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Author: EdEd Date: Jun 8, 2008 09:47
On Jun 8, 6:59 am, "andy-k" wrote:
> turtoni wrote:
>> Immortalist wrote:
>>> "andy-k" wrote:
There are no scientific observations of consciousness -- it is
entirely private, and so there can be no science of consciousness.
That's not to say that scientists can't have their opinions about
consciousness -- just that they can't test their opinions in the
public
domain (i.e. scientifically).- Hide quoted text -
How did you establish that there can be no science?
Take one aspect of consciousness; the fact that there is some. It
seems to me that the evidence for that is just as "scientific" as the
evidence for other so-called scientific phenomena, like quarks. In
both cases it's indirect but that doesn't make it unscientific.
The lack of an experiment about other aspects is unfortunate, but may
be temporary. After the publication of Special Relativity it was some
years before an experiment was designed that could verify the theory;
but one was found and now more have been discovered.
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Date: Jun 8, 2008 10:40
Ed wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> There are no scientific observations of consciousness -- it is entirely
>> private, and so there can be no science of consciousness. That's not
>> to say that scientists can't have their opinions about consciousness --
>> just that they can't test their opinions in the public domain
>> (i.e. scientifically).
>
> How did you establish that there can be no science?
Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
"this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jun 10, 2008 10:14
> Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
> "this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
Sure there are.
Nice to see you still around, Andy.
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Date: Jun 10, 2008 10:15
Publius wrote:
>> Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
>> "this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
>
> Sure there are.
Details?
> Nice to see you still around, Andy.
Nice to see you back Publius.
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jun 10, 2008 18:03
"andy-k" wrote in news:%%Ey3k.105693$x55.32615
@newsfe17.ams2:
> Publius wrote:
>>> Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
>>> "this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
>>
>> Sure there are.
>
> Details?
A system is conscious (we impute that paraproperty to it) IFF it behaves,
in certain contexts, in certain characterisitc ways. The behaviors and the
context are publicly observable.
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Date: Jun 10, 2008 22:35
Publius wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Publius wrote:
>>>> Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
>>>> "this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
>>>
>>> Sure there are.
>>
>> Details?
>
> A system is conscious (we impute that paraproperty to it) IFF it
> behaves, in certain contexts, in certain characterisitc ways. The
> behaviors and the context are publicly observable.
That's what Chalmers calls a "bait-and-switch". We could indeed label a
particular aspect of behavior 'consciousness' and then we would have public
truth conditions for the above propositions, but then again we would not be
speaking of the *phenomenal* consciousness that is the issue here.
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Author: EdEd Date: Jun 11, 2008 16:26
On Jun 8, 1:40 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
> Ed wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote:
>>> There are no scientific observations of consciousness -- it is entirely
>>> private, and so there can be no science of consciousness. That's not
>>> to say that scientists can't have their opinions about consciousness --
>>> just that they can't test their opinions in the public domain
>>> (i.e. scientifically).
>
>> How did you establish that there can be no science?
>
> Because there are no public truth conditions for the propositions
> "this object is conscious" and "that object is not conscious".
We've discussed this before but given the elucidation in your other
posts here in this thread I have to ask; why should we believe in
"consciousness" as you use it, at all? It seems an elaborate
construction with no evidence to support it.
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jun 11, 2008 20:54
"andy-k" wrote in
news:1uJ3k.100281$SA7.32846@newsfe09.ams2:
>> A system is conscious (we impute that paraproperty to it) IFF it
>> behaves, in certain contexts, in certain characterisitc ways. The
>> behaviors and the context are publicly observable.
> That's what Chalmers calls a "bait-and-switch". We could indeed label
> a particular aspect of behavior 'consciousness' and then we would have
> public truth conditions for the above propositions, but then again we
> would not be speaking of the *phenomenal* consciousness that is the
> issue here.
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Author: ArtArt Date: Jun 12, 2008 07:08
On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 16:26:22 -0700 (PDT), Ed earthlink.net>
wrote:
>On Jun 8, 1:40 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
>> Ed wrote:
>>> "andy-k" wrote:
>>>> There are no scientific observations of consciousness -- it is entirely
>>>> private, and so there can be...
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Date: Jun 12, 2008 09:31
Publius wrote:
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Publius wrote:
>>> A system is conscious (we impute that paraproperty to it) IFF it
>>> behaves, in certain contexts, in certain characterisitc ways. The
>>> behaviors and the context are publicly observable.
>
>> That's what Chalmers calls a "bait-and-switch". We could indeed label
>> a particular aspect of behavior 'consciousness' and then we would
>> have public truth conditions for the above propositions, but then
>> again we would not be speaking of the *phenomenal* consciousness
>> that is the issue here.
>
> The observed behavior is not what is "labelled" consciousness. The
> behavior is merely evidence of a capacity for having subjective
> states, or for being in one of those subjective states. The concept
> of "consciousness" functions logically much like the concept of
> "talent." If we observe someone playing a Beethoven sonata deftly and
> artfully, we say she has a *talent*, i.e., a capacity for making
> pleasing sounds with a piano. The talent, however, is not the ...
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