"andy-k" wrote in
news:ZCy7k.89641$1B6.83687@newsfe21.ams2:
>> I suggest that if you probe into it a bit more, you'll discover there
>> is no substantive difference between "tree" and "nostalgia" (in this
>> respect/context). The concept of a tree, and the concepts of all
>> other "physical entities", resolve into sets of primitive percepts,
>> qualia, all of which are just as private as the feeling of nostalgia.
>> And nostalgia, like tree, has some publicly observable and
>> communicable aspects. We learn both words (how and when to use them)
>> via those public, communicable aspects, and then associate whatever
>> inner experiences we may have at that time with those terms.
> Yes! And even "other people" should (under your 'qualia' scheme)
> resolve into these primitive percepts, so even the distinction between
> 'public' and 'private' is 'private'! 'Communication', then, is a
> process that goes on between entities appearing within this private
> domain of conscious experience (that can only be alluded to by the use
> of words arising within it). *This* should be the point of departure,
> and not the "objective world model" that is also a part of this
> private domain.
I agree that is the point of departure. It is the Cartesian *Cogito*. The
next question is, Where do we go from that point?
> From 'here' there is a whole spectrum of possibilities
> and no empirical means of choosing between them, with solipsism at one
> extreme and panpsychism at the other (the intervening spectrum
> consisting of the variety afforded by the word 'some' in the statement
> that "some entities are conscious and some are not").
Agree again. But it is premature at this point to invoke empiricism, since
empiricism presumes an external world. We must make a metaphysical
commitment to an external world before empiricism becomes relevant. Hence
that commitment, whichever one is made, must rest on some grounds other
than empiricism.
> Within this
> private domain wherein communication takes place, still some aspects
> of its contents are categorized as 'private' and some 'public' by
> virtue of the instinctive belief that these "other people" are
> associated with "private domains" of their own: Trees are public with
> public truth conditions, nostalgia is private with public truth
> conditions, and the fact of the existence of this domain is private
> with no public truth conditions.
Well, if solipsism is assumed, then there is no "communication," since
communication is understood to be transmission of information from one mind
(or other sending source) to another mind (or other receiver). If there is
only one mind, mine, then what I'm calling "communication" is just noise of
inexplicable origin.
So how do we move beyond solipsism? Or do you assume there is no rational
ground for doing so?
>> You are making an unwarranted leap there. I don't disagree with your
>> speculations regarding the cognitive sequence. I believe we (and even
>> infants and many animals) erect just such a cognitive model very
>> early in maturation (your "idea" is, I submit, the appearance in the
>> mind of that cognitive model, which appears not to be present at
>> birth but emerges within a few months). The leap comes when you
>> equate this "idea" (or cognitive model) with the concept of
>> consciousness. The latter is denoted by a verbal construction
>> ("consciousness") which is not learned until the child has acquired
>> the basic syntax of his native language and a substantial vocabulary.
>> He could not learn that term were it not associated with with public
>> truth conditions he can observe. Having learned in what circumstances
>> that term is used, he can *then* associate it with the inner states
>> he experiences when he finds himself in the circumstances which
>> govern its use.
> We hold a belief that other people have similar private feelings as
> one would have oneself under the same public conditions -- i.e. we
> empathize. I submit that empathy is not the result of induction but
> rather is a fixed behavior pattern encoded on the genes, and (like all
> instincts) this behavior makes its appearance at the appropriate
> juncture in the development of the individual.
Empathy is not a behavior pattern. It is one of those internal subjective
states we are discussing, of the same class as love, admiration, jealousy,
emnity, etc. --- i.e., affective responses we may experience in the
presence of other people (or some animals). It is not a source of
*knowledge* regarding those other entities, i.e., it will not inform us
whether the entity before us is alive, is human, is in pain, or is
conscious. We have to make those judgments *before* the affective state of
empathy can make an appearance.
