> How Neocon Favorites Duped U.S.
>
> By Robert Parry
> Created Nov 2 2006 - 8:45am
>
> A Special Report
>
>
>
> When American voters go to the polls on Nov. 7, one of the foremost
> questions that should be on their minds is how did the United States get
> into the Iraq mess, which has claimed the lives of more than 2,800 U.S.
> soldiers and possibly hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. What went wrong
> with
> Washington and what can citizens do about it?
>
> Part of the answer to what went wrong is that the normal checks and
> balances - in Congress, the national news media and the U.S. intelligence
> community - collapsed in the face of George W. Bush's determination to
> invade Iraq. Pro-war neoconservative opinion leaders also acted as
> intellectual shock troops to bully the few voices of dissent.
>
> Amid this enforced "group think," a self-interested band of Iraqi exiles
> found itself with extraordinary freedom to inject pro-war disinformation
> into the U.S. decision-making process. Despite many reasons to challenge
> the
> truthfulness of Iraqi "defectors" handled by the Iraqi National Congress,
> few in Washington did.
>
> Now, four years later, the Senate Intelligence Committee has issued a
> long-awaited post-mortem on how the INC influenced this life-and-death
> debate. The report reveals not only specific cases of coached Iraqi
> "defectors" lying to intelligence analysts but a stunning failure of the
> U.S. political/media system to challenge the lies.
>
> In one case, U.S. intelligence analysts correctly concluded that an
> INC-supplied defector was a "fabricator/provocateur," but his claims about
> Iraq's supposed mobile weapons labs were never withdrawn and were cited by
> Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations Security
> Council in February 2003.
>
> Another INC source, a supposed nuclear engineer who made claims about
> Iraq's
> alleged nuclear program, couldn't answer relevant physics questions and
> kept
> excusing himself to run to the bathroom where he apparently reviewed notes
> given to him so he could deceive his American debriefers.
>
> Before interviewing that source, U.S. analysts had received a warning from
> another Iraqi that an INC representative had instructed the source to
> "deliver the act of a lifetime." [For details, see below.]
>
> Yet, with President George W. Bush and the powerful right-wing
> political/media machine pressing for war, the intimidated U.S.
> intelligence
> process often worked like a reverse filter, screening out the gems of
> truth
> and letting through the dross of disinformation.
>
> Congress and the mainstream Washington press corps proved equally flawed,
> applying almost no quality controls and serving more as a conveyor belt to
> carry the polluted information down the line to the broader American
> public.
>
> While certain individuals and institutions surely deserve the lion's share
> of the blame, the truth is that the Iraq War represented a systemic
> failure
> in Washington - and one that continues to this day because few of the
> culprits have faced any accountability.
>
> In this Special Report - less than a week before the Nov. 7 elections,
> possibly the last chance to exact any accountability - Consortiumnews.com
> looks at how and why the system failed, a failure that has cost the lives
> of
> so many people and has so badly damaged U.S. national interests:
>
> Special Report
>
> It started out with a simple need.
>
> To gain public acceptance of an unprovoked invasion of Iraq justified by
> the
> "war on terror," the Bush administration had to demonstrate two central
> points: first, the American people had to be convinced that Saddam Hussein
> had rebuilt his arsenal of unconventional chemical and biological weapons
> and was well on his way to manufacturing a nuclear bomb, and second, there
> had to be a plausible case that Hussein's secular dictatorship had a
> secret
> relationship with Islamic terrorists, who might carry Hussein's weapons to
> the United States.
>
> Otherwise, it was unlikely the American people would support sending an
> expeditionary force halfway around the world to attack a country that
> presented no plausible threat to the United States.
>
> The Bush administration's success in selling the bogus Iraq case to a
> still-frightened American public would mark a near total breakdown of the
> U.S. institutional capability of separating fact from fiction, both in the
> corridors of government and in the news media where newspaper editors and
> TV
> executives would act as enablers and collaborators in disinforming
> America.
>
> With the handful of WMD skeptics marginalized to the fringes of public
> discourse, it would take a long time for the fuller story of the deception
> to emerge.
