"andy-k" wrote in
news:Jhw9k.207375$M63.98946@newsfe13.ams2:
>>> 'Reality' is a treacherous word.
>>
>> Yes it is. Which is why I avoided it. :-)
>
> Good move.
This is still a digression, but I'll confess that I'm an "explanatory
ontologist," i.e., that a concept of ours denotes something "real" if
the theory defining or postulating the entity has explanatory power (it
allows us to correctly predict future experience). Trees, quarks, and
subjective states are all "real" for that reason, and that reason alone.
Gods, demons, evil humours, unicorns, and the luminiferous ether are all
"unreal" for the same reason (they have no explanatory power, or less
explanatory power than competing theories which do not postulate them).
For anything X now deemed "real," should a new theory appear which
eschews X yet has more explanatory power, X will become "unreal."
>> In many cases it does. But that is irrelevant. Since those responses
>> can often be misguided or gratuitous, we can't rely on our response
>> itself as conclusive evidence for the the nature of the stimulus, or
>> even that there has been a stimulus.
>
> There is no need for certainty here -- the instinctive response kicks
> in first and doubt may arise later. It's in my interests to give a
> wide berth to what appears to be a snake, even if it turns out to be
> nothing more than a coil of rope -- natural selection favors the
> individual that errs on the side of caution.
There is no need for certainty about the snake when hiking in the woods.
But there is such a need for herpetologists and chemists working on
antivenins, zoologists puzzing over the evolutionary history of snakes,
and philosophers pondering their place in the scheme of things.
>> You are trying to answer that by saying, "Well, we instinctively
>> respond to him *as though* he is in a particular subjective state
>> (pain, etc.)" But that is all but worthless, by itself, as evidence
>> of those states, since we also respond the same way to things we
>> agree are not in that subjective state, or indeed in any.
> Empathy is instrumental in social cohesion. Anything as useful as that
> would surely have avoided elimination through natural selection.
That a belief facilitates social cohesion does guarantee its truth.
Indeed, false beliefs have often facilitated social cohesion (most
religions, Naziism, Marxism, etc.) But my comment above referred to the
trustworthiness or evidentiary value of instinctive responses, not their
utility for social cohesion.
>> BTW, did you notice that imputing subjective states to Alfie does
>> indeed have empirical consequences, even on your theory? Namely,
>> that we and others respond is certain ways if Alfie is in those
>> states? And I'd agree that qualifies as evidence (but it falls far
>> short of conclusive evidence).
> Unquestionably our beliefs give rise to responses. Some people
> believe in an interventionist god -- should we then take their
> responses as evidence of the existence of an interventionist god?
Yes. But we should not take them as conclusive evidence. As with
evidence for anything else, we should weigh it against other available
evidence and let the chips fall where they may. If someone says, "There
is a burglar in my house!," and behaves as though there is a burglar in
her house, then surely we take her claim and behavior as evidence there
is a burglar in her house. But we also investigate the claim. Her claim
and behavior are sufficent evidence to launch an investigation, but not
to reach a conclusion.
Since gods (like subjective states in others) are explanatory
constructs, what we weigh is the explanatory power of the theories
postulating them against alternative theories.
>> (I put that "instinctive" in scare quotes because I doubt those
>> imputations are "built-in" to our wiring. I think it more likely they
>> are conceived and then imputed as explanatory hypotheses for the
>> observable behaviors of certain systems, in the same way that gods,
>> demons, evil spirits, and the like are postulated to explain weather,
>> seasons, disease, and so on. What we seem to have an instinct for is
>> contriving nonobservable entities to explain observable phenomena.
>> :-)
>
> In a previous post I supplied a couple of links to articles that
> support the view that these imputations are "built-in" to our wiring.
> I can find no fault in that view.
