"andy-k" wrote in
news:3k3ck.201485$Ek2.48834@newsfe17.ams2:
> Perhaps I'm wording my point badly, so I'll try another tack. We
> automatically place certain kinds of object into one of two categories
> -- those that have the capacity for subjective states and those that
> don't (I'm aware that there are cases that might be troublesome to
> categorize, but I'm speaking of this concept just as I would speak of
> the concept of, say, baldness -- some people are clearly bald and some
> are clearly not). Members of our species are the kind of object that
> we place firmly in the category of having that capacity.
". . . . certain *kinds* of objects." So our instincts respond to kinds,
rather than individuals? And how do we sort individuals into kinds, other
than by appearance and behavior? (Don't say "by instinct," because that
would be circular).
> Modes of instinctive behavior first manifest at a particular stage of
> development. An early instinct in many animals is imprinting, and
> this is clearly not species-specific -- the survival value of
> immediate bonding is so strong that the neonate will latch onto the
> first moving thing it sees. But I don't see how this argument can be
> used to defend the idea that there is no such ability (or that our
> species has lost the ability) to instinctively judge an object on
> grounds of similarity.
Well, because there is no evidence that any judgment of "similarity" is
involved or required. The animal responds to specific stimuli, regardless
of whether the source of the stimulus is similar to them or not.
> Yes, and we respond appropriately to other members of our own
> species. I don't think we're actually taking opposing views here,
> but just getting out of step on terminology. I'm *not* suggesting that
> we have a "species recognition module" in our brains -- we respond
> on grounds of the degree of similarity by virtue of specific automatic
> response modules in the brain, but certainty is not guaranteed
> (there is no essential attribute that can be coded for).
I.e., we are more likely to respond to creatures similar to us, because
they are more likely to be sending the signals to which we are programmed
to respond? I'd go along with that. :-)
>> As I think we agree, the only brute fact of which we are in
>> possession is the brute fact of our *own* consciousness. We have no
>> brute facts regarding consciousness in anything or anyone else, so if
>> we are to impute that property to anyone or anything else, we will
>> need some criteria for applying it (and "instinct" will not do the
>> trick: it is unreliable when applied to humans, and improbable when
>> applied to alien plant-creatures). And if we are to be able to
>> communicate with others using this concept those criteria must be
>> public.
>
> I still don't see why our instinct to recognize (i.e. to respond
> appropriately to) other members of our species doesn't do the trick.
Well, as I said, because our "instinctive" responses are sometimes invoked
inappropriately. They are sometimes triggered when they shouldn't be (cat
statues, dead and brain-dead persons), and are sometimes not triggered when
they should be (alien-plant creatures). In other words, our automatic
responses are not reliable. So we need some criteria that are.
> Dead persons and brain-dead persons would automatically be
> associated with an absence of subjective states.
How would we determine that they are dead or brain-dead, other than via
empirical cues? Then, having made that determination, is it "instinct" that
informs us they are not conscious, or is that a conclusion we immediately
draw from the facts just discovered?
> "Thinking machines"
> would not be subject to this instinctive categorization, and so would
> require some learned or reasoned form of judgment.
But how could we make such a learned or reasoned judgment, unless we had
some criteria to apply? And where might we find such criteria, unless by
adopting those we apply to our paradigm cases?
>> I defined consciousness as "having the capacity for being in
>> subjective states," or (occurrent sense) "being in one or more of
>> those states." How does that overlook subjective states?
> What is being overlooked is not subjective states but "this" --
> the first-person subjective perspective upon a world (this idea is
> not a precondition for the having of subjective states nor for the
> imputation of subjective states to others). We don't need to have
> arrived at the idea of this perspective in order to impute subjective
> states to others (we do that automatically), but when we do arrive
> at this idea, the word 'consciousness' acquires a new use (it now
> pertains to the fact of the existence of this perspective and draws
> attention to the nature of it's relationship with the object with
> which it is associated). It is this new use that gets overlooked by
> insisting that the term has public truth conditions.
You are using "consciousness" to mean several different things:
1. A "Unified first-person subjective perspective upon a world;"
2. A "First-person subjective perspective upon a world," and
3. A "Subjective perspective" (a subjective aspect to objective
interactions among objective entities).
I'm not sure how you see these relating. I believe #2 is implied whenever
we impute subjective states to anything --- if we impute a subjective state
to, say, an animal exhibiting pain behavior, then we impute a subjective
perspective on that behavior and the circumstances surrounding it to that
creature, ipso facto. The subjective state *is* the subjective perspective
on that situation. And if we assume that subjective states of one kind or
another are associated with all of the different situations in which the
creature finds itself, then that creature has a "subjective perspective
upon the world." Doesn't it?
As I suggested in my last post, #3 seems to me to have no purpose. (This is
the meaning of consciousness I take it you would impute to atoms). Atoms
exhibit no behaviors which this assumption would help explain, and you
can't derive consciousness in sense #2 from it --- you can't predict
whether or where #2 will appear in complex entities from #3, much less
describe or predict the "qualitative character" of any subjective states
those systems might have. So it is superfluous.
