"andy-k" wrote in
news:B8ibk.229884$M63.123622@newsfe13.ams2:

[cont'd]

We either need some explanation for that simple conviction, and some
criteria for deciding when it is justified and not justified, or it is
mystical.

Did the previous post illuminate that any? We experience a succession of
subjective states. We learn to associate various public terms with our
own subjective states, which terms we have earlier, or concurrently,
also learned to apply to others based on their behavior. Having made
those associations, we impute similar subjective states to the other
things whose behaviors warrant those terms. We learn that the term
"consciousness" is applied to the things to which those terms (for
subjective states) are applied, and so the term "consciousness" comes to
denote those subjective states generally, or the capacity for having
them.

[ a bit snipped, similar points]

You seem to be lumping together two issues there --- how do we learn to
use the term "consciousness," (addressed above), and how do we explain
the fact of consciousness ("the existence of the perspective"). The
latter question is of course the central question of a theory of
consciousness --- what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
system to be, and be considered, conscious? And before we can deal with
the first part, being conscious, we have to settle the the second part
(what is required for a system to be considered conscious?). Otherwise
we won't know where to look for answers to the first part. We need a
concept that clearly delineates the phenomena of interest.

Hypothetical constructs need not be pure artifacts of imagination. Atoms
just happen to be. They are often also analogs or variants of familiar
concepts, or metaphors. What makes them hypothetical is that in the
current context they are unobservables, but useful for predicting the
behavior of that system.

[more snipped, same points]

See previous post.

Well, that again raises the issue of imputing a property which has no
discernible consequences, and relates also to the point just made above
about delineating the boundaries of that concept (consciousness). If
cognition is not a necessary condition for imputing it, then what *are*
the necessary conditions? You seem prepared to suppose it may have none.
And of course, in that case we may impute it to whatever we like with
impunity; nobody could possibly prove us wrong. But also, of course, so
imputing it would tell us nothing substantive about that thing, just as
declaring that a thing is "infused with the Holy Spirit" tell us nothing
about that thing.

We haven't "overlooked" something by insisting on some necessary and
sufficient conditions for imputing that property. That is a prerequisite
for any term or concept to be meaningful (capable of conveying
information). We may, to be sure, argue about what those necessary and
sufficient conditions *are*. But we cannot, I think, rationally argue
that none are required.

May we also claim, then, that everything is infused with the Holy
Spirit? May we claim that everything is inhabited by a demon? May I
claim that there is an intangible, invisible elephant in my front yard,
who makes no sounds, leaves no tracks or droppings? Are we obliged to
leave all those possibilities open, since there is no possible means of
eliminating them (and could never be, given the way we've defined them)?

I'm not sure why you think attaching some objective truth conditions to
the term "consciousness" omits its subjective referent. Don't you think
your own conciousness and subjective states have publicly discernible
consequences, via which others can rationally impute those states to
you, even though they can't observe them directly? Aren't you as certain
of the connections between those subjective states and your own
behaviors as you are of the states themselves? E.g., if you touch a hot
stove and reflexively jerk your hand away, don't you know there is a
relation between your behavior and the blister on your finger, and the
pain you felt? Between the subjective sensation of hunger and your
behavior (preparing and eating a meal)? I suggest you know of those
connections with Cartesian certainty. So why would you not count similar
behaviors by others as as at least putative evidence of similar states
in them?

I read it; had not read it before. Thanks!

But it has serious problems. T'would take a whole paper to deal with
them properly, so I'll concentrate here on two.

The first is Strawson's undefended reliance on metaphysical realism
(MR). MR assumes that there is an "ultimate reality," distinct and
independent of any conception we may have of it (which conception we
take to represent it in some fashion), which has definite but largely
unknown (and perhaps permanently unknowable) properties. Russell and
Eddington, whom he quotes favorably, share that view. That leads them
and Strawson to conclude, since we know so little about this ultimate
reality, that it is presumptuous to declare that consciousness is not
part of its "fundamental nature." Quoting Eddington, "Science has
nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the atom."