You are trying to promote empathy, an affective subjective state, into some
kind of perceptual or cognitive tool. That was the point of the gorilla-
thing example --- whether "empathy" would allow you to decide among the
alternative explanations (and you seemed to agree it would not). The
question is, How do we *decide* whether another entity is conscious, in
pain, etc., not how we feel about that entity once we've decided.
> Thus the belief that
> other people are conscious is ***instinctive and not conditioned***
> (regardless of any linguistic associations). There are no public truth
> conditions for the existence of a subjective perspective upon the
> world by which any such conditioning might take place.
I would have no strong quarrel with the claim that we "instinctively"
impute subjective states to creatures we are convinced are conscious (they
are alive, sufficiently complex, not in a coma, not in deep sleep, etc.).
But it is not "instinct" which allows us to make those preliminary
determinations.
Suppose we discover a native lifeform on an alien world. These organisms
are woody mounds ranging from a centimeter or so in diameter to 3 meters or
more. The mounds surmount an intricate root system which may extend over
several hectares (for larger specimens). They absorb nutrients from the
soil and carry out some photosynthesis via pigments in their bark, but they
also ingest microorganisms via thousands of microvacuoles arrayed along
their roots. So their metabolism is plant-like in some respects, animal-
like in others (though of course they are inanimate, firmly rooted in
place). Inside the larger mounds biologists discover a soft core of densely
packed and interwoven cell processes, which may weigh up 30 kg, whose
geometry suggests a complex neural reticulum --- a "brain." However, the
lifeform appears not to have any specialized organs for detecting light or
sound, though the biologists speculate that it might be capable of
detecting and identifying substances in the soil and perhaps in the
atmosphere. And since the organism is rooted in place and has no mobile
limbs, what purpose would a brain serve? Also, the brain-like organ
exhibits no electrical activity.
What would it take for the biologists to pronounce this organism
"conscious?" Would empathy or "instinct" suffice? Or would you simply
conclude it is conscious a forteriori (per panpsychism)?
> We do, however, acquire the word 'consciousness' through social
> conditioning, as you say, and primarily in respect of the responsivity
> of the organism to sensory stimuli -- i.e. behaviorally, and in
> contrast to the word 'unconscious'. The term 'unconscious' therefore
> not only carries the connotation of being unresponsive to
> environmental stimuli, but also (by virtue of our instinct for
> empathy) the additional connotation that subjective states are absent
> -- i.e. we associate a behavioral or public state of a person with a
> subjective or private state for which there is no empirical evidence
> but only an instinctive belief.
I'm not clear on this. Are you saying we have an "instinctive belief" that
a responsive system (I presume of the right kind) is conscious and an
"instinctive belief" that a nonresponsive system is not conscious, i.e.,
that this instinct tells us whether the system is conscious or not,
independently of the behavioral evidence? Or are you saying that we have no
grounds for making that distinction at all?
> The subsequent error is that not only
> do we *associate* consciousness with certain modes of behavior, but
> also that we come to *identify* it by those modes of behavior. We then
> feel justified in denying subjective states to non-cognitive objects,
> and the claim that there are public truth conditions for consciousness
> becomes plausible. But this is falling prey to the logical fallacy of
> denying the antecedent: Behavior, therefore consciousness; No
> behavior, therefore no consciousness.
Ah, so that is where the denying the antecedent comes from. Your mistake is
in the premise: it is not a conditional but a biconditional, e.g.,
B <--> C, not B --> C. That is because C (consciousness) is a *hypothetical
construct* imputed *only* to systems evincing certain characteristic
behaviors in certain circumstances. It is not a material conditional
derived from an empirical generalization. We learn that term by observing
its use in certain contexts (like all other terms). We do not apply it to
systems or entities not exhibiting those behaviors because it is not
defined for those entities (the same reason we don't describe rocks as
"talented" or trees as "citizens"). What we *associate* with the term,
*after we have learned it*, is our own subjective states. We then impute
those states to others who evince the behaviors defining it (but not to
entities which do not evince those behaviors). I'd even accept that we do
the latter "instinctively" (because there is a sense of that term that
simply means "immediately, unreflectively"). But it is actually an
inductive generalization --- the "instinct" would not happen were the
physical and behavioral cues not present.