I'm not sure of the difference between #2 and #1. Wouldn't the first-person
subjective perspective of any creature who has one be unified (or at least
as unified as the neural structure underlying it)? Or does #1 refer to the
subjective perspective of creatures like us, who are able to reflect on our
subjective perspective and be puzzled by it?
My own thought is that all creatures (or even possibly machines) which have
neural systems of the right design and are sufficient complex to construct
virtual models of themselves and their environment will have subjective
states, and thus a unified subjective perspective upon the world. If they
are also able to "model the model" via a conceptual structure emerging from
language (or possibly some other abstract encoding scheme evolved for
communication), then they will also possess reflective consciousness; they
will be able to think about and talk about their own subjective perspective
via that scheme.
Could you explain how those 3 meanings relate, in your view? Or clarify
them, if I've bobbled them?
> I suspect we first encounter the word 'conscious' in its
> negative form 'unconscious' as a description of somebody
> who is "unresponsive to environmental stimuli".
Probably true.
>> 2. We also learn to apply terms for internal states to things (among
>> us Westerners, primarily humans and animals), also based on their
>> appearance and behavior ("She is happy, he is angry, that dog is
>> hungry, that cat is in pain," etc.).
>
> I would prefer to say that certain public conditions prevailing in a
> third-person case automatically bring to mind any subjective states
> that would be associated with those conditions when prevailing in
> the first-person case, resulting in the imputation of those states in
> the third-person case (empathy).
And how do those first-person states come to be associated in the first
place, except by associating our own behaviors and the circumstances
surrounding it with a subjective state? And how would we learn the terms
for those states, except by others applying them to us when we exhibit the
behaviors *they* associate with the terms? You are glossing over how those
associations are formed.
> In a third-person case to which
> we impute a subjective state, any term associated with the public
> conditions prevailing in that case thereby acquires an association
> with that subjective state.
Yes.
>> 6. Because of our propensity to impose complete patterns on things
>> which present only a portion of the pattern, we then automatically
>> impute subjective states similar to our own to anything that exhibits
>> the appearance and behaviors that are *criterial* for the imputation
>> of those states to others.
>
> Empathy (step2 above).
Empathy is not a perceptual or cognitive tool. It is itself a subjective
state we experience when encountering another creature to which we inpute a
subjective state we would find unpleasant. But we do not experience that
state (empathy) unless we already have reason to suppose that creature is
experiencing (and is able to experience) the unpleasant state we impute to
it. And we make that imputation based on its appearance, behavior, and the
circumstances surrounding it. Empathy is not some kind of "sixth sense;" it
does not tell us whether another creature is or is not in a particular
subjective state. It is an emotional response on our part to conclusion
we've reached on empirical grounds.
> And this is what makes subjective states non-hypothetical. We don't
> *hypothesize* subjective states in order to account for the behavior
> of other people, and subsequently impute them also to ourselves --
No, no! We certainly don't hypothesize subjective states to ourselves, or
even impute them to ourselves! We experience them. They are hypothetical
only as applied to others.
> We experience them and automatically impute
> them to others. We don't need to create hypotheses accounting for the
> behavior of others, since we automatically believe subjective states
> to play their role in that behavior.
They are hypothetical when imputed to others whether we make those
imputations automatically or not. They are hypothetical by virtue of the
fact that they are unobservable; whether we impute them explicitly, on the
basis of some kind of reflective analysis, or automatically, as conditioned
responses, or even "instinctively" does not make them any less
hypothetical. And if they are imputed unreflectively, as conditioned
responses or instinctive responses, then they merit scrutiny, because
conditioned and instinctive responses can be inapprorpiate, and indeed
irrational.
>> We haven't "overlooked" something by insisting on some necessary and
>> sufficient conditions for imputing that property. That is a
>> prerequisite for any term or concept to be meaningful (capable of
>> conveying information). We may, to be sure, argue about what those
>> necessary and sufficient conditions *are*. But we cannot, I think,
>> rationally argue that none are required.
> The unavailability of necessary and sufficient conditions may be
> enough for some to dismiss the idea, but not for others. I'm not yet
> convinced that the likes of Nagel, Strawson, and Chalmers are wrong.
I'm sure that neither Chalmers, Strawson, nor Nagel would abide imputing a
property which had no discernible consequences. Chalmers and Strawson are
willing to entertain panpsychism because they believe it offers a
possibility for explaining the kind of consciousness (senses #2 and #3)
with which we are familiar, which they suppose NE theories cannot possibly
do. They are mistaken in both respects: NE theories can explain all that
can be explained about consciousness that can be described in words, and E
theories cannot carry explanation any further. Strawson and Chalmers are
willing to introduce a new "fundamental property" because they believe it
will have explanatory power (that is the discernible consequence they
anticipate). But it won't.
If you'd like to launch a new thread on the Strawson paper, do so. I'll
follow.