>
> Four years after the key deceptions, the Senate Intelligence Committee
> released its long-awaited assessment of how so much bad intelligence had
> been injected into the decision-making process. In September 2006, the
> committee released two reports, one evaluating the false intelligence that
> buttressed the claims of cooperation between Saddam Hussein's government
> and
> al-Qaeda terrorists, and the other on the Iraqi National Congress, an
> influential group of exiles who worked with American neoconservatives to
> sell the case for war with Iraq.
>
> The History
>
> The official U.S. relationship with these Iraqi exiles dated back to 1991
> after President George H.W. Bush had routed Hussein's army from Kuwait and
> wanted to help Hussein's domestic opponents.
>
> In May 1991, the CIA approached Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Shiite who had
> not
> lived in Iraq since 1956. Chalabi was far from a perfect opposition
> candidate, however. Beyond his long isolation from his homeland, Chalabi
> was
> a fugitive from bank fraud charges in Jordan. Still, in June 1992, the
> Iraqi
> exiles held an organizational meeting in Vienna, Austria, out of which
> came
> the Iraqi National Congress. Chalabi emerged as the group's chairman and
> most visible spokesman.
>
> But Chalabi soon began rubbing CIA officers the wrong way. They complained
> about the quality of his information, the excessive size of his security
> detail, his lobbying of Congress, and his resistance to working as a team
> player.
>
> For his part, smooth-talking Chalabi bristled at the idea that he was a
> U.S.
> intelligence asset, preferring to see himself as an independent political
> leader. Nevertheless, he and his organization were not averse to accepting
> American money.
>
> With U.S. financial backing, the INC waged a propaganda campaign against
> Hussein and arranged for "a steady stream of low-ranking walk-ins" to
> provide intelligence about the Iraqi military, the Senate Intelligence
> Committee report said.
>
> The INC's mix of duties - propaganda and intelligence - would create
> concerns within the CIA as would the issue of Chalabi's "coziness" with
> the
> Shiite government of Iran. The CIA concluded that Chalabi was
> double-dealing
> both sides when he falsely informed Iran that the United States wanted
> Iran's help in conducting anti-Hussein operations.
>
> "Chalabi passed a fabricated message from the White House to" an Iranian
> intelligence officer in northern Iraq, the CIA reported. According to one
> CIA representative, Chalabi used National Security Council stationery for
> the fabricated letter, a charge that Chalabi denied.
>
> In December 1996, Clinton administration officials decided to terminate
> the
> CIA's relationship with the INC and Chalabi. "There was a breakdown in
> trust
> and we never wanted to have anything to do with him anymore," CIA Director
> George Tenet told the Senate Intelligence Committee.
>
> However, in 1998, with the congressional passage of the Iraq Liberation
> Act,
> the INC was again one of the exile organizations that qualified for U.S.
> funding. Starting in March 2000, the State Department agreed to grant an
> INC
> foundation almost $33 million for several programs, including more
> propaganda operations and collection of information about alleged war
> crimes
> committed by Hussein's regime.
>
> By March 2001, with George W. Bush in office and already focusing on Iraq,
> the INC was given greater leeway to pursue its projects, including an
> Information Collection Program.
>
> The INC's blurred responsibilities on intelligence gathering and
> propaganda
> dissemination raised fresh concerns within the State Department. But
> Bush's
> National Security Council intervened against State's attempts to cut off
> funding.
>
> The NSC shifted the INC operation to the control of the Defense
> Department,
> where neoconservatives wielded more influence. To little avail, CIA
> officials warned their counterparts at the Defense Intelligence Agency
> about
> suspicions that "the INC was penetrated by Iranian and possibly other
> intelligence services, and that the INC had its own agenda," the Senate
> report said.
>
> "You've got a real bucket full of worms with the INC and we hope you're
> taking the appropriate steps," the CIA told the DIA.
>
> Media Hype
>
> But the CIA's warnings did little to stanch the flow of INC propaganda
> into
> America's politics and media. Besides irrigating the U.S. intelligence
> community with fresh propaganda, the INC funneled a steady stream of
> "defectors" to U.S. news outlets eager for anti-Hussein scoops.
>
> The "defectors" also made the rounds of Congress where members saw a
> political advantage in citing the INC's propaganda as a way to talk tough
> about the Middle East. In turn, conservative and neoconservative think
> tanks
> honed their reputations in Washington by staying at the cutting edge of
> the
> negative news about Hussein, with human rights groups ready to pile on,
> too,
> against the brutal Iraqi dictator.
