> 'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
> This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
> alone.
>
> 'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
> into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
> objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
> objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
>
> But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
> Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
> ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
> reassertions of a physical ontology?
>

> "John Jones" aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1190066748.288306.248730@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...> 'All unmarried men are batchelors'.

>> This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
>> alone.

>

>> 'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
>> into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
>> objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
>> objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.

>

>> But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
>> Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
>> ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
>> reassertions of a physical ontology?

>
> So THATS what I chose to remain single....:-)
>
> You are correct. All people who understand that principle are wise in the ...

> 'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
> This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
> alone.
>
> 'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
> into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
> objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
> objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
>
> But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
> Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
> ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
> reassertions of a physical ontology?

> On Sep 17, 7:37 pm, "brian fletcher" bigpond.net.au> wrote:

>> "John Jones" aol.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:1190066748.288306.248730@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...> 'All
>> unmarried men are batchelors'.

>>> This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
>>> alone.

>>

>>> 'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
>>> into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
>>> objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
>>> objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.

>>

>>> But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
>>> Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
>>> ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
>>> reassertions of a physical ontology?

>> ...

>'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
>This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
>alone.
>
>'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
>into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
>objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
>objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
>
>But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
>Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
>ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
>reassertions of a physical ontology?

> On Mon, 17 Sep 2007 15:05:48 -0700, John Jones aol.com>
> wrote:
>

>>'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
>>This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
>>alone.

>

>>'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
>>into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
>>objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
>>objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.

>

>>But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
>>Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
>>ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
>>reassertions of a physical ontology?

>
> That example you gave is an example given from judgments, not objects. ...

> On Wed, 19 Sep 2007 11:50:47 -0700, John Jones aol.com>
> wrote:
>

>>I am trying to see what reformulations such as these are doing with a
>>definition. It seems also that a judgement places a definition into an
>>ontological framework. Thus we have for a judgement IF ....THEN....,
>>which seems to turn a definition into a causality. I was saying that
>>an analytic statement does the same thing - attributes causility or
>>physical existence criteria to definitions (and judgements).

>
> No, to me, you are confusing logical relations, such as antecedent and
> consequent, with real relations, such as cause and effect. As Kant
> knew, causality cannot be derived from logical tautologies, following...

>I agree with that. But it seems that when we move from
>
>'A batchelor is an unmarried man'
>to
>'if there is a batchelot then he is an unmarried man'
>
>then the latter way of putting it seems to be making an existence/
>causal claim.

> On Thu, 20 Sep 2007 11:12:52 -0700, John Jones aol.com>
> wrote:
>

>>I agree with that. But it seems that when we move from

>

>>'A batchelor is an unmarried man'
>>to
>>'if there is a batchelot then he is an unmarried man'

>

>>then the latter way of putting it seems to be making an existence/
>>causal claim.

>
> That would be a synthetic judgment, no? Any claim about existence is
> synthetic according to Kant, as it involves going beyond the concept.