> Immortalist says...
>
Dam, your good man, and make me cut to the chase;
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
C) New Knowledge as Undefeated Justification:
A Revisionist Alternative to the Skeptic
and the Epistemist
Let us reflect on the dispute between the skeptic and the epistemist.
The skeptic has proven that our perceptual beliefs and corrigible
beliefs generally are not completely justified in any way that
guarantees the truth of those beliefs and excludes all chance of error.
Must we concede the day to the skeptic? The arguments_of the skeptic
are formidable. What have we learned from her? We have learned that all
justification runs some risk of error. Any justification for what we
believe is fallible. When we seek a justification for what we believe,
the best we can find will inevitably fall short of guaranteeing the
truth of what we believe. Justification can aim at truth but cannot
eliminate the risk of error. If our search for knowledge is the quest
for complete justification and a guarantee of truth, we must admit our
ignorance and concede the day to the skeptic. There is another way,
however.
We can revise our conception of knowledge. We may redefine knowledge
without committing the redefinist fallacy by admitting that our new
conception is a revision. We can construct a new conception of
knowledge and make this new knowledge the object of our philosophical
quest. How can we do this? We begin by admitting that our justification
for what we believe remains fallibIe and falls short of a complete
justification. We continue by noting that the fallible justification we
do have tor our beliefs, the sort appealed to by the internalist, for
example, may prove a trustworthy and reliable guide to truth. Such
justification may lead us to truth without being based on any false
premise or assumption. These reflections show us how to revise our
conception of knowledge. The revisionist takes fallible justification
rather than complete justification as the basis of knowledge, and
affirms that when fallible justification for our beliefs does not
depend on error and leads us to truth, we attain a new kind of
knowledge. This kind of knowledge based on fallible justification
becomes the legitimate object of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
In this way, revisionism transcends epistemism and skepticism,
combining the insights of both. We have not been able to prove the
skeptical hypotheses to be false. We believe, however, that those
hypotheses are fanciful, false constructions of the imagination, rather
than a truthful account of our world. We believe that our perceptual
beliefs about the objects we see, hear, and touch inform us in a
trustworthy way about the truth of those objects. We believe,
therefore, that beliefs that are justified by our internal standards of
justification, though those standards be fallible guides to truth, are
also externally connected with truth in a trustworthy and reliable
manner. We believe all this.
Suppose, in fact, that our fallible internal justification for our
perceptual beliefs and other corrigible beliefs does not rest on error
but instead leads us to truth in some trustworthy and reliable manner,
as the externalist maintains. Then a revised conception of knowledge
lies shining before us. One component is fallibilism, which we take
from the skeptic. Another component is internal justification, which we
take from the epistemist and the internalist. The final component,
which we take from the epistemist and the externalist, is that of
justification that is undefeated by error and that connects us with
truth in a trustworthy and reliable manner. It is easy to assemble the
components, as we have seen, to obtain a revised conception of
knowledge. Undefeated fallible justification is the new knowledge that
we seek.
It is the object of our inquiry. We cannot prove, as the skeptic has
taught us, that our justification is undefeated by error. We have
learned from her that some forms of error are invincible and beyond
detection. If some skeptical hypothesis of invincible deception is
true, then our justification is defeated and our perceptual beliefs are
errors. In that case, our situation is epistemically desperate, and we
must remain ignorant. If, however, we are right in thinking that our
perceptual beliefs will lead us to truth in a trustworthy manner, as
our internal standards of justification tell us, then our fallible
justification is undefeated, and we have new knowledge, If there is an
appropriate match between our beliefs about ourselves and our
perceptual relation to the external world, then internal justification
matches external justification, fallible justification goes undefeated,
and we obtain a new kind of knowledge.
We must, in conclusion, thank the skeptic for undermining our dogmatism
and our arrogance. She has shown us our fallibility. We may,
nevertheless, seek reasoning and justification that lead us to truth in
a reliable manner. The nobility of the goal of truth sustains the
undertaking. We enoble ourselves in seeking truth, even when we realize
that we may fail to obtain that noble objective. If the justification
we find does not rest on error and enables us to reach the truth, we
shall have attained our revised kind of knowledge. This new knowledge
is based on a fallible quest for truth without any guarantee of sucess;
we may attain it, though we cannot prove that we will. To the skeptic
who asks for proof that we shall succeed, we must put our hands over
our mouths in silence. We have no proof. We may, however, invite her to
join our quest for truth and the new kind of knowledge we seek. Once we
admit to the skeptic that she is right and we have no guarantee of
success, she, being a woman of insight and character, who has,
moreover, freed us of our dogmatism and arrogance, may join as a
sympathetic friend in our noble undertaking. We may say to her, "Let us
reason further with one another to find some fallible justificafion to
lead us to the truth in what interests us, concerning freedom, mind,
God and morals," and she, our brilliant adversary, will become a friend
to our philosophical undertaking. The modesty resulting from a
recognition of our own fallibility becomes us, opens the road to
inquiry and removes the roadblocks to understanding. Revisionism
combines the insights of skepticism and epistemism in harmony.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
