that there would be a "what it is like" to be the
>> robot?
>
>> # Yes, a good example. The Terminator is aware of its own existence, and
>> can seek out clothes, weapons, etc, to fulfil its purpose. It is robotic
>> (slave-like) in that its sole aim in "life" is to destroy Sarah Connor,
>> having been programmed for this purpose. Like a suicide-bomber (or the
>> average soldier) it will sacrifice its own life to fulfil its aim.
>> I claim that such an animated computer needs to be able to distinguish
>> "itself" from its surroundings, by sensory input, to have any idea of
> "ego".
>> With us humans, this first comes when a new-born child begins to see Mum,
>> and Dad, as separate entities from itself, hovering over the cot. In all
>> respects a kid merely yells to get what it wants, without knowing what it
>> wants, or why it wants it Mum and Dad are "service robots" who must figure
>> out what the kid needs. I baby is the supreme egotist - it has to be, for
>> survival.
>
> I don't understand how you suggest it could have a perspective like
> that. Consider the robot with its robot eye looking at a tree. You
> seem to be suggesting that it could have a first person perspective as
> in the Terminator Movie, where there is a tree.
>
> The problem becomes apparent when we investigate what is being
> suggested. Now suppose the binary input going from the robot eye to
> the robot brain was I, and an output from the robot brain related to
> it, was O (perhaps going to some speaker system, causing "I see a
> tree" to be said).
>
> Now if the robot brain were placed inside a vat, with a million mile
> thick lead walls, and it were fed input I, and it gave output O, the
> suggestion would be that it would still experience the first person
> perspective, as depicted in the Terminator movie, of the tree.
>
> Though what if the input source were infact not a robot eye looking at
> a tree, but a drum machine, and the output destination were not a
> speaker system, but a controller of fairy lights. Just to be clear, we
> are still talking about input I, and output O. In this scenario, what
> the processing represents, is what fairy lights were to go on, given
> the sound input. Thus you can see, that the function the processing is
> actually serving (what the processing represents) would depend on the
> context, and that as there is no information passed which could give
> the context, and no way to know the context through 1 million mile
> thick lead walls, and no placing the likelyhood of the processing
> being for one context/function over another based on purpose. So how
> could it be suggested that the robot had a first person perspective,
> such as in the Terminator movie, seeing a tree, without the suggestion
> of purpose (of it representing a tree more than it represents which
> fairy lights should go on dependent on sound, or another billion
> possible representations dependent on what the input sources, or
> output destinations were), linking the processing to the
> representation of a tree.
>
> Do you understand the point I am making?
>
> # Â I think so. Â Our concept of "I" relates to our realisation that each of
> us is a separate entity from others and from our environment - and this is
> gained from sensory input.
> Â Â This may be a necessary, but not sufficient condition, and more may be
> needed. Â However, an Android can be constructed from an examination of
> Humans, and, unless you consider we Humans are somehow unique, then our Ego
> can be replicated in a an Android. Â But first we need to know how an Ego is
> constructed. Â It is essentially mental; a focal point in our psyche, maybe
> like the active part of CPU of a computer, at any given moment.
> Â Â The modern computer is a mere machine, and has no senses. Â Give it
> senses, and see what happens.
> Â Â Also, a computer may know "words" as binary combinations, but has no
> knowledge of words as names of external things. Â Again, senses are needed
> before "dog" can be programmed as a generic term of experience of many dogs
> (as visual objects). Â Yes, a long way to go before we get to Android stage.
>
Well if you did understand my point you certainly didn't address how
the robot could be suggested to have a first person perspective
without the suggestion of purpose, you seemed just to assume a
physicalist perspective, and assume that we were simply biological
robots.
Though if you had understood the point, it was that you couldn't
explain the robot having a first person perspective, of a tree for
example, without purpose (the placing the likelyhood of it
representing one context being more likely than it representing
another, due to the suggestion that the processing would be more
purposeful for the given context), and physicalism doesn't allow
purpose.
So perhaps you'd be best to re-evaluate your assumptions. Don't assume
that we are a biological robot, and then consider how you could even
suggest that a robot could have a first person perspective of a tree,
if there were nothing but the physical. You'll find that you can't
without relying somewhere on purpose, which wouldn't be allowed, if
indeed there was nothing but the physical.