>>>>>>>>>>>Where are the WMD's? You might find them in this article.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Where the WMDs Went
>>>>>>>>>>>By Jamie Glazov
>>>>>>>>>>>
FrontPageMagazine.com | November 16, 2005
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
www.frontpagemag.com . . .
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Frontpage InterviewÂ’s guest today is Bill Tierney, a former military
>>>>>>>>>>>intelligence officer and Arabic speaker who worked at Guantanamo Bay in
>>>>>>>>>>>2002 and as a counter-infiltration operator in Baghdad in 2004. He was
>>>>>>>>>>>also an inspector (1996-1998) for the United Nations Special Commission
>>>>>>>>>>>(UNSCOM) for overseeing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction
>>>>>>>>>>>and ballistic missiles in Iraq. He worked on the most intrusive
>>>>>>>>>>>inspections during this period and either participated in or planned
>>>>>>>>>>>inspections that led to four of the seventeen resolutions against Iraq.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: Mr. Tierney, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: Thanks for the opportunity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: With the Democrats now so viciously and hypocritically attacking
>>>>>>>>>>>Bush about WMDs, IÂ’d like to discuss your own knowledge and expertise on
>>>>>>>>>>>this issue in connection to Iraq. You have always held that Iraq had
>>>>>>>>>>>weapons of mass destruction. Why? Can you discuss some actual finds?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: It was probably on my second inspection that I realized the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis had no intention of ever cooperating. They had very successfully
>>>>>>>>>>>turned The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections during
>>>>>>>>>>>the eighties into tea parties, and had expected UNSCOM to turn out the
>>>>>>>>>>>same way. However, there was one fundamental difference between IAEA and
>>>>>>>>>>>UNSCOM that the Iraqis did not account for. There was a disincentive in
>>>>>>>>>>>IAEA inspections to be aggressive and intrusive, since the same
>>>>>>>>>>>standards could then be applied to the members states of the inspectors.
>>>>>>>>>>>IAEA had to consider the continued cooperation of all the member states.
>>>>>>>>>>>UNSCOM, however, was focused on enforcing and verifying one specific
>>>>>>>>>>>Security Council Resolution, 687, and the level of intrusiveness would
>>>>>>>>>>>depend on the cooperation from Iraq.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>I came into the inspection program as an interrogator and Arabic
>>>>>>>>>>>linguist, so I crossed over various fields and spotted various deception
>>>>>>>>>>>techniques that may not have been noticed in only one field, such as
>>>>>>>>>>>chemical or biological. For instance, the Iraqis would ask in very
>>>>>>>>>>>reasonable tones that questionable documents be set aside until the end
>>>>>>>>>>>of the day, when a discussion would determine what was truly of interest
>>>>>>>>>>>to UNSCOM. The chief inspector, not wanting to appear like a
>>>>>>>>>>>knuckle-dragging ogre, would agree. Instead of setting the documents on
>>>>>>>>>>>a table in a stack, the Iraqis would set them side to side, filling the
>>>>>>>>>>>entire table top, and would place the most explosive documents on the
>>>>>>>>>>>edge of the table. At some point they would flood the room with people,
>>>>>>>>>>>and in the confusion abscond with the revealing documents.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>This occurred at Tuwaitha Atomic Research Facility in 1996. A car tried
>>>>>>>>>>>to blow through an UNSCOM vehicle checkpoint at the gate. The car had a
>>>>>>>>>>>stack of documents about two feet high in the back seat. In the middle
>>>>>>>>>>>of the stack, I found a document with a Revolutionary Command Council
>>>>>>>>>>>letterhead that discussed Atomic projects with four number designations