>
> The Bush administration found all this anti-Hussein propaganda fitting
> perfectly with its international agenda.
>
> So the INC's information program served the institutional needs and biases
> of Official Washington. Saddam Hussein was a despised figure anyway, with
> no
> influential constituency that would challenge even the most outrageous
> accusations against him.
>
> When Iraqi officials were allowed onto American news programs, it was an
> opportunity for the interviewers to show their tough side, pounding the
> Iraqis with hostile questions. The occasional journalist who tried to be
> evenhanded would have his or her professionalism questioned. An
> intelligence
> analyst who challenged the consensus view could expect to suffer career
> repercussions.
>
> A war fever was sweeping the United States and the INC was doing all it
> could to spread the infection. INC's "defectors" supplied primary or
> secondary intelligence on two key points in particular, Iraq's supposed
> rebuilding of its unconventional weapons and its alleged training of
> non-Iraqi terrorists.
>
> Sometimes, these "defectors" would enter the cloistered world of U.S.
> intelligence with entrees from former U.S. government officials.
>
> For instance, ex-CIA Director James Woolsey referred at least a couple of
> these Iraqi sources to the DIA. Woolsey, who was affiliated with the
> Center
> for Strategic and International Studies and other neoconservative think
> tanks, had been one of the Reagan administration's favorite Democrats in
> the
> 1980s because he supported a hawkish foreign policy. After Bill Clinton
> won
> the White House, Woolsey parlayed his close ties to the neoconservatives
> into an appointment as CIA director.
>
> In early 1993, Clinton's foreign policy adviser Samuel "Sandy" Berger
> explained to one well-placed Democratic official that Woolsey was given
> the
> CIA job because the Clinton team felt it owed a favor to the
> neoconservative
> New Republic, which had lent Clinton some cachet with the insider crowd of
> Washington.
>
> Amid that more relaxed post-Cold War mood, the Clinton team viewed the CIA
> directorship as a kind of a patronage plum that could be handed out as a
> favor to campaign supporters. But new international challenges soon
> emerged
> and Woolsey proved to be an ineffective leader of the intelligence
> community. After two years, he was replaced.
>
> As the 1990s wore on, the spurned Woolsey grew closer to Washington's
> fast-growing neoconservative movement, which was openly hostile to
> President
> Clinton for his perceived softness in asserting U.S. military power,
> especially against Arab regimes in the Middle East.
>
> On Jan. 26, 1998, the neocon Project for the New American Century sent a
> letter to Clinton urging the ouster of Saddam Hussein by force if
> necessary.
> Woolsey was one of the 18 signers. By early 2001, he also had grown close
> to
> the INC, having been hired as co-counsel to represent eight Iraqis,
> including INC members, who had been detained on immigration charges.
>
> So, Woolsey was well-positioned to serve as a conduit for INC "defectors"
> trying to get their stories to U.S. officials and to the American public.
>
> The 'Sources'
>
> DIA officials told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Woolsey
> introduced
> them to the first in a long line of INC "defectors" who told the DIA about
> Hussein's WMD and his supposed relationship with Islamic terrorists. For
> his
> part, Woolsey said he didn't recall making that referral.
>
> The debriefings of "Source One" - as he was called in the Senate
> Intelligence Committee report - generated more than 250 intelligence
> reports. Two of the reports described alleged terrorist training sites in
> Iraq, where Afghan, Pakistani and Palestinian nationals were allegedly
> taught military skills at the Salman Pak base, 20 miles south of Baghdad.
>
> "Many Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama
> bin Ladin in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.,"
> Source One claimed, according to the Senate report.
>
> After the 9/11 attacks, information from Source One and other
> INC-connected
> "defectors" began surfacing in U.S. press accounts, not only in the
> right-wing news media, but many mainstream publications.
>
> In an Oct. 12, 2001, column entitled "What About Iraq?" Washington Post
> chief foreign correspondent Jim Hoagland cited "accumulating evidence of
> Iraq's role in sponsoring the development on its soil of weapons and
> techniques for international terrorism," including training at Salman Pak.
>
> Hoagland's sources included Iraqi army defector Sabah Khalifa Khodada and
> another unnamed Iraqi ex-intelligence officer in Turkey. Hoagland also
> criticized the CIA for not taking seriously a possible Iraqi link to 9/11.
