Re: A Post for Brian
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Re: A Post for Brian         

Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: zinnic
Date: Aug 21, 2007 23:48

On Aug 21, 10:45 pm, Immortalist yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Aug 20, 8:23 am, "brian fletcher" bigpond.net.au> wrote:
>
>> "Immortalist" yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
>>news:1187581641.697682.53250@q4g2000prc.googlegroups.com...
>
>>> On Aug 19, 7:35 pm, turtoni fastmail.net> wrote:
>>>> On Aug 19, 1:06 am, Immortalist yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>>>> On Aug 17, 11:46 pm, turtoni fastmail.net> wrote:
>
>>>>>> "In contemporary analytic philosophy, the issue of subject -- and
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> specifically the "point of view" of the subject, or "subjectivity" --
>>>>>> has received attention as one of the major intractable problems in
>>>>>> philosophy of mind (another intractable issue being the mind-body
>>>>>> problem). In the essay What is it like to be a bat?, Thomas Nagel
>>>>>> famously argued that explaining subjective experience -- the "what it
>>>>>> is like" to be something -- is currently beyond the reach of
>>>>>> scientific inquiry, because scientific understanding by definition
>>>>>> requires an objective perspective, which, according to Nagel, is
>>>>>> diametrically opposed to the subjective first-person point of view.
>>>>>> These additional features of subjective experience are often referred
>>>>>> to as qualia (see Frank Cameron Jackson and Mary's room)."
>
>>>>>> H O P E .. T H A T .. H E L P S ..
>
>>>>> Sounds like something Berkeley might have said back in the
>>>>> Enlightenment. Maybe this "bat" thing is a species version of human
>>>>> solipsism? The argument has many other problems to but I am pointing
>>>>> out the humorus one.
>
>>>>> Solipsism (Latin: solus, alone + ipse, self) is the philosophical idea
>>>>> that "My mind is the only thing that I know exists". Solipsism is an
>>>>> epistemological or metaphysical position that knowledge of anything
>>>>> outside the mind is unjustified. The external world and other minds
>>>>> cannot be known and might not exist.
>
>
>
>>>> "The whole Matrix series can also be interpreted as the story of
>>>> Jesus, with Neo, Trinity and Morpheus representing the Holy Trinity.
>>>> Neo represents Jesus (the Son), Trinity represents the Holy Spirit and
>>>> Morpheus represents the Father. Neo also has extraordinary powers and
>>>> dies before being brought back to life. Adding credence to this idea
>>>> is the fact that "Anderson" means "Son of Man.""
>
>
>>>> "In philosophy, the brain in a vat is any of a variety of thought
>>>> experiments intended to draw out certain features of our ideas of
>>>> knowledge, reality, truth, mind, and meaning. It is drawn from the
>>>> idea, common to many science fiction stories, that a mad scientist
>>>> might remove a person's brain from the body, suspend it in a vat of
>>>> life-sustaining liquid, and connect its neurons by wires to a
>>>> supercomputer which would provide it with electrical impulses
>>>> identical to those the brain normally receives. According to such
>>>> stories, the computer would then be simulating a virtual reality
>>>> (including appropriate responses to the brain's own output) and the
>>>> person with the "disembodied" brain would continue to have perfectly
>>>> normal conscious experiences without these being related to objects or
>>>> events in the real world.
>
>>>> The simplest use of brain-in-a-vat scenarios is as an argument for
>>>> philosophical skepticism and Solipsism. A simple version of this runs
>>>> as follows: Since the brain in a vat gives and receives the exact same
>>>> impulses as it would if it were in a skull, and since these are its
>>>> only way of interacting with its environment, then it is not possible
>>>> to tell, from the perspective of that brain, whether it is in a skull
>>>> or a vat. Yet in the first case most of the person's beliefs may be
>>>> true (if he believes, say, that he is walking down the street, or
>>>> eating ice-cream); in the latter case they are false. Since, the
>>>> argument says, you cannot know whether you are a brain in a vat, then
>>>> you cannot know whether most of your beliefs might be completely
>>>> false. Since, in principle, it is impossible to rule out your being a
>>>> brain in a vat, you cannot have good grounds for believing any of the
>>>> things you believe; you certainly cannot know them.
>
>>>> This argument is a contemporary version of the argument given by
>>>> Descartes in Meditations on First Philosophy (which he eventually
>>>> rejects) that he could not trust his perceptions on the grounds that
>>>> an evil demon might, conceivably, be controlling his every experience.
>>>> It is also more distantly related to Descartes' argument that he
>>>> cannot trust his perceptions because he may be dreaming (Descartes's
>>>> dream argument is preceded by Zhuangzi in "Zhuangzi dreamed he was a
>>>> butterfly".). In this latter argument the worry about active deception
>>>> is removed."- Hide quoted text -
>
>>> I would bet that Descartes meant by "trust" that it is probable and
>>> not certain that his beliefs about the matter were correct. He was
>>> only trying to find out what he can know for certain, but when he
>>> stepped out of his front door, he probably trusted the probable.
>>> Thought experiements are like that.
>
>> Correct. They just think and think.
>
>> When the knower thinks, he can think he does not know, but when the thinker
>> knows, he knows he thinks also.
>
> Knowing that he thinks is probably theoretical and not necessary.
>
> Cogito, Ergo Sum (The Circle Game) Descartes
>
> THE CIRCLE GAME: "Descartes was a philosophical disaster!" Attacking
> Descate's Cogito from within Descartes's own logical structure rather
> than from a modern context.
>
> Examining Descartes's philosophy from within its own logical
> structure, we see that Descartes is unable to escape the necessity of
> an observer in his attempt to find a foundation for his philosophy. As
> I will show, he grounds his philosophy on the postulates of his
> ability to discern truth from fiction and his own existence. Descartes
> foundationalist philosophy fails, as a result, because neither the
> infallibility and integrity of the observer nor the observer's
> existence are certain.
>
> Descartes attempts to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
> single, undeniable truth which he knows to be "fixed and assured". He
