...On Sep 2, 4:36 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote: Logic must "look after itself", or so Wittgenstein tells us... A PROPOSAL Logic borrows a number of ideas... intent, leave us with objects that alone can express a logic that can "look after itself". If you strip away the concepts that justify the procedures of establishing logical truths, then those...
....com> wrote: Logic must "look after itself", or so Wittgenstein tells us... ...express a logic that can "look after itself". If you strip away the concepts that...is hidden and logic "look(s) after itself". In respect of that, we would not..., if logic is to look after itself, a matter of indifference.) 2) Laws ... we want logic to look after itself we must not assume an implicit ...
Logic must "look after itself", or so Wittgenstein tells us... A PROPOSAL Logic...express a logic that can "look after itself". DISCUSSION Accordingly, "P" ought to say no...is hidden and logic "look(s) after itself". In respect of that, we would ... if logic is to look after itself, a matter of indifference.) 2) Laws... we want logic to look after itself we must not assume an implicit ...
... argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self- justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I cannot doubt ...
...: A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses. .. and results that are able to be duplicated. Consensus. Here is the beginning, I do believe. It is in the consensus, not the evidence itself. "Science is a social disease"
... in unjustified beleifs (2) go on infinitely (without circularity) (3) circle back upon itself in some way. The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, ... is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self- justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the ...
...>>The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self- justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I cannot doubt ...
...terminate in unjustified beleifs (2) go on infinitely (without circularity) (3) circle back upon itself in some way. The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, ... is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self- justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the ...
... justification does not terminate in basic emperical beliefs, then it must either: (1) terminate in unjustified beleifs (2) go on infinitely (without circularity) (3) circle back upon itself in some way. If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of distinct justified beliefs is ...
...>>The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self- justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I cannot doubt ...