>
> Hoagland's column was followed by a Page One article in The New York
> Times,
> which was headlined "Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism." It
> relied
> on Khodada, the second source in Turkey (who was later identified as Abu
> Zeinab al-Qurairy, a former senior officer in Iraq's intelligence agency,
> the Mukhabarat), and a lower-ranking member of Mukhabarat.
>
> This story described 40 to 50 Islamic militants getting training at Salman
> Pak at any one time, including lessons on how to hijack an airplane
> without
> weapons. There were also claims about a German scientist working on
> biological weapons.
>
> In a Columbia Journalism Review retrospective on press coverage of U.S.
> intelligence on Iraq, writer Douglas McCollam asked Times correspondent
> Chris Hedges about the Times article, which had been written in
> coordination
> with a PBS Frontline documentary called "Gunning for Saddam," with
> correspondent Lowell Bergman.
>
> Explaining the difficulty of checking out defector accounts when they
> meshed
> with the interests of the U.S. government, Hedges said, "We tried to vet
> the
> defectors and we didn't get anything out of Washington that said, 'these
> guys are full of shit.'"
>
> For his part, Bergman told CJR's McCollam, "The people involved appeared
> credible and we had no way of getting into Iraq ourselves."
>
> The journalistic competition to break anti-Hussein scoops was building.
> Based in Paris, Hedges said he would get periodic calls from Times editors
> asking that he check out defector stories originating from Chalabi's
> operation.
>
> "I thought he was unreliable and corrupt, but just because someone is a
> sleazebag doesn't mean he might not know something or that everything he
> says is wrong," Hedges said. Hedges described Chalabi as having an
> "endless
> stable" of ready sources who could fill in American reporters on any
> number
> of Iraq-related topics.
>
> The Salman Pak story would be one of many products from the INC's
> propaganda
> mill that would prove influential in the run-up to the Iraq War but would
> be
> knocked down later by U.S. intelligence agencies.
>
> According to the Senate Intelligence Committee's post-mortem, the DIA
> stated
> in June 2006 that it found "no credible reports that non-Iraqis were
> trained
> to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak
> after
> 1991."
>
> Explaining the origins for the bogus tales, the DIA concluded that
> Operation
> Desert Storm had brought attention to the training base at Salman Pak, so
> "fabricators and unestablished sources who reported hearsay or third-hand
> information created a large volume of human intelligence reporting. This
> type of reporting surged after September 2001."
>
> Going with the Flow
>
> However, in the prelude to the Iraq War, U.S. intelligence agencies found
> it
> hard to resist the INC's "defectors" when that would have meant bucking
> the
> White House and going against Washington's conventional wisdom. Rather
> than
> take those career chances, many intelligence analysts found it easier to
> go
> with the flow.
>
> Referring to the INC's Source One, a U.S. intelligence memorandum in July
> 2002 hailed the information as "highly credible and includes reports on a
> wide range of subjects including conventional weapons facilities, denial
> and
> deception; communications security; suspected terrorist training
> locations;
> illicit trade and smuggling; Saddam's palaces; the Iraqi prison system;
> and
> Iraqi petrochemical plants."
>
> Only analysts in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
> Research
> were skeptical because they felt Source One was making unfounded
> assumptions, especially about possible nuclear research sites.
>
> Only after the invasion of Iraq would U.S. intelligence recognize the
> holes
> in Source One's stories and spot examples of analysts extrapolating faulty
> conclusions from his limited first-hand knowledge.
>
> "In early February 2004, in order to resolve ... credibility issues with
> Source One, Intelligence Community elements brought Source One to Iraq,"
> the
> Senate Intelligence Committee report said. "When taken to the location
> Source One had described as the suspect [nuclear] facility, he was unable
> to
> identify it.
>
> "According to one intelligence assessment, the 'subject appeared stunned
> upon hearing that he was standing on the spot that he reported as the
> location of the facility, insisted that he had never been to that spot,
> and
> wanted to check a map' ...
>
> "ntelligence Community officers confirmed that they were standing on the
> location he was identifying. ... During questioning, Source One
> acknowledged
> contact with the INC's Washington Director [redacted], but denied that the
> Washington Director directed Source One to provide any false information.