> takes "I think, therefore I am" "as the first principle of the
> philosophy I was seeking", believing that this is the only truth which
> is necessary to found a philosophy. His logical structure , however,
> relies on a second postulate. He claims that "the capacity to judge
> correctly and to distinguish the true from the false is naturally
> equal in all men". This postulate is more fundamental to his logical
> structure than the cogito because without it, he cannot escape the
> skepticism of his foundationalist structure.
>
> Unpacking the significance of this postulate is somewhat of a
> metaphysical thicket, but the effort is well rewarded. There is no
> question that by thinking "I think, therefore I am", Descartes is
> thinking. Beyond the statement of his existence, however, Descartes
> cannot form any other conclusion unless he has the ability to discern
> the truth of a thought-except the conclusion that he is, there is no
> method to discern a true thought from a thought implanted into his
> head by an other being unless he can make the distinction himself. If
> he is to make any progress in his philosophy, he must rely on this
> second postulate.
>
> Even with this condition, Descartes's philosophy remains unstable. His
> first postulate, the cogito, fails because it depends on the integrity
> of the subject, the ego. Unlike a similar postulate of mathematics,
> such as x+0=x, which does not depend on the integrity of the observer
> in order to be true, Descartes's postulate is singularly tied to the
> subject because the subject, the "I", is an integral part of the
> statement. In the postulate, the "I" must be distinct since the cogito
> makes no claims about the existence of anything outside the mind.
> Descartes admits, however, that the mind is subject to failings caused
> by the body:
>
> "the mind depends so much on the temperament and on the disposition of
> the organs of the body, that if it is possible to find some means of
> rendering men as a whole wiser and more dexterous than they have been
> hitherto, I believe it must be sought in medicine".
>
> Furthermore, the mind cannot be sure of even its own state. Descartes
> admits that "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can
> distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". Most
> significantly, however, Descartes requires the fallibility of his mind
> in order to prove the existence of God. Within his proof, Descartes
> gives as an antecedent to his argument the observation that "my being
> was not completely perfect" when it was created. But the infallible
> ability to discern truth is, by nature of its indisputeability, a form
> of perfection. He appears to be directly contradicting his second
> postulate, the ability to discern truth from fiction. This logical
> breakdown within Descartes's argument hints at a much greater problem,
> however.
>
> Descartes has a problem of authorship. That he exists and that he
> conceives of his existence are synonymous according to the cogito
> postulate. Furthermore, the existence of anything outside of his mind
> depends on his own existence. He is assured of the existence of the
> rest of the Universe by his perception of thinking of it. If the
> observer stops observing himself, he ceases to exist, however. Thus
> the reality of the Universe within Descartes's system depends on his
> ability to conceive of it, which in turn requires that he exist. This
> introduces a rather interesting problem in to his philosophy.
>
> By the time he has completed his proof of the existence of God,
> Descartes concludes that his own existence is dependent of the
> existence of God. Because he creates a foundationalist philosophy,
> Descartes must believe that the laws of the Universe are deriveable
> from the cogito postulate. After attempting to establish the existence
> of God, however, he admits that "I have observed certain laws which
> God has so established in nature and of which he has impressed such
> notions in our souls". According to his postulates, all that is in
> Descartes's mind is the result of the fact that he thinks, yet here he
> seems to be adding yet another subject to the set of actors upon which
> his philosophy rests. The validity of the claims he has already made
> are again questioned by further doubt over the author of existence:
>
> "And who can give me the assurance that this God has not arranged that
> there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no figure, no
> magnitude, or place, and that nevertheless I should have the
> perception of all these things, and the persuasion that they do not
> exist other than as I see them?"
>
> Clearly, Descartes would not want to add dependency on a second
> subject to his philosophy but he nonetheless accepts the notion that
> not all existence can be attributed to his thoughts alone. God, he
> qualifies, must also have authorship:
>
> "if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is such that I know
> clearly that it is not within me, either formally or eminently, and
> that consequently I cannot myself be its cause, it follows necessarily
> from this that I am not alone in the world, but that there is besides
> some other being who exists, and who is the cause of this idea."
>
> It is illogical that such a being, whose existence in the Universe is
> dependent on the thoughts and observations of an observer could also
> be the author of the same observer's thoughts. Surely Descartes
> realized this but he seems to ignore its significance. He declares
> "God is necessarily the author of my existence" and so falls into a
> circular dependency, where his own existence is dependent on a God
> whose existence in the Universe is dependent on Descartes's ability to
> conceive of God and to determine the truth of such a perception.
> Because the observer is thus permanently trapped within Descartes's
> web of logic, the entire foundation of the structure is unsound.
>
> With the foundation of Descartes carefully laid structure crumbling in
> front of close examination, it appears, a philosophical failure. Such
> an evaluation is made strong if it comes from within the logical
> structure that Descartes presents. The job is easy, however, because
> Descartes establishes such a dependent, recursive structure that his
> entire fabrication falls under its own twisted weight.
>
> http://www.stanford.edu/~bwark/papers/circle_game.html> BOfL-

Thanks for a real insight that confirms that 'self-referentials' prove
nothing and in fact are the hidden culprits in many confusions.
Z
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