>>>>>>>>>>>that were previously unknown. The Iraqis were extremely concerned. I
>>>>>>>>>>>turned the document over to the chief inspector, who then fell for the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis’ “reasonable request” to lay it out on a table for later
>>>>>>>>>>>discussion. The Iraqis later flooded the room, and the document
>>>>>>>>>>>disappeared. Score one for the Iraqis.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>On finds, the key word here is “find.” UNSCOM could pursue a lead and
>>>>>>>>>>>approach an inspection target from various angles to cut off an escape
>>>>>>>>>>>route, but at some point, the Iraqis would hold up their guns and keep
>>>>>>>>>>>us out.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>A good example of this was the inspection of the 2nd Armored Battalion
>>>>>>>>>>>of the Special Republican Guards in June 1997. We came in from three
>>>>>>>>>>>directions, because we knew the Iraqis had an operational center that
>>>>>>>>>>>tracked our movement and issued warnings. The vehicle I was in arrived
>>>>>>>>>>>at the gate first. There were two guards when we arrived, and over
>>>>>>>>>>>twenty within a minute, all extremely nervous.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>The Iraqis had stopped the third group of our inspection team before it
>>>>>>>>>>>could close off the back of the installation. A few minutes later, a
>>>>>>>>>>>soldier came from inside the installation, and all the other guards
>>>>>>>>>>>gathered around him. He said something, there was a big laugh, and all
>>>>>>>>>>>the guards relaxed. A few moments later there was a radio call from the
>>>>>>>>>>>team that had been stopped short. They could hear truck engines through
>>>>>>>>>>>the tall (10”) grass in that area. When we were finally allowed in, our
>>>>>>>>>>>team went to the back gate. The Iraqis claimed the gate hadnÂ’t been
>>>>>>>>>>>opened in months, but there was freshly ground rust at the gate hinges.
>>>>>>>>>>>There was a photo from overhead showing tractor trailers with missiles
>>>>>>>>>>>in the trailers leaving the facility.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>When pressed, Tariq Aziz criticized the inspectors for not knowing the
>>>>>>>>>>>difference between a missile and a concrete guard tower. He never
>>>>>>>>>>>produced the guard towers for verification. It was during this period
>>>>>>>>>>>that Tariq Aziz pulled out his “no smoking gun” line. Tariq very
>>>>>>>>>>>cleverly changed the meaning of this phrase. The smoking gun refers to
>>>>>>>>>>>an indicator of what you are really looking for - the bullet. Tariq
>>>>>>>>>>>changed the meaning so smoking gun referred to the bullet, in this case
>>>>>>>>>>>the WMD, knowing that as long as there were armed guards between us and
>>>>>>>>>>>the weapons, we would never be able to “find,” as in “put our hands on,”
>>>>>>>>>>>the weapons of mass destruction. The western press mindlessly took this
>>>>>>>>>>>up and became the IraqisÂ’ tool. I will let the reader decide whether
>>>>>>>>>>>this inspection constitutes a smoking gun.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: So can you tell us about some other “smoking guns”?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: Sure. Another smoking gun was the inspection of the 2nd
>>>>>>>>>>>Infantry Battalion of the Special Republican Guards. After verifying
>>>>>>>>>>>source information related to biological weapons formerly stored at the
>>>>>>>>>>>National War College, we learned at another site that the unit
>>>>>>>>>>>responsible for guarding the biological weapons was stationed near the
>>>>>>>>>>>airport. We immediately dashed over there before the Iraqis could react,
>>>>>>>>>>>and forced them to lock us out. One of our vehicles took an elevated
>>>>>>>>>>>position where they could look inside the installation and see the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis loading specialized containers on to trucks that matched the