> "
>
> The U.S. intelligence community had mixed reactions to other Iraqi
> "walk-ins" arranged by the INC. Some were caught in outright deceptions,
> such as "Source Two" who had talked about Iraq supposedly building mobile
> biological weapons labs.
>
> After catching Source Two in contradictions, the CIA issued a "fabrication
> notice" in May 2002, deeming him "a fabricator/provocateur" and asserting
> that he had "been coached by the Iraqi National Congress prior to his
> meeting with western intelligence services."
>
> However, the DIA never repudiated the specific reports that had been based
> on Source Two's debriefings. So, Source Two continued to be cited in five
> CIA intelligence assessments and the pivotal National Intelligence
> Estimate
> in October 2002, "as corroborating other source reporting about a mobile
> biological weapons program," the Senate Intelligence Committee report
> said.
>
> Source Two was one of four human sources referred to by Secretary of State
> Colin Powell in his United Nations speech on Feb. 5, 2003. When asked how
> a
> "fabricator" could have been used for such an important speech, a CIA
> analyst who worked on Powell's speech said, "we lost the thread of concern
> ... as time progressed I don't think we remembered."
>
> A CIA supervisor added, "Clearly we had it at one point, we understood, we
> had concerns about the source, but over time it started getting used again
> and there really was a loss of corporate awareness that we had a problem
> with the source."
>
> Flooding Defectors
>
> Part of the challenge facing U.S. intelligence agencies was the sheer
> volume
> of "defectors" shepherded into debriefing rooms by the INC and the appeal
> of
> their information to U.S. policymakers.
>
> "Source Five," for instance, claimed that Osama bin Laden had traveled to
> Baghdad for direct meetings with Saddam Hussein. "Source Six" claimed that
> the Iraqi population was "excited" about the prospects of a U.S. invasion
> to
> topple Hussein. Plus, the source said Iraqis recognized the need for
> post-invasion U.S. control.
>
> By early February 2003, as the final invasion plans were underway, U.S.
> intelligence agencies had progressed up to "Source Eighteen," who came to
> epitomize what some analysts still suspected - that the INC was coaching
> the
> sources.
>
> As the CIA tried to set up a debriefing of Source Eighteen, another Iraqi
> exile passed on word to the agency that an INC representative had told
> Source Eighteen to "deliver the act of a lifetime." CIA analysts weren't
> sure what to make of that piece of news - since Iraqi exiles frequently
> badmouthed each other - but the value of the warning soon became clear.
>
> U.S. intelligence officers debriefed Source Eighteen the next day and
> discovered that "Source Eighteen was supposed to have a nuclear
> engineering
> background, but was unable to discuss advanced mathematics or physics and
> described types of 'nuclear' reactors that do not exist," according to the
> Senate Intelligence Committee report.
>
> "Source Eighteen used the bathroom frequently, particularly when he
> appeared
> to be flustered by a line of questioning, suddenly remembering a new piece
> of information upon his return. During one such incident, Source Eighteen
> appeared to be reviewing notes," the report said.
>
> Not surprisingly, the CIA and DIA case officers concluded that Source
> Eighteen was a fabricator. But the sludge of INC-connected misinformation
> and disinformation continued to ooze through the U.S. intelligence
> community
> and to foul the American intelligence product - in part because there was
> little pressure from above demanding strict quality controls.
>
> Curve Ball
>
> Other Iraqi exile sources - not directly connected to the INC - also
> supplied dubious information, including a source for a foreign
> intelligence
> agency who earned the code name "Curve Ball." He contributed important
> details about Iraq's alleged mobile facilities for producing agents for
> biological warfare.
>
> Tyler Drumheller, former chief of the CIA's European Division, said his
> office had issued repeated warnings about Curve Ball's accounts. "Everyone
> in the chain of command knew exactly what was happening," Drumheller said.
> [Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2005]
>
> Despite those objections and the lack of direct U.S. contact with Curve
> Ball, he earned a rating as "credible" or "very credible," and his
> information became a core element of the Bush administration's case for
> invading Iraq.
>
> Drawings of Curve Ball's imaginary bio-weapons labs were a central feature
> of Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the U.N.
