> In De Anima III.2, Aristotle writes:
>
> "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing
> or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing,
> or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this
> new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. color:
> so that either (1) there will be two senses both percipient of the
> same sensible object, or (2) the sense must be percipient of itself.
> Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different
> from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must
> somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we
> ought to do this in the first case."
>

> andy-k wrote:

>> In De Anima III.2, Aristotle writes:
>>
>> "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing
>> or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing,
>> or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this
>> new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. color:
>> so that either (1) there will be two senses both percipient of the
>> same sensible object, or (2) the sense must be percipient of itself.
>> Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different
>> from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must
>> somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we
>> ought to do this in the first case."

>
> Which seems to make it unclear whether or not Aristotle actually has
> discrimination (that other sense) already built into the content, as
> if the individuations and relations of meaning were done by an
> objective world-mind prior to the human receiving information input.
> It's usually said that Aristotle made the categories external whereas ...

> "D H" wrote:

>> andy-k wrote:

>>> In De Anima III.2, Aristotle writes:
>>>
>>> "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing
>>> or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing,
>>> or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this
>>> new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. color:
>>> so that either (1) there will be two senses both percipient of the
>>> same sensible object, or (2) the sense must be percipient of itself.
>>> Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different
>>> from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must
>>> somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we
>>> ought to do this in the first case."

>>
>> Which seems to make it unclear whether or not Aristotle actually has
>> discrimination (that other sense) already built into the content, as
>> if the individuations and relations of meaning were done by an
>> objective world-mind prior to the human receiving information input. ...

> Returning to the "we are conscious of our own consciousness, but most
> of the time we don't entertain that idea".... and following up on a
> thought expressed elsewhere in the thread....
>
> I believe the me / not-me distinction is (probably) always
> nonlinguistically present in experience as its Point Of View. There is
> a convergence node with relations to the rest of the discriminated
> content (even in hearing, touch, smell, etc).
>
> The POV could be absent if there are other ways that information might
> be integrated besides the (phenomenal / conceptual) experiential
> format, but those would be too noumenal to bother speculating about as
> possibility. I can't consider third-person descriptions to really
> qualify since they are developed and manifested in the cognitive...

> "D H" wrote:

>> Returning to the "we are conscious of our own consciousness, but most
>> of the time we don't entertain that idea".... and following up on a
>> thought expressed elsewhere in the thread....
>>
>> I believe the me / not-me distinction is (probably) always
>> nonlinguistically present in experience as its Point Of View. There is
>> a convergence node with relations to the rest of the discriminated
>> content (even in hearing, touch, smell, etc).
>>
>> The POV could be absent if there are other ways that information might
>> be integrated besides the (phenomenal / conceptual) experiential
>> format, but those would be too noumenal to bother speculating about as
>> possibility. I can't consider third-person descriptions to really
>> qualify since they are developed and manifested in the cognitive agent
>> format; subsumed by it no matter how practical it is to pretend
>> they're not.

>
> I'd be interested in your comments on the following paper: ...

> andy-k wrote:

>> I'd be interested in your comments on the following paper:
>> http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/edey.html

>
> Interesting article.
>
> Excerpt One: "Here a crucial point should be emphasised. The
> distinction between subject and object, and our capacity to make that
> distinction, is prior to any particular opinion or theory about what
> either the subject or the object may be. Another way to make the point
> is to say that we make the same distinction, and make it the same way,
> regardless of what we may think we believe about the nature of the
> self or consciousness and their relation to the world. Yet another way
> to put it is to say that the distinction is not made on merely
> conceptual grounds."
>
> Comment: I agree, as stated before, that the distinction is there
> before we engage in the transparent kinds of discrimination (exhibited
> in linguistic categorizations / theories, emotional attitudes, willful ...

> "D H" wrote:

>> Returning to the "we are conscious of our own consciousness, but most
>> of the time we don't entertain that idea".... and following up on a
>> thought expressed elsewhere in the thread....

>

>> I believe the me / not-me distinction is (probably) always
>> nonlinguistically present in experience as its Point Of View. There is
>> a convergence node with relations to the rest of the discriminated
>> content (even in hearing, touch, smell, etc).

>

>> The POV could be absent if there are other ways that information might
>> be integrated besides the (phenomenal / conceptual) experiential
>> format, but those would be too noumenal to bother speculating about as
>> possibility. I can't consider third-person descriptions to really
>> qualify since they are developed and manifested in the cognitive agent
>> format; subsumed by it no matter how practical it is to pretend
>> they're not.

>
> I'd be interested in your comments on the following paper:http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/edey.html- Hide quoted text - ...

> I use the word 'consciousness' differently to you, and this isn't helpful
> (that's not a criticism aimed at you but at the situation). I've come to
> regard consciousness as a kind of "internal perspective" enjoyed by
> certain kinds of object, not evident from their external appearance.
> From the *internal* perspective associated with a particular object,
> only the *external* appearances of other objects are available;
> similarly the internal perspective that is this 'me' is not available to
> other objects -- they only perceive an object associated with this 'me'.
> Taking this line, Edey's argument seems sound to me.

> andy-k wrote:

>> I use the word 'consciousness' differently to you, and this isn't
>> helpful (that's not a criticism aimed at you but at the situation).
>> I've come to regard consciousness as a kind of "internal
>> perspective" enjoyed by certain kinds of object, not evident from
>> their external appearance. From the *internal* perspective
>> associated with a particular object, only the *external* appearances
>> of other objects are available; similarly the internal perspective
>> that is this 'me' is not available to other objects -- they only
>> perceive an object associated with this 'me'. Taking this line,
>> Edey's argument seems sound to me.

>
> It's not necessarily a case of incommensurability between the
> two. How an internal condition of matter would create the external
> appearance would also have to involve individuating the informational
> whole and distinguishing one part from another. "Discrimination" is a
> neutral placeholder for an inscrutable action that produces "things",
> inscrutable regardless of how much one can map the territory it
> correlates to in whatever differentiated realm it depicts (like the ...

> D H wrote:

>> andy-k wrote:

>>> I use the word 'consciousness' differently to you, and this isn't
>>> helpful (that's not a criticism aimed at you but at the situation).
>>> I've come to regard consciousness as a kind of "internal
>>> perspective" enjoyed by certain kinds of object, not evident from
>>> their external appearance. From the *internal* perspective
>>> associated with a particular object, only the *external* appearances
>>> of other objects are available; similarly the internal perspective
>>> that is this 'me' is not available to other objects -- they only
>>> perceive an object associated with this 'me'. Taking this line,
>>> Edey's argument seems sound to me.

>>
>> It's not necessarily a case of incommensurability between the
>> two. How an internal condition of matter would create the external
>> appearance would also have to involve individuating the informational
>> whole and distinguishing one part from another. "Discrimination" is a
>> neutral placeholder for an inscrutable action that produces "things",
>> inscrutable regardless of how much one can map the territory it ...