>>>>>>>>>>>source description for the biological weapons containers. The Iraqis
>>>>>>>>>>>claimed that we had inspected the facilities a year earlier, so we
>>>>>>>>>>>didnÂ’t need to inspect it again.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Another smoking gun was the inspection of Jabal Makhul Presidential
>>>>>>>>>>>Site. In June/July 1997 we inspected the 4th Special Republican Guards
>>>>>>>>>>>Battalion in Bayji, north of Tikrit. This unit had been photographed
>>>>>>>>>>>taking equipment for the Electro-magnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)
>>>>>>>>>>>method of uranium enrichment away from inspectors. The Iraqis were
>>>>>>>>>>>extremely nervous as this site, and hid any information on personnel who
>>>>>>>>>>>may have been involved with moving the equipment. This was also the site
>>>>>>>>>>>where the Iraqi official on the UNSCOM helicopter tried to grab the
>>>>>>>>>>>control and almost made the aircraft crash.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>When I returned to the States, I learned that the Iraqis were extremely
>>>>>>>>>>>nervous that we were going to inspect an unspecified nearby site, and
>>>>>>>>>>>that they checked that certain code named items were in their proper
>>>>>>>>>>>place. I knew from this information the Iraqis could only be referring
>>>>>>>>>>>to Jabal Makhul Presidential Site, a sprawling mountain retreat on the
>>>>>>>>>>>other side of the ridge from the 4th Battalion, assigned to guard the
>>>>>>>>>>>installation. This explained why the Iraqis caused the problems with the
>>>>>>>>>>>helicopter, to keep it from flying to the other side of the mountain.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>We inspected Jabal Makhul in September of 1997. The Iraqis locked us out
>>>>>>>>>>>without a word of discussion. This was the start of the Presidential
>>>>>>>>>>>Site imbroglio. The Iraqis made great hay out of inspectors wanting to
>>>>>>>>>>>look under the presidentÂ’s furniture, but this site, with its hundreds
>>>>>>>>>>>of acres, was the real target.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>During the Presidential Site inspections in Spring of 1998, inspectors
>>>>>>>>>>>found an under-mountain storage area at Jabal Makhul. When the
>>>>>>>>>>>inspectors arrived, it was filled with drums of water. The Iraqis
>>>>>>>>>>>claimed that they used the storage area to store rainwater. Jabal Makhul
>>>>>>>>>>>had the Tigris River flowing by at the bottom of the mountain, and a
>>>>>>>>>>>massive pump to send water to the top of the mountain, where it would
>>>>>>>>>>>cascade down in fountains and waterfalls in SaddamÂ’s own little
>>>>>>>>>>>Shangri-la, but the Iraqi had to go to the effort of digging out an
>>>>>>>>>>>underground bunker akin to our Cheyenne Mountain headquarters, just so
>>>>>>>>>>>they could store rainwater.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>A London Sunday Times article in 2001 by Gwynne Roberts quoted an Iraqi
>>>>>>>>>>>defector as stating Iraq had nuclear weapons in a heavily guarded
>>>>>>>>>>>installation in the Hamrin mountains. Jabal Makhul is the most heavily
>>>>>>>>>>>guarded location in the Hamrin mountains. With its under-mountain
>>>>>>>>>>>bunker, isolation, and central location, it is the perfect place to
>>>>>>>>>>>store a high-value asset like a nuclear weapon.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>On nukes, some analysts wait until there is unambiguous proof before
>>>>>>>>>>>stating a country has nuclear weapons. This may work in a courtroom, but
>>>>>>>>>>>intelligence is a different subject altogether. I believe it is more
>>>>>>>>>>>prudent to determine what is axiomatic given a nationÂ’s capabilities and
>>>>>>>>>>>intentions. There was no question that Iraq had triggering mechanisms
>>>>>>>>>>>for a nuke, the question was whether they had enriched enough uranium.
