> On Mar 21, 4:22 am, EdgarO...@att.net wrote:
>
>
>

>> On Mar 20, 2:36 pm, "andy-k" wrote:

>

>>> EdgarO...@att.net wrote:

>>>> I invite all those interested in a novel approach to the so called
>>>> 'Hard Problem of Consciousness' and how it is related to the
>>>> structure of physical reality and the nature of the observer in
>>>> modern science to take a look at my paper
>>>>http://EdgarLOwen.com/hardproblem.pdf. All serious comments would
>>>> be welcome either directly to my email or in response to this post.

>

>>> In your essay you write:

>

>>>> "Consciousness, in the fundamental sense of the hard problem, is
>>>> something in which individual content may appear, rather than the
>>>> sequence of content itself."
>>>> [...]
>>>> "The diverse contents of consciousness are recognized as forms in the
>>>> medium of consciousness itself."
>>>> [...]
>>>> "But what is this underlying substance of consciousness that remains as
>>>> individual contents subside?"
>>>> [...]
>>>> "So it is this direct experience of the present moment that remains
>>>> that is the essence of what we mean by consciousness itself, as
>>>> opposed to its contents. It is the presence and source of this
>>>> underlying field of consciousness that the hard problem seeks to
>>>> address. For without this underlying consciousness, there can be no
>>>> consciousness of individual content."

>

>>> It seems clear that you regard consciousness as a medium within which the
>>> "contents of consciousness" arise. You may be aware of William James' essay
>>> "Does Consciousness Exist?" in which he demolishes the idea of consciousness
>>> as substance. If so then I'd be interested to hear your counter-argument.
>>> If you're not aware of this essay then you may find it interesting:

>

>>>http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/consciousness.htm

>

>> Andy-k,

>

>> Thanks for the link. I read it some time ago in college. I wouldn't
>> quite say that I regard consciousness as a medium as that implies it
>> is some sort of medium independent of the rest of physical reality.
>> I'm not suggesting that at all. The basic idea is that what produces
>> consciousness is simply the flow of clocktime through the present
>> moment. Everything that has actual reality exists only in this present
>> moment and every entity 'experiences' impinging events within that
>> present moment according to its own particular structure. So every
>> entity has a kind of proto-consciousness. Humans 'experience' events
>> in the present moment in terms of their particular cognitive and
>> sensory structures just as do all entities. The result for humans is
>> called human consciousness. Consciousness is simply the reality of the
>> present moment in terms of an observer's structure.

>

>> Edgar- Hide quoted text -

>

>> - Show quoted text -

>
> I apologize for cutting in, but I wanted to respond to this comment,
> and esp. to the idea contained in last sentence.
> The clear expression of ideas is appreciated, which helps to inspire a
> response.  I will mention first that, we might consider filtering our
> observations though an understanding of brain function itself -- that
> is, the words we choose with which to describe thoughts, ideas, and
> experiences, are literally products of our brain processes, and must
> therefore be taken with a grain of salt.  The observer must be
> observed through an additional layer of detached observation in order
> to clarify why we are describing things with the terms we use.
>
> Also, one might more correctly claim that "Consciousness is the
> connected movement of coordinated associational processes over time,
> culminating in that (result) which our brain activity triggers its
> language cortex to describe as 'conscious experience' ".  Notice that
> thought, language, etc., are processes, thus require time.  Otherwise,
> I would begin by saying "Th..." frozen at that moment, and the full
> linguistic course of communication would not even proceed to "The" --
> that is, at any instant we have a fragment and not the whole, and
> therefore, brain activity at any moment is part of a developing
> totality which can only be considered "consciousness" over time.  The
> course of thinking, and of fleshing out ideas, requires time also.  To
> test this, engage in thought, and have someone suddenly interrupt you
> -- the process is aborted midway and conceptualization is
> fragmentary.  Furthermore, isn't it true that, the rapid activation of
> abstract representative centers denotes the working brain -- that is,
> the mind -- and that chains of neuronal activation also require time
> (and this is different from the computer analogy or mathematical
> analogy which can represent an entire program or formula frozen in an
> instant of time, even though it involves procedure over time for a
> living brain to comprehend and cognize either)?  If consciousness
> reflects a process rather than a momentary state -- rather than a
> sequence of moments each of which is sufficient to describe
> consciousness (again, do not be fooled by the computer analogy, since
> semiconductors operate on a very different principle from living
> cells), then a segment of time is required in order to grasp its
> significance fully.
>
> We often follow analogies too closely, too literally, and comparing
> the brain to a computer or to a mathematical equation on a blackboard,
> in my opinion, is not quite accurate.  Living cells, and all the
> movement that implies, have something to do with consciousness, and
> that is a riddle that our necessarily mortal and limited brains may
> not be able to grasp intuitively.  Thus "It seems this way" -- the
> intuitive approach -- may be no more accurate than intuitive attempts
> to refute quantum mechanics, which are proven to be wrong, and so on.
> I will add that, the consciousness' self-observations are woefully
> subjective and ought not to be mixed or confused with entirely
> objective scientific scrutiny, or else errors will result.  This may
> call for a definite division between philosophy and neuroscience,
> although the two may be integrated so long as their independent
> implications and definitions are respected.