Re: aesthetic fetishes of logical type
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Re: aesthetic fetishes of logical type         

Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: Art
Date: Aug 15, 2008 07:02

On Wed, 13 Aug 2008 00:59:33 -0700 (PDT), galathaea
gmail.com> wrote:
>let me try anew
>
>formalism was not created in the twentieth century
>
>nor did it arise spontaneously in the nineteenth century
> or blossom in the eighteenth
>or any such recent history
>
>the fact that language is possible at all
>is the foundations of formalism
> and this goes back hundreds of thousands of years
>
>all language is based on formal negotiations
>exchanging information
>
>the pointing metaphor goes well into our great ape ancestry
> and aparently is found in many animals
>(several pack marine animals to many land animals)
>
>so?
>
>well logic isn't something
> born when they created the word "axiomatic"
>
>the structure of language itself is built of the primitives
> with which all logical calculi are constructed
>
>rigorousness has one valid scientific criteria:
> repeatability
>
>repeatability attractors separate out
> using the dynamics of evolution
> and the thermodynamics of use
>
>words form languages
>
> ***********..^^^^^^^^^^
>
>now flash forward to goldblatt's book "topoi"
>
>if you expect to see axioms as strings
> you may be disappointed
>
>most of the axioms are expressed in strings
> commonly the natural language of english
>but often much informational content is expressed
>in diagrams of directed graphs
>
>now i will make a desperate confession
>
>when i first read goldblatt
> i didn't think it was truly a formalisation
>
>i thought it had too many hand-wavy
> "well-you-know-what-i-mean"s
>to be correctly seen as an axiom system
>
>so i made my own axiom system
>
>but i thought you needed to actually change the symbology
> to reach true rigor
>
>so i actually had four different types of objects
> and four different types of morphisms
>
>rules of formation were diagram productions
>
>i used a named dotted arrow
>
> a
>.....>
>
>to mean forAny morphism a
>
>and i used a named solid arrow
>
> A
>----->
>
>to mean thereExists morphism A
>
>similarly
> i had as negation symbols
> the above arrows with slashes through them
>
>("not for any" and "there does not exist" respectively)
>
>the same partition was used for objects
> a named dot forAny object
> and a named solid circle when thereExists an object
>
>i actually didn't like objects
> so i usually started out with their mappings to identities
>
>so there was a rule i would write
>
> ________________
> | m |
> ________ | a ....> . b |
>| | | ^ .\ |
>| . a | =====> | id_a| . |
>|________| | . m |
> | a |
> |________________|
>
>these diagrams were to be read
> "forAny object a
> thereExists a morphism id_a suchThat
> the given diagram on the right commutes forAny morphism m"
>
>notice how the rule also forms the naming convention
>
>it is assumed in this formalisation
> that symbols can be made to substitute in simple enough way
>so id_a really means that if a were called X
> we really mean id_X
>
>similarly
> this easily included other axioms of category theory
>
>the composition rule was
>
> ______________ ________________
>| | | |
>| a | | a |
>| . | | .\ |
>| . | | . \ m2 o m1 |
>| . | | . \ |
>| .m1 | ===> | .m1 \ |
>| V | | V / |
>| . .....> . | | . ......> . |
>| b m2 c | | b m2 c |
>|______________| |________________|
>
>now
> i had strange desires during this time
>
>like i really thought that no diagrams
> should ever consist of commutative diagrams larger than triangles
>
>in fact
> the composition rule and association make it easy
> to decompose into separate diagrams each triangles
>using a standard "and" interpretation of the collection operation
>so i started calling these diagrams "dox"es
>(as in the root meaning "word")
> and i called contradictory inversions of axioms
> "paradoxes"
>
>e.g.
> b
> .
> m1 \ . m2
> . /
> . ----/----> .
>a c
>
>because there always exists a composition
>
>i went through and translated many of the theorems
>into this new language i created
> and i thought myself so clever and bright
>that i showed this to a professor i knew from the putnam tests
>
>he looked them over
>and then turned and asked me a question i'll never forget
>
>"so what can you do with this?"
>
>well
> it's a formalisation
> and it makes things explicit
> and it shows how a computer might see it
> and...
>
>"but where did you learn the rules in the first place?"
> he said
>
>and i told of the main sources
> all the standards of mac lane and bell and others
>and i felt so happy for myself
> because none of it was taught at the school
>and...
>
>"can your diagrams do anything you didn't learn from the books?"
>
>he got me
>
>because
> well
>no they really couldn't
>
>they were just there to "make rigorous"
> what the books taught
>
>but the books obviously had rigor
>since i was able to repeatably duplicate their theorems
>
>so i swallowed my pride
> which was quite a big gulp in those days
>and confessed that i couldn't explain why i thought it was better
>
>and he said
> and this was a guy i did not regularly respect
>he said
>"don't get lost in aesthetic fetishes"
>
>i went home and reread goldblatt
> which was the only reference i actually owned at the time
>and step by step i looked for the theorems
>
>except for the clearly marked exercises
> they all were very fully detailed
>and i was amazed that my translations
>often amounted to a mechanical transformation
> of explanations often couched in a formal english
>
>i eventually ended up rereading the book
> (for what was like the fourth time)
>working through almost every theorem
>almost as an act of pride
>
>although there were a few places where i finally found
> that some simple arrow chasing steps were not described
>they almost always ended up the same applications
>of basic axiomatic rules like composition
> that were usually well known by then
>
>by the end of this fiasco
>i had come to a very hard conclusion:
>
>i really was stuck on a preference
> that was purely an aesthetic difference
>
>formalisation is a reduction to negotiated primitives
>and this could come in many different forms
>
>suddenly
> the whole foundational scare of the twentieth century
>seemed a silly bravado
>as if the chasm no previous generation had faced
> were a simple linguistic game
> translating ancient paradoxes into new symbologies
>
>fascinating themselves
>
>i understood why many constructivists
> who already recognise those negotiated primitives
>don't commit deeply to formalism
>
>because it often deteriorated
>into religious battles over coding standards
>
>and over the years as i entered the computer science field
>i saw many religious battles over coding standards
>
>what doesn't matter in any of these
> is brace placement or collection type
>
>what matters
> is behavior
>and fit to conceptual pattern matching modes
>
>what matter is how it acts
>
>how it looks is pure aesthetic fetish
>
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar

Interesting post. I'd appreciate your thoughts on something.

You may have heard the following old puzzle:

You are in a land where there are two kinds of people only.
Those who tell the truth all the time and those who lie all
the time. You are walking up a trail heading towards a inn.
You come to a fork in the trail and you don't know which
branch to follow. There are two men at the fork. You are
allowed two questions, each of which must only evoke a
"yes" or "no" response. What two questions do you ask
that will ascertain the correct branch to follow?

Years ago I solved this puzzle by following on a hunch
that the first question (to man A let's say) must
determine the kind of individual man B must be. My
hunch also suggested that the first question must ask
for a comparison. So I guessed that I might ask man A
the question, "Are you the same kind as your friend"?
Then this truth table exists:

A B Response
------------------------
T T Yes
T L No
L T Yes
L L No

Notice that a "yes" response means man B is a truth
teller and a "no" response means man B is a liar. With
this information, the rest is trivial. You simply point to the
right branch (say) and ask man B "Is this the way to the inn"?
Knowing his kind, you simply act according to his answer,
taking the left branch if he's a liar, for example.

Now, at the time I solved this puzzle, I was immersed
in computer circuitry, digital logic, Boolean algebra, etc.
In solving the puzzle, though, I used no formal methods.
The idea of a exclusive OR gate and "sign or polarity
detection" simply came to my mind and led to my
solution.

So, I'm now thinking of artificial intelligence and the
ability of a machine to solve the puzzle. I'm wondering
if it requires knowledge as well as logical and creative
abilities. I know AI have demonstrated mathematical
creativity. I'm wondering if the above puzzle wouldn't
offer one kind of test of AI capabilities. Or maybe AI
have already far surpassed this kind of puzzle, and
it would be trivial for modern AI.

Thoughts? Is knowledge required to solve the puzzle?
Or is "raw intelligence" sufficient?

Art
http://home.ptd.net/~artnpeg
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