>>>>>>>>>>>Given IraqÂ’s intensive efforts to build a nuke prior to the Gulf War,
>>>>>>>>>>>their efforts to hide uranium enrichment material from inspectors, the
>>>>>>>>>>>fact that Israel had a nuke but no Arab state could claim the same, my
>>>>>>>>>>>first-hand knowledge of the limits of UNSCOM and IAEA capabilities, and
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqi efforts to buy yellowcake uranium abroad (Joe Wilson tea parties
>>>>>>>>>>>notwithstanding), I believe the TWELVE years between 1991 and 2003 was
>>>>>>>>>>>more than enough time to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium to
>>>>>>>>>>>produce a nuclear weapon. Maybe I have more respect for the IraqisÂ’
>>>>>>>>>>>capabilities than some.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: Tell us something you came up with while conducting
>>>>>>>>>>>counter-infiltration ops in Iraq.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: While I was engaged in these operations in Baghdad in 2004, one
>>>>>>>>>>>of the local translators freely stated in his security interview that he
>>>>>>>>>>>worked for the purchasing department of the nuclear weapons program
>>>>>>>>>>>prior to and during the First Gulf War. He said that Saddam purchased
>>>>>>>>>>>such large quantities of precision machining equipment that he could
>>>>>>>>>>>give up some to inspections, or lose some to bombing, and still have
>>>>>>>>>>>enough for his weapons program. This translator also stated that when
>>>>>>>>>>>Saddam took human shields and placed some at Tarmiya Nuclear Research
>>>>>>>>>>>Facility, he was sent there to act as a translator. One of the security
>>>>>>>>>>>officers at Tarmiya told him that he had just recovered from a sickness
>>>>>>>>>>>he incurred while guarding technicians working in an underground
>>>>>>>>>>>facility nearby. The security officer stated that the technicians left
>>>>>>>>>>>for a break every half hour, but he stayed in the underground chamber
>>>>>>>>>>>all day and got sick. The security officer didnÂ’t mention what they were
>>>>>>>>>>>doing, but I would say uranium enrichment is the most logical pick.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>What, not enough smoke? There was the missile inspection on MaÂ’moun
>>>>>>>>>>>Establishment. I was teamed with two computer forensic specialists. A
>>>>>>>>>>>local technician stood by while we opened a computer and found a flight
>>>>>>>>>>>simulation for a missile taking off from the Iraqi desert in the same
>>>>>>>>>>>area used during the First Gulf War and flying west towards Israel. The
>>>>>>>>>>>warhead was only for 50 kilograms. By the time we understood was this
>>>>>>>>>>>was, the poor technician was coming apart. I will never forget meeting
>>>>>>>>>>>his eyes, and both of us realizing he was a dead man walking. The Iraqis
>>>>>>>>>>>tried to say that the computer had just been transferred from another
>>>>>>>>>>>facility, and that the flight simulation had not been erased from before
>>>>>>>>>>>the war. The documentÂ’s placement in the file manager, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>technicianÂ’s reaction belied this story. UNSCOMÂ’s original assessment
>>>>>>>>>>>was that this was for a biological warhead, but I have since seen
>>>>>>>>>>>reporting that make me think it was for a nuclear weapon.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>These are only some of the observations of one inspector. I know of
>>>>>>>>>>>other inspections where there were clear indicators the Iraqis were
>>>>>>>>>>>hiding weapons from the inspectors.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: Ok, so where did the WMDs go?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: While working counter-infiltration in Baghdad, I noticed a
>>>>>>>>>>>pattern among infiltrators that their cover stories would start around
>>>>>>>>>>>Summer or Fall of 2002. From this and other observations, I believe
>>>>>>>>>>>Saddam planned for a U.S. invasion after President BushÂ’s speech at West
>>>>>>>>>>>Point in 2002. One of the steps taken was to prepare the younger
>>>>>>>>>>>generation of the security services with English so they could
>>>>>>>>>>>infiltrate our ranks, another was either to destroy or move WMDs to
>>>>>>>>>>>other countries, principally Syria. Starting in the Summer of 2002, the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis had months to purge their files and create cover stories, such as
>>>>>>>>>>>the letter from Hossam Amin, head of the Iraqi outfit that monitored the
>>>>>>>>>>>weapons inspectors, stating after Hussein KamalÂ’s defection that the
>>>>>>>>>>>weapons were all destroyed in 1991.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>I was on the inspections that follow-up on Hussein KamalÂ’s defection,
>>>>>>>>>>>and Hossam said at the time that Hussein Kamal had a secret cabal that
>>>>>>>>>>>kept the weapons without the knowledge of the Iraqi government. It was
>>>>>>>>>>>pure pleasure disemboweling this cover story. Yet the consensus at DIA
>>>>>>>>>>>is that Iraq got rid of its weapons in 1991. This is truly scary. If
>>>>>>>>>>>true, when and where did Saddam have a change of heart? This is the same
>>>>>>>>>>>man who crowed after 9/11, then went silent after news broke that
>>>>>>>>>>>Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence operative in Prague. Did
>>>>>>>>>>>Saddam spend a month with Mother Theresa, or go to a mountain top in the
>>>>>>>>>>>HimalayaÂ’s? Those that say there were no weapons have to prove that
>>>>>>>>>>>Saddam had a change of heart. I await their evidence with interest.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: So do you think the WMD is the central issue regarding Iraq?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: No, and it never should have been an issue. The First Gulf War
>>>>>>>>>>>-- and I use this term as a convention, since this is actually all the
>>>>>>>>>>>same war -- was a prime example of managing war instead of waging it.
