> whyzard wrote:

>> right now the west is seeking proof of the mysteries, most notably mind
>> reading (also clairovoyance too).
>>
>> which is very interesting because the east has been trying to deny the
>> existence of mind for about 3000 years now. I guess i mean the hindu
>> advaita schools. I also see this too in the ancient east cosmogonic
>> cycles. There is a wish to do away with the liberty, even the reality
>> of the mind.
>>
>> so the west is trying to read what doesn't exist.
>>

>
> This is a very weak sounding argument and how you expect us to come
> around to seeing it your way with a little mention of some religious
> tradition is beyond me.
>
> First off, what is this mind you speak of? Is it mental activitiy or
> experience? Surely your not saying these don't happen are you?

>
> "explanatory success is not the
> only evidence for mental entities"
>
> It sounds like "Irrationalism" in that there are three alternatives,
> rationalism, inductivism and irrationalism.
>
> Churchland Said:
>
> 1. Our ordinary ways of thinking about the mental make up a theory
> (folk psychology) by which human behavior is explained and predicted.
>
> 2. Folk psychology provides only rough and in many cases completely
> defective or nonexistent explanations of human behavior (think of
> mental illness and. sleep, respectively, as examples).
>
> 3. A mature neuroscience will provide more accurate and informative
> explanations of human behavior than folk psychology.
>
> 4. Hence, we are justified in believing that folk psychology is a
> defective theory, and so that the mental entities the theory
> incorporates can be eliminated. That is, eliminative materialism is
> justified.
>
> -------------------------------------------
> 6) Objection: We Cannot Eliminate
> What Is Not Posited
>
> In some cases, when a theory is found to be defective in some manner,
> we conclude that the entities talked about in the theory do not exist.
> Suppose a theory is found to provide inaccurate explanations and
> predictions, and that some other theory in the same subject area
> provides much better and more accurate explanations and predictions.
> Frequently, the old theory is wholly rejected and the new theory is
> adopted. As an example, consider again demon theory, from early
> theories of medicine. People then believed that demons somehow entered
> a person's body and caused the person to become ill. To cure the
> person, one had either to make the demons leave the person's body or at
> least to appease them; and various methods were prescribed by those
> thought to be learned in demon theory to help bring about these cures.
> Modern medical theories, which talk of germs, however, provide much
> better explanations of the relevant illness. Moreover, attempts to cure
> the person typically proceed by attacking the underlying cause, such as
> the germ, and these methods, when successful, themselves help to
> confirm the germ theory. Modern germ theory has, of course, supplanted
> the demon theory: we conclude that the demon theory is false and that
> the entities posited by the theory (namely demons) do not exist. Demons
> were eliminated by advances in medical theory.
>
> This story of demon theory may be used to illustrate two epistemic
> points, as they pertain to entities posited by theories. In the demon
> case, if there are good explanatory reasons for referring to demons
> when trying to explain certain human disorders, then that alone is good
> reason to think there are demons. On the other hand, if there are no
> good explanatory reasons for referring to demons in attempting to
> explain certain human disorders, then that alone is good reason to
> think there are no demons. Shorthand versions of these two principles
> would be these: (1) if demons are good explainers, then that is good
> reason to think they exist; and, (2) if demons are bad explainers (or
> not needed for explanations), then that is good reason to think they do
> not exist.
>
> Now what about sensations and other mental entities: are they analogous
> to demons in the ways suggested by these two principles? They are, with
> respect to principle (1): if sensations are good explainers, then that
> is good reason to think sensations exist. The same would hold for other
> mental entities such as beliefs or emotional states. But the second
> principle is a different matter. It would say: If sensations and other
> mental entities are bad explainers (or are not needed for
> explanations), then that is good reason to think there are no
> sensations and other mental entities. The reason for saying that this
> second principle as it applies to sensations and other mental entities
> is dubious is simple: there are other reasons, aside from explanatory
> virtues, for thinking that there are sensations and other mental
> entities. So, even if mental entities turn out to be failures, from the
> explanatory standpoint, there would still be these other reasons for
> thinking that mental entities exist. So, mental entities are not
> analogous to demons in quite the way supposed by the eliminativist. The
> only reason to think there are demons is if they should be good
> explainers. But explanatory success is not the only reason for thinking
> there are mental entities.
>
> What this argument shows is that the inference from step (3) to (4) in
> Churchland's argument is not a valid one. Even if folk psychology is
> defective in the ways Churchland describes, that alone is not enough to
> warrant elimination of its mental entities. For explanatory success is
> not the only evidence for mental entities.
>
> Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
> by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
>

>> probably why james randi can't ever find his super psychic.
>>
>> there is no mind to read
>> you don't even have one yourself much less someone else.
>>

>
> Another absurd argument unless you can make it sound rational by giving
> us a good definition of this mind. Isn't the mind just what the brain
> is currently doing, the soul is just the brain's activities?
>

>> got this idea from pondering radios.
>>
>> basically, we are radios and the station we are tuned to is "ego mind"'
>>

>
> Scientific research has the best theory with the most reliable evidence
> and their theory is that the brain's activities are enough to be
> subjective experience. What need is there for radio signals.
>

>> i'm not gonna think this through to save on my neurotransmitter/vitamin
>> levels

>
> LOL you believe in neurotransmitters!?!

>

>> seems like an easy thought experiment at first,
>> you will say, well then, you can read minds from the radio station
>> broadcasting all the signals or some sort of mystic collective theory
>> like that----a oneness
>> i don't see it that easy cause you are thinking spatially, which
>> doesn't apply to mind not even a little bit unless you are thinking
>> about landscaping or mowing a lawn or something.
>> also too temporal thinking is interfering with trying to deny mind.
>> oh god, my imagination just called forth my copy of Kant....concepts
>> are starting to stream in trying to chit chat about radios. No good.
>> Too tired. Good night. Be back tomorrow with more reflections on no
>> mind.