"andy-k" wrote in
news:PU_ck.208113$Ek2.158487@newsfe17.ams2:
> But there can never be certainty. There is no "essential attribute"
> that we can tune-into in order to decide whether or not an object is
> conscious.
The relevant question is, Are there attributes essential for an
imputation of consciousness to an entity to have explanatory value? (And
if imputing it has no explanatory value, why bother imputing it?)
> Reasoning leads us to
> extend the tendency to employ form/function as criteria, but there is
> another mode of reasoning that suggests otherwise (and one to which
> you don't subscribe, but that's a different argument).
Now you've aroused my curiosity.
??
>> Would we have that in cases of alien plant creatures or "thinking
>> machines"? Is consciousness (in the sense of #2 or #1) ruled out
>> *tout court* for those entities, in your view?
> Consciousness can never be ruled out *tout court*, and this is my
> point.
Not even in sense #1 ("unified first-person subjective perspective upon
a world")?
>>> I use these two synonymously in an assumed association
>>> with a person who is responsive to environmental stimuli.
>>
>> Persons only, or could those also apply to animals, aliens, and
>> thinking machines?
>
> I think the term "first-person" answers that question by itself.
That seems to imply that a first-person perspective is ruled out for
non-persons by definition. Could we preserve the substance of the
question by using "first-entity perspective"?
>> Yes, agreed (but I think our uses of that term have been the same).
>> BTW, I sort subjective states into 3 broad classes: efferent states
>> (associated with the arrival of particular sensory stimuli), afferent
>> states (states associated with different assessments of the
>> organism's current well-being, e.g., happiness, sadness, anger,
>> fear, anxiety, etc.), and motivational states (desire & aversion in
>> varying degrees). Each state presents itself to the organism as a
>> distinct (and ineffable) impression, sensation, or "feeling."
> Then there seems to be a difference between a subjective state and a
> subjective perspective upon the world, in that the latter is comprised
> of subjective states.
Yes. An entity which experiences a succession of subjective states,
correlated and varying with its interactions with a world, has a
subjective perspective upon that world.
> (I guess that 'qualia' might be regarded as a
> category of primary or ultimate subjective states, though I'm unhappy
> about any suggestion of reductionism in this regard.)
The term "qualia" is used most often to refer to the subjective states
associated with sensory inputs, especially those reporting conditions
external to the body. But not always. There needs to be some consensus
on this vocabulary (among everyone using it). I tend to use it to refer
to any distinct and recurring subjective state, so that sleepiness,
hunger, sadness, etc., are also "qualia." But that is a bit non-
standard.
>> We don't need substates! I think we both mean the same thing by
>> "subjective states." But you didn't contradict what I said above (I
>> didn't say we observed (in the third-party sense) the association
>> between our own behaviors and the associated states. What we observe
>> (in the third-party sense) is the circumstances governing the terms
>> used to denote and describe them. And I agree we may impute those
>> states to others whose behavior parallels our own in similar
>> circumstances, with or without language. (I'm sure my cat correctly
>> imputes anger to me when I'm angry, even though she doesn't know the
>> meaning of the term "anger." But she does so on the basis of
>> empirical cues).
> What I was trying to say is that 'we' don't associate our own
> behaviors (and the circumstances surrounding them) with their
> respective subjective states -- the association already exists
> as part of the first-person subjective perspective.
"Already exists" --- when? There is a fair amount of evidence that
infants do not distinguish between "self" and "other" until a few months
after birth. It also takes some time for the infant to develop
behaviors, as opposed to random movements (a "behavior" being a
coordinated sequence of movements directed to attainment of a goal). I
would think associating internal states with behaviors would be
difficult prior to the appearance of coherent, repeatable behaviors. And
being able to execute behaviors is an important factor in making the
distinction between self and other ("self" is that which I can
control;" "other" that which I cannot). And until that differentiation
is made, I'm not sure what it would mean to say the infant had a first-
person perspective upon a world.
>> Again, I agree. However, we must resort to explicit (reflective)
>> criteria when trying to decide whether to impute them to unfamiliar
>> entities (for which we have not developed automatic responses), or to
>> familiar entities whose behaviors or appearance deviate from the
>> expected.
> That's one way of reasoning, but you seem to be claiming that it
> is the only 'reasonable' way of reasoning. That seems to be an
> argument best left for my reply to your comments on Strawson.
I'm anxious to hear about this other way of reasoning!