>>>>>>>>>>>Instead of telling Saddam to get out of Kuwait or we will push him out,
>>>>>>>>>>>we should have said to get out of Kuwait or we will remove him from
>>>>>>>>>>>power. As it was, we were projecting our respect for human life on
>>>>>>>>>>>Saddam, when actually, from his point of view, we were doing him a favor
>>>>>>>>>>>by killing mostly ShiÂ’ite military members who were a threat to his
>>>>>>>>>>>regime. I realize that Saudi Arabia, our host, did not want a change in
>>>>>>>>>>>government in Iraq, and they had helped us bring down the Soviet Union
>>>>>>>>>>>with oil price manipulation, but we should have bent them to our will
>>>>>>>>>>>instead of vice versa. Saddam would not have risked losing power to keep
>>>>>>>>>>>Kuwait, and we could have avoided this whole ordeal.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>We topped one mistake with another, expecting Saddam Hussein and the
>>>>>>>>>>>Baath Party, a criminal syndicate masquerading as a political party, to
>>>>>>>>>>>abide by any arms control agreement. Gun control and Arms control both
>>>>>>>>>>>arise from the “mankind is good” worldview. If you control the
>>>>>>>>>>>environment, i.e. get rid of the guns, then manÂ’s natural goodness will
>>>>>>>>>>>rise to the surface. I hope it is evidence after more than a decade of
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqi intransigence how foolish this position is. The sobering fact is
>>>>>>>>>>>that if a nation feels it is in their best interest to have certain
>>>>>>>>>>>weapons, they are going to have them. Chemical weapons were critical to
>>>>>>>>>>>warding off hoards of Iranian fighters, and the Iraqis knew they would
>>>>>>>>>>>always be in a position of weakness against Israel without nuclear
>>>>>>>>>>>weapons. The United States kept nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet
>>>>>>>>>>>Union, but we would deny the same logic for Iraq?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>There is also the practicality of weapons inspections/weapons hunts.
>>>>>>>>>>>After seventeen resolutions pleading with the Iraqis to be nice, the
>>>>>>>>>>>light bulb still didnÂ’t go off that the entire concept is fundamentally
>>>>>>>>>>>flawed. Would you like to live in a city where the police chief sent out
>>>>>>>>>>>resolutions to criminals to play nice, instead of taking them off the
>>>>>>>>>>>streets?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>As I said earlier, I knew the Iraqis would never cooperate, so the
>>>>>>>>>>>inspections became a matter of illustrating this non-cooperation for the
>>>>>>>>>>>Security Council and the rest of the world. No manipulation or
>>>>>>>>>>>fabrication was necessary. There was a sufficient percentage of
>>>>>>>>>>>defectors with accurate information to ensure that we would catch the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis in the act. UNSCOM was very successfully at verifying the IraqisÂ’
>>>>>>>>>>>non-cooperation; the failure was in the cowardice at the Security
>>>>>>>>>>>Council. Maybe cowardice is too strong a word. Maybe the problem was
>>>>>>>>>>>giving a mission that entailed the possible use of force to an
>>>>>>>>>>>organization with the goal of eliminating the use of force.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>On the post-war weapons hunt, the arrogance and hubris of the
>>>>>>>>>>>intelligence community is such that they canÂ’t entertain the possibility
>>>>>>>>>>>that they just failed to find the weapons because the Iraqis did a good
>>>>>>>>>>>job cleaning up prior to their arrival. This reminds me of the police