Your links discussed innate pattern recognition. I've read much of that
literature, and am thoroughly persuaded it is on the right track (and
being a Kantian, it coheres well with that viewpoint). But an innate
capacity for recognizing certain patterns (which is fairly easy to
explain neurologically), and populating the world with unobservable
entities or imputing unobservable properties to observable entities, is
a further step. I do think we have an innate propensity to do exactly
that. But the details of those constructs depend on the details of the
observable phenomena we postulate them to explain, which we learn via
experience. We seem to come into the world equipped with a pattern
generator, as well as a number of primitive pattern templates. As
experience accumulates we put the pattern generator to work organizing
the data into cohesive units (mother, dog, tree), which we later (after
acquiring language) begin to denote with words.
> We describe an object as 'conscious' if we believe it to have a
> unified subjective perspective upon the world. This permits us to
> distinguish two classes of object -- those that we believe have such a
> unified perspective (e.g. people, mammals, perhaps all animals) and
> those that we believe have not (e.g. cars, chairs, central heating
> systems, etc.).
> The question arises as to what kinds of thing may be considered to be
> associated with a unified subjective perspective upon a world, and
> what kinds of thing may not. I have little doubt that people and
> mammals may be so considered and that cars, chairs, central heating
> systems, etc. may not. But I have grave doubts about any conclusion
> that, e.g. an amoeba may not. And if we cannot justifiably deny
> consciousness to an amoeba, then how can we deny it to molecules?
That is where a theory of consciousness comes in. One common way to
proceed is to carefully analyze the clear cases, both those which, per
ordinary usage, clearly do have the property (living humans, living
dogs, etc.), and those which do not (dead persons and dogs, chairs,
etc.). That should give us some clues as to what to look for in the
borderline cases. One thing the clear, positive cases have in common is
a hugely complex nervous system, and we know that if that nervous system
is not working property, such as in a brain-dead person, then all of the
other observable evidence for consciousness (the evidence that makes
those clases "clear"), disappears. So it would appear that a complex
nervous system --- or perhaps something functionally similar --- is
necessary for consciousness. Thus we could rule out the amoeba, because
it lacks a nervous system (and explaining the behavior of amoebas does
not require a postulate of consciousness). But we could not necessarily
rule out consciousness in a honeybee. They have nervous systems, though
not nearly as complex as those of mammals and birds. Is the bee's
nervous system complex enough? Their behaviors are complex and variable
enough that imputing consciousness might be helpful in explaining them.
So that remains an open question.
And of course atoms neither have nervous systems, nor exhibit any
behaviors which consciousness might aid in explaining. So imputing that
property to atoms serves no purpose whatsoever.
> I haven't come across a version of panpsychism that claims that atoms
> can be happy, unhappy, or talented. Panpsychism as I understand the
> term proposes that there may be an experiential counterpart to objects
> such as atoms -- i.e. that they might experience their interactions
> with e.g. photons. It is a logical error to deny this claim on grounds
> that there would be no empirical difference between these two
> possibilities.
Just to clarify, the difference need not be "empirical" in the narrow
sense of being immediately sensible. But there would have to be a
difference *discernible* by some means ---perhaps a difference in the
way the "conscious" atoms react with other atoms in certain conditions,
or the rates at which they decay (if radioactive), etc. If there are no
differences discernible by any means whatsoever, then we have a pseudo-
property. That is not a logical argument (and thus not a "logical
error"); it is a methodological one. Either you accept the II principle
or you entertain ontologies overrun with mythical creatures, invisible
entities, and unobservable properties, none of which contribute a thing
to our understanding of the world: "God (or the Holy Spirit) is in
everything." "Just because no one has ever seen a unicorn, that doesn't
mean they don't exist! They don't want to be seen!"
>> Noncognitive means a proposition for which no means exists, in
>> principle, for determining whether it is true or false. Noncognitive
>> propositions are usually formulated in such a way as to guarantee
>> that result ("the universe and everything in it is doubling in size
>> every second"). That we may respond to certain things *as though*
>> they have certain properties is not compelling evidence that they
>> actually do have those properties.
> You're dismissing all cases where there is no compelling evidence
> one way or the other. This seems to be a rather blunt instrument.
> Surely the right move in such situations is to reserve judgment
> until compelling evidence becomes available?
He who proposes an unobservable is obliged to also specify the evidence
which would count in favor of of that entity, and also to propose a
scenario where that evidence might be obtained.
