|
|
 Up |
|
|
  |
Author: ImmortalistImmortalist Date: Oct 12, 2006 08:55
Suppose I say that I know that there is someone standing outside the
door. What must be the case for this claim of mine to be correct?
1. I must believe or think that someone is outside the door. I must
not, for example, be telling a lie. For if, in saying 'There is someone
outside the door', I am telling a lie, then I do not believe it and
cannot be said to know it. (This holds even if, by chance, there does
happen to be someone outside the door, so that my statement happens to
be true. I still told a lie, said something I did not believe to be
true, and so did not know that someone was outside the door.) So the
first condition for the truth of a statement of the form 'A knows that
P' (where A is a person and P a proposition) is that A genuinely
believes that P. But clearly belief is not enough: I may genuinely
believe that someone is outside the door, but if in fact there is no
one there I will not be said to know it.
Belief is a necessary condition
for knowledge but not a
sufficient condition.
|
| Show full article (2.71Kb) |
|
| | 71 Comments |
|
|
Author: Daryl McCulloughDaryl McCullough Date: Oct 12, 2006 09:51
Immortalist says...
>Conclusion:
>
>So we now have three conditions for knowledge. For a statement of the
>form 'A knows that P' to be correct, it must be the case that:
>
>(1) A believes that P
>
>(2) P is true
>
>(3) A can justify his belief that P.
Actually, that's not sufficient, either. It can be the case
that A believes P, that P is true, that A can justify his
belief in P, yet A's justification is itself faulty.
For example: Suppose that Joe believes that Sparky the dog
has wet fur. You ask why he believes that, and he says: "Because
Sparky just came in from outside, and it's raining outside."
In fact, Sparky was not outside, but his hair is wet because
he has just been given a bath.
|
| Show full article (1.09Kb) |
|
| | 3 Comments |
|
|
Author: ImmortalistImmortalist Date: Oct 12, 2006 10:15
Daryl McCullough wrote:
> Immortalist says...
>
>>Conclusion:
>>
>>So we now have three conditions for knowledge. For a statement of the
>>form 'A knows that P' to be correct, it must be the case that:
>>
>>(1) A believes that P
>>
>>(2) P is true
>>
>>(3) A can justify his belief that P.
>
> Actually, that's not sufficient, either. It can be the case
> that A believes P, that P is true, that A can justify his
> belief in P, yet A's justification is itself faulty.
>
> For example: Suppose that Joe believes that Sparky the dog
> has wet fur. You ask why he believes that, and he says: "Because ...
|
| Show full article (7.80Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: Daniel T.Daniel T. Date: Oct 12, 2006 12:08
"Immortalist" yahoo.com> wrote:
> Suppose I say that I know that there is someone standing outside the
> door. What must be the case for this claim of mine to be correct?
>
> 1. I must believe or think that someone is outside the door...
|
| Show full article (2.49Kb) |
| 41 Comments |
|
|
Author: Peter_SmithPeter_Smith Date: Oct 12, 2006 15:32
> Stop right there. There is no "P is true" without the justification. "P
> is true" and "A can justify his belief that P." are identical statements.
Good heavens above! Who is this "A" who has perfect access to the
truth, and for every true proposition P can justify his belief that P?
God, perhaps?
|
| |
| 36 Comments |
|
|
Author: a_frienda_friend Date: Oct 12, 2006 17:09
Immortalist wrote:
> Suppose I say that I know that there is someone standing outside the
> door. What must be the case for this claim of mine to be correct?
>
> 1. I must believe or think that someone is outside the door. I must
> not, for example, be telling a lie. For if, in saying 'There is someone
> outside the door', I am telling a lie, then I do not believe it and
> cannot be said to know it. (This holds even if, by chance, there does
> happen to be someone outside the door, so that my statement happens to
> be true. I still told a lie, said something I did not believe to be
> true, and so did not know that someone was outside the door.) So the
> first condition for the truth of a statement of the form 'A knows that
> P' (where A is a person and P a proposition) is that A genuinely
> believes that P. But clearly belief is not enough: I may genuinely
> believe that someone is outside the door, but if in fact there is no
> one there I will not be said to know it.
>
> Belief is a necessary condition
> for knowledge but not a
> sufficient condition. ...
|
| Show full article (1.40Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: Brian FletcherBrian Fletcher Date: Oct 12, 2006 18:12
> Suppose I say that I know that there is someone standing outside the
> door. What must be the case for this claim of mine to be correct?
>
> 1. I must believe or think that someone is outside the door. I must
> not, for example, be telling a lie. For if, in saying 'There is someone
> outside the door', I am telling a lie, then I do not believe it and
> cannot be said to know it. (This holds even if, by chance, there does
> happen to be someone outside the door, so that my statement happens to
> be true. I still told a lie, said something I did not believe to be
> true, and so did not know that someone was outside the door.) So the
> first condition for the truth of a statement of the form 'A knows that
> P' (where A is a person and P a proposition) is that A genuinely
> believes that P. But clearly belief is not enough: I may genuinely
> believe that someone is outside the door, but if in fact there is no
> one there I will not be said to know it.
>
> Belief is a necessary condition
> for knowledge but not a ...
|
| Show full article (3.64Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: Craig FranckCraig Franck Date: Oct 12, 2006 18:39
"Daryl McCullough" wrote
> Immortalist says...
>
>>Conclusion:
>>
>>So we now have three conditions for knowledge. For a statement of the
>>form 'A knows that P' to be correct, it must be the case that:
>>
>>(1) A believes that...
|
| Show full article (2.22Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
Author: Daniel T.Daniel T. Date: Oct 12, 2006 19:58
"Peter_Smith" cam.ac.uk> wrote:
>> Stop right there. There is no "P is true" without the
>> justification. "P is true" and "A can justify his belief that P."
>> are identical statements.
>
> Good heavens above! Who is this "A" who has perfect access to the
> truth, and for every true proposition P can justify his belief that
> P? God, perhaps?
Not at all. To say "P is true" is merely to say, "I believe P and have
justification for that belief." There is nothing else.
I cannot convince you P is true without justifying my belief in P.
--
There are two things that simply cannot be doubted, logic and perception.
Doubt those, and you no longer
|
| |
| 34 Comments |
|
|
|
|
|
Author: Nam NguyenNam Nguyen Date: Oct 12, 2006 20:17
Peter_Smith wrote:
>> Stop right there. There is no "P is true" without the justification. "P
>> is true" and "A can justify his belief that P." are identical statements.
>
> Good heavens above! Who is this "A" who has perfect access to the
> truth, and for every true proposition P can justify his belief that P?
> God, perhaps?
No, not God! His Kingdom is too far away that our mortal beliefs,
one way or another, won't have anything to do with Him. "A" is actually
any of us, doing reasoning. Truth must be assumable/interpretable and
without one who's doing the assumption/interpretation there is no
truth to talk about. (Though one must be consistent about assumptions
and interpretation of course.)
So, "There is no 'P is true' *without* the justification".
--
-----------------------------------------------------
|
| Show full article (1.01Kb) |
| no comments |
|
|
|
|