>>>>>>>>>>>chief who announced on television plans to raid a secret drug factor on
>>>>>>>>>>>the outskirts of town. At the time appointed, the police, all twelve of
>>>>>>>>>>>them, lined up behind each other at the front door, knocked and waiting
>>>>>>>>>>>for the druggies to answer, as protocol required. After ten minute of
>>>>>>>>>>>toilet flushing and back-door slamming, somebody came to the front door
>>>>>>>>>>>in a bathrobe and explained he had been in the shower. The police took
>>>>>>>>>>>his story at face value, even though his was dry as a bone, then police
>>>>>>>>>>>proceeded to inspect the premises ensuring that the legal, moral ,
>>>>>>>>>>>ethnic, human, and animal rights, and also the national dignity, of the
>>>>>>>>>>>druggies was preserved. After a search, the police chief announced THERE
>>>>>>>>>>>WERE NO STOCKPILES of drugs at the inspected site. Anyone care to move
>>>>>>>>>>>to this city?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: LetÂ’s talk a little bit more about how the WMDs disappeared.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: In IraqÂ’s case, the lakes and rivers were the toilet, and Syria
>>>>>>>>>>>was the back door. Even though there was imagery showing an inordinate
>>>>>>>>>>>amount of traffic into Syria prior to the inspections, and there were
>>>>>>>>>>>other indicators of government control of commercial trucking that could
>>>>>>>>>>>be used to ship the weapons to Syria, from the ICs point of view, if
>>>>>>>>>>>there is no positive evidence that the movement occurred, it never
>>>>>>>>>>>happened. This conclusion is the consequence of confusing litigation
>>>>>>>>>>>with intelligence. Litigation depends on evidence, intelligence depends
>>>>>>>>>>>on indicators. Picture yourself as a German intelligence officer in
>>>>>>>>>>>Northern France in April 1944. When asked where will the Allies land,
>>>>>>>>>>>you reply “I would be happy to tell you when I have solid, legal proof,
>>>>>>>>>>>sir. We will have to wait until they actually land.” You won’t last very
>>>>>>>>>>>long. That officer would have to take in all the indicators, factor in
>>>>>>>>>>>deception, and make an assessment (this is a fancy intelligence word for
>>>>>>>>>>>an educated guess).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>The Democrats understand the difference between the two concepts, but
>>>>>>>>>>>have no qualms about blurring the distinction for political gain. This
>>>>>>>>>>>is despicable. This has brought great harm to our nationÂ’s credibility
>>>>>>>>>>>with our allies. A perfect example is Senator Levin waving deception by
>>>>>>>>>>>one single source, al-Libi, to try and convince us that this is evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>there was no connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, as though the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>argument rested on this one source. Senator Levin, and his media
>>>>>>>>>>>servants, think the public canÂ’t read through his duplicity. He is
>>>>>>>>>>>plunging a dagger into the heart of his own country.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Could the assessments of IraqÂ’s weapons program been off? I am sure
>>>>>>>>>>>there were some marginal details that were incorrect, but on the matter
>>>>>>>>>>>of whether Iraq had a program, the error was not with the pre-war
>>>>>>>>>>>assessment, the error was with the weapons hunt.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>I could speak at length about the problems with the weapons hunt. Mr.