That does not mean, of course, that we could not impute subjective states
to other kinds of entities if we wished, i.e., extend the class of eligible
objects. The question there would be, What would be the advantage of doing
so? How would doing so help us predict the behavior of those entities?
The gist of our disagreement seems to turn on the origins of our
understanding of that concept (consciousness). You seem to think that we
have some "instinctive" (innate, prelinguistic) grasp that it refers to our
experienced subjective states. My claim is that there are no innate,
prelinguistic grasps of any terms; the meanings of all of them are
arbitrary and can be learned only in speech communities, by observing the
contexts of their use. We can't apply terms in the public language to any
inner states until we have learned their public truth conditions.
>> I'm not sure what you find attractive about the term "instinct" in
>> this connection. I should think our propensity for inductive
>> generalization would be adequate to explain that imputation. If I
>> borrow a friend's car I expect that it will start when I turn the
>> key, and that I'd find an engine under the hood if I looked, even if
>> I've never driven his car before. When I encounter another person I
>> likewise expect him to behave in various ways characteristic of
>> humans. I also expect he will experience various inner subjective
>> states, just as I expect the car to have an engine under the hood.
> One can check empirically for an engine under the hood,
> but one can't check empirically for another's subjective states.
One can, but would rarely have reason to do so. If the hood were welded
shut I'd still assume there was an engine under it, as long as the car
performed as expected. And of course the subjective states are hypothetical
constructs, not (like the engine) observables. We impute them to explain
behavior. If there is no behavior there is nothing to explain, and thus no
reason to impute them.
>> If I believe, based on appearances, that a coin in my hand is silver,
>> do I then have an instinctive belief that it has atoms having 47
>> protons and electrons? Or is that belief just a consequence of my
>> understanding of the concept "silver"?
> The coin's constitution may be verified empirically,
> whereas a person's subjective perspective may not.
That it has 47 electrons cannot be ascertained empirically. All that can be
ascertained empirically are certain properties having 47 electrons helps
explain (and predict), e.g., melting point, reactions with other
substances, etc.
>> We're tempted to say there is "no way of knowing" whether an atom is
>> conscious because we misunderstand the conceptual category to which
>> "consciousness" and "subjective states" belong. We make a category
>> mistake. We suppose they must be observables, and since we can't make
>> the observations which would seem to be required, we decide that
>> agnosticism is the prudent position.
>
> No, what I'm saying is that they are *not* observables.
>
>
>> But those properties are not observables;
>
> Agreed.
>
>
>> they are intervening variables. Hence the criteria for their
>> existence is not direct observation, but their explanatory value
>> --- their usefulness in explaining the behavior of certain systems.
> Usefulness in explaining the behavior of certain systems is one kind
> of explanatory value. Another kind, pertinent here, is usefulness in
> explaining the very existence of the subjective perspective associated
> with members of our species (at least).
Not sure I'm following that. How can asserting X explain X? Asserting X may
explain Y, but I don't see how it explains itself. Are you suggesting that
imputing consciousness to atoms somehow explains consciousness in humans,
i.e., that making consciousness a universal property of all things somehow
makes human consciousness more comprehensible? Don't the differences
between humans and other things previously regarded as nonconscious, which
gave rise to the question to begin with, still remain?
>> Subjective states have the same role --- imputing them to
>> certain systems permits us to predict the behavior of those
>> systems with some reliability.
> Being able to predict the behavior of a system *without* recourse to
> subjective states does not entitle us to conclude that the system is
> devoid of subjective states -- that would be denying the antecedent.
Covered above (I think).