>
> Even after the invasion, U.S. officials continued to promote these claims,
> portraying the discovery of a couple of trailers used for inflating
> artillery balloons as "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding
> a
> biological warfare program." [CIA-DIA report, "Iraqi Mobile Biological
> Warfare Agent Production Plants," May 16, 2003]
>
> Finally, on May 26, 2004, a CIA assessment of Curve Ball said
> "investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source
> indicate he lied about his access to a mobile BW production product."
>
> The U.S. intelligence community also learned that Curve Ball "had a close
> relative who had worked for the INC since 1992," but the CIA could never
> resolve the question of whether the INC was involved in coaching Curve
> Ball.
>
> One CIA analyst said she doubted a direct INC role because the INC pattern
> was to "shop their good sources around town, but they weren't known for
> sneaking people out of countries into some asylum system."
>
> Delayed Report
>
> In September 2006, four years after the Bush administration seriously
> began
> fanning the flames for war against Iraq, a majority of Senate Intelligence
> Committee members overrode the objections of the panel's senior
> Republicans
> and issued a report on the INC's contribution to the U.S. intelligence
> failures.
>
> The report concluded that the INC fed false information to the
> intelligence
> community to convince Washington that Iraq was flouting prohibitions on
> WMD
> production. The panel also found that the falsehoods had been "widely
> distributed in intelligence products prior to the war" and did influence
> some American perceptions of the WMD threat in Iraq.
>
> But INC disinformation was not solely to blame for the bogus intelligence
> that permeated the pre-war debate. In Washington, there had been a
> breakdown
> of the normal checks and balances that American democracy has
> traditionally
> relied on for challenging and eliminating the corrosive effects of false
> data.
>
> By 2002, that self-correcting mechanism - a skeptical press, congressional
> oversight, and tough-minded analysts - had collapsed. With very few
> exceptions, prominent journalists refused to put their careers at risk;
> intelligence professionals played along with the powers that be;
> Democratic
> leaders succumbed to the political pressure to toe the President's line;
> and
> Republicans marched in lockstep with Bush on his way to war.
>
> Because of this systematic failure, the Senate Intelligence Committee
> concluded four years later that nearly every key assessment of the U.S.
> intelligence community as expressed in the 2002 National Intelligence
> Estimate about Iraq's WMD was wrong:
>
> "Postwar findings do not support the [NIE] judgment that Iraq was
> reconstituting its nuclear weapons program; ... do not support the [NIE]
> assessment that Iraq's acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes was
> intended for an Iraqi nuclear program; ... do not support the [NIE]
> assessment that Iraq was 'vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and
> yellowcake' from Africa; ... do not support the [NIE] assessment that
> 'Iraq
> has biological weapons' and that 'all key aspects of Iraq's offensive
> biological weapons program are larger and more advanced than before the
> Gulf
> war'; ... do not support the [NIE] assessment that Iraq possessed, or ever
> developed, mobile facilities for producing biological warfare agents; ...
> do
> not support the [NIE] assessments that Iraq 'has chemical weapons' or 'is
> expanding its chemical industry to support chemical weapons production';
> ...
> do not support the [NIE] assessments that Iraq had a developmental program
> for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 'probably intended to deliver biological
> agents' or that an effort to procure U.S. mapping software 'strongly
> suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions
> targeting the United States.'"
>
> So, it now falls to the electoral process - another flawed part of the
> American democratic system - to exact some measure of accountability on
> individuals and institutions that sent more than 2,800 American soldiers
> to
> their death on false pretenses.
>
> The Nov. 7 elections stand as the last check and balance, perhaps the last
> hope.
>
>
>
> --
> NOTICE: This post contains copyrighted material the use of which has not
> always been authorized by the copyright owner. I am making such material
> available to advance understanding of
> political, human rights, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues.
> I
> believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of such copyrighted material as
> provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright
> Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107
>
> "A little patience and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their
> spells dissolve, and the people recovering their true sight, restore their
> government to its true principles. It is true that in the meantime we are
> suffering deeply in spirit,
> and incurring the horrors of a war and long oppressions of enormous public
> debt. But if the game runs sometimes against us at home we must have
> patience till luck turns, and then we shall have an opportunity of winning
> back the principles we have lost, for this is a game where principles are
> at
> stake."
> -Thomas Jefferson
>
>
>