... monism as always positing *experience* as being the neutral factor that both physical and mental emerge from, but it's not welded to any specific principle for the neutral element. Galen Strawson reinterprets Russell's neutral monism and his own as a kind of *materialism*, but the entry dismisses that biased preference as another one that neutral monists need not adhere to: "It ...
... neutral monism as always positing *experience* as being the neutral factor that both physical and mental emerge from, but it's not welded to any specific principle for the neutral element. Galen Strawson reinterprets Russell's neutral monism and his own as a kind of *materialism*, but the entry dismisses that biased preference as another one that neutral monists need not adhere to: "It ...
... and evidence of some kind, which is accessible and open to scrutiny and evaluation. A proposition claimed to rest on an "act of faith" is not a metaphysical proposition. Many of your comments below, e.g., "The metaphysical status of any referent is not determinable," "this is a linguistic device and not a metaphysical judgement," and others, now make some sense to me, in light of ...
...observing the consequences they are predicted to have within the ER. I'm also curious about your comment, "I impose no constraint that nothing can be said about the UR." Of course, we can ... into some conscious system. It is dualism-by-stealth. There's no smuggling going on -- Strawson's conjecture is all quite up-front and open, and his reasoning is cogent. If consciousness...
... inadequate? Incorrect? I'm also curious about your comment, "I impose no constraint that nothing can be said ... do that? Well, that is an interesting comment. What would be an alternative way to conceive... etc.). But I'm puzzled by your comment that the CR "fails" to account for ... count as succeeding in accounting for it? My comment was that the *UR* fails to account for ...
... the chicken-and-egg problem itself. Well, that is an interesting comment. What would be an alternative way to conceive the problem, or ... delineated by that CR order. But I'm puzzled by your comment that the CR "fails" to account for observed order. What do...as a fundamental metaphysical axiom, but (I gather from your comment below) this axiom has no causal role in the existence of ...
... of investigation we might subsequently pursue -- the discussion has been nipped in the bud. This is strange. You are proposing dualism as a fundamental metaphysical axiom, but (I gather from your comment below) this axiom has no causal role in the existence of the ER or its various phenomena? We can only investigate the *logical* consequences of the postulate since it does not ...
... would one tell what purported information was relevant? Of course, to say something like, "We have to investigate in order to know how or what to investigate" would be circular. [skipping comments on "abduction"; a bit of a sidetrack] Well, yes. Given that the conceptual artifacts of science are contrived to be testable, then imputing nontestable properties to them certainly...
... to account for their presence in the "physical world." A non-Strawson, non-materialist, "dual substance" rather than generic "dual-aspect" ...> Technically, that's probably a kind of "neutral monism", but Strawson apparently wants to hang onto the tradition of calling the monism... strayed into that myself as the result of prior comments sort of inviting me to venture into that vein. ...
...that was the correct "summoning pattern". A non-Strawson, non-materialist, "dual substance" rather than generic "...s probably a kind of "neutral monism", but Strawson apparently wants to hang onto the tradition of..., the mystery remains. BR: I've already commented how cosmology can entertain its "wild" ...into that myself as the result of prior comments sort of inviting me to venture into ...