>>>>>>>>>>>Hanson has an excellent article in “The American Thinker,” and Judith
>>>>>>>>>>>Miller, one of the few bright lights at the New York Times, did an
>>>>>>>>>>>article on the problems with the weapons hunt that I can corroborate
>>>>>>>>>>>from other sources. But if the Iraqi Survey Group had been manned by a
>>>>>>>>>>>thousand James Bonds, and every prop was where it should have been, I
>>>>>>>>>>>doubt the result would have been much different. The whole concept of
>>>>>>>>>>>international arms inspections puts too much advantage with the
>>>>>>>>>>>inspected country. Factor in the brutality used by the Baath Party, and
>>>>>>>>>>>it amounts to a winning combination for our opponents.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>I was shocked to learn recently that members of the Iraqi Survey Group
>>>>>>>>>>>believed their Iraqi sources when they said they donÂ’t fear a return of
>>>>>>>>>>>the Baath Party. During my eight months of counterinfiltration duty, we
>>>>>>>>>>>had 50 local Iraqis working on our post who were murdered for
>>>>>>>>>>>collaborating. Of the more than 150 local employees our team identified
>>>>>>>>>>>as security threats, the most sophisticated infiltrators came from the
>>>>>>>>>>>Baath Party. This was just one post, yet the DIA believes no one was
>>>>>>>>>>>afraid to talk, even though scientists who were cooperating with ISG
>>>>>>>>>>>were murdered. You can add this to the Able Danger affair as another
>>>>>>>>>>>example of the deep rot inside the intelligence community.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>I believe that once the pertinent sources have a sense of security, a
>>>>>>>>>>>whole lot of people are going to have egg on their face. I believe the
>>>>>>>>>>>Iraqis had a WMD program, and I am not changing my story, no matter how
>>>>>>>>>>>many times Chris Matthews hyperventilates.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: Before we go, can you briefly touch on some of the prevailing
>>>>>>>>>>>attitudes in the U.S. military that may hurt us?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: There is a prevailing attitude that the U.S. is too big and
>>>>>>>>>>>ponderous to lose, so individual officers donÂ’t have to take the
>>>>>>>>>>>potentially career-threatening risks necessary to win. I have heard it
>>>>>>>>>>>said that for every one true warrior in the military, there are two to
>>>>>>>>>>>three self-serving, career-worshipping bureaucrats. We shouldnÂ’t be
>>>>>>>>>>>surprised. After all, the Army advertised “Be all you can be!” Or in
>>>>>>>>>>>other words, get a career at taxpayer expense.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>President Clinton changed the definition of the military from peace
>>>>>>>>>>>makers to peace keepers, and no senior officers resigned or objected.
>>>>>>>>>>>President Clinton took a one star general who ran a humanitarian effort
>>>>>>>>>>>in Northern Iraq, Shalikashvilli, and made him Chairman of the Joint
>>>>>>>>>>>Chiefs of Staff. The signal was out, warriors need not apply.
>>>>>>>>>>>Shalikashvilli later spoke at a U.N. meeting and listed the roles for
>>>>>>>>>>>the military in the “Revolution in Military Affairs.” He included warm
>>>>>>>>>>>and fuzzy things like “confidence building,” but failed to mention
>>>>>>>>>>>waging war. In my five years at CENTCOM headquarters, I very rarely
>>>>>>>>>>>heard the words, “war,” “enemy,” or “winning.” This was all absorbed
>>>>>>>>>>>into the wonderful term “strike operations.”
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Operation Desert Fox was a perfect example of the uselessness of strike
>>>>>>>>>>>operations. Iraqis have told me that the WMD destruction and movement
>>>>>>>>>>>started just after Operation Desert Fox, since after all, who would be
>>>>>>>>>>>so stupid as to start a bombing campaign and just stop.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>It was only after Saddam realized that President Clinton lacked the
>>>>>>>>>>>nerve for anything more than a temper-tantrum demonstration that he knew
>>>>>>>>>>>the doors were wide open for him to continue his weapons program. We
>>>>>>>>>>>didnÂ’t break his will, we didnÂ’t destroy his weapons making capability
>>>>>>>>>>>(The Iraqis simply moved most of the precision machinery out prior to
>>>>>>>>>>>the strikes, then rebuilt the buildings), but we did kill some Iraqi
>>>>>>>>>>>bystanders, just so President Clinton could say “something must be done,
>>>>>>>>>>>so I did something.”
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>General Zinni, Commander of CENTCOM, and no other senior officer had any
>>>>>>>>>>>problem with this fecklessness. They apparently bought into the notion
>>>>>>>>>>>that wars are meant to be managed and not waged. The warriors coming
>>>>>>>>>>>into the military post 9/11 deserve true warriors at the top. I believe
>>>>>>>>>>>the house cleaning among the senior military leadership started by the
>>>>>>>>>>>Secretary of Defense should continue full force. If not across the
>>>>>>>>>>>board, then definitely in the military intelligence field.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>FP: Mr. Tierney it was a pleasure to speak with you today. Thank you for
>>>>>>>>>>>visiting Frontpage.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Tierney: Thank you Jamie for the opportunity to say there were weapons,
>>>>>>>>>>>and that we were right to invade Iraq.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20154> He was there.
> The reporters only know what's told to them.