Well, Eddington is mistaken. We know all there is to know about the
atom, because it is an hypothetical construct defined by us. We know all
there is to know about the "intrinsic nature" of atom for the same
reason we know all there is to know about the "intrinsic nature" of
triangles. All of the properties characterizing the atom have been
conceived and assigned by us, and it cannot possibly have any other
properties, unless and until we decide to impute them to it. And why
might we do that? Well, we might if it begins to appear that defining
another property into the atom would endow it with additional
explanatory power. But we may also at some point scrap the entire
concept of the atom, and replace it with another kind of "fundamental
stuff" altogether. The atom is not part of any "ultimate reality" (or if
it is, it is so by the most awesome coincidence). "Ultimate reality," if
there is one, is, as Kant said, "utterly unknowable."

We invent atoms to explain (and thus enable ourselves to predict) future
experience. We endow them with the properties they have because those
properties contribute to their explanatory power. We have no more reason
to impute inconsequential properties to atoms than we do to triangles
("All triangles are inherently green").

This mistake, however, merely leaves room for the second mistake (we
can't deny consciousness to atoms because we don't know enough about
atoms to draw such conclusions). The second mistake, which leads
directly to the rejection of "emergentism," is the mistake of thinking
that physical theory (the theory postulating atoms, EM fields, etc.)
ought to be able to predict the distinctive qualitative character, the
"essential nature," of subjective experience. It is the same mistake
made by Chalmers, Frank Jackson, et al.

"I certainly don't mean that all characteristics of what is going on, in
the case of experience, can be described by physics and neurophysiology,
or any nonrevolutionary extensions of them."

It is those "missing characteristics" which what Strawson calls "P-
phenomena" fail to describe and predict. And one cannot conceive of
those characteristics "emerging" from ultimates which lack them, says
Strawson, any more than one can imagine extended entities emerging from
nonextended, point-like entities.

The problem is, that those missing characteristics cannot be described,
by physical theory or any other theory. The missing characteristics
cannot, in fact, be characterized; they cannot be described in any
terms. It is a misnomer to describe primitive subjective experiences as
having "characteristics" at all. Each of them has a *character*, but no
characteristics which can be described in language or communicated to
anyone else. And thus it is otiose to declare physical theory inadequate
or incomplete because it fails to describe them. A theory which imputes
some kind of "experience" to fundamental particles would not be able to
explain or predict them any better, because it would not be able to
describe them either (it would not be able to generate arguments that
from particles with E-property 1 and E-property 3, we will get E-state
"---------", with the blank being some description of what that E-state
will "look like" or "feel like."

And of course, since that is what Strawson (and Chalmers, et al) demand
of an adequate theory, this new theory of E-particles would fail also.

This mistake is as old as Jackson's Mary argument. Jackson faults
physics for failing to predict what Mary will experience when leaving
the black-and-white room, but overlooks that neither can Mary's
colleagues, all of whom have normal color vision and may enter and leave
the room freely, simply *tell* Mary what she will experience when she
leaves it. Jackson faults physics for failing to generate descriptions
from theory which other persons, all of whom have personally experienced
the phenomena in question, cannot describe either.

Strawson's condemnation of "emergentism" badly misses the mark. His
analogies of extended and spatial things emerging from non-extended,
nonspatial things are inapt, since being extended or spatial are
quantitative concepts, and all multiples of zero remain zero, by logical
necessity. Consciousness is not a quantitative property, but a
qualitative one. There is no logical necessity that the components of a
conscious entity be themselves conscious, or even "protoconscious," any
more than all the boards in a beautiful house be themselves beautiful.
"How can the house possibly be beautiful, if there is no beauty in the
boards, shingles, nails, etc.?"

Here's a paper you might find interesting, if you haven't read it
already:

http://www.rjhjr.com/joomla/files/Knowargobj.pdf

(This article has been online for a couple of years. Recently appeared
in *Philosophical Studies*. Not sure whether the online version above is
the same as the published version.)