... The sense of touch is still necessary. However,truth could be taken as true with ...> (3) A can justify his belief that P. Actually, that's notsufficient, either. It can... true, that A can justify his belief in P, yet A's justification is...s raining outside." In fact, Sparky was not outside, but his hair is wet because...> But then the whole process is not well-founded---we can never get ...
...wrote: Again, how do you know the truth value of P? The answer is the .... Gettier problems have as premises "A believes P, A can justify that belief, P is not true." For it to be a problem though, all three premises must ... be that way without my having a justified belief that it is. I may have a justified belief without the world being that way. However, you cannot know what ...
... (3) A can justify his belief that P. Actually, that's notsufficient, either. It ...s raining outside." In fact, Sparky was not outside, but his hair is wet ... But then the whole process is not well-founded---we can never get ....wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem So the beliefs must stand in some relation to ... was a false, but well justified belief. What I think this means is ...
... can justify his belief that P. Actually, that's notsufficient, either. ... inevitably fall short of guaranteeing the truth of what we believe. Justification can...a trustworthy and reliable guide to truth. Such justification may lead us to... standards be fallible guides to truth, are also externally connected with ...is an appropriate match between our beliefs about ourselves and our perceptual ...
... (3) A can justify his belief that P. Actually, that's notsufficient, either. It can be the case... true, that A can justify his belief in P, yet A's justification is...s raining outside." In fact, Sparky was not outside, but his hair is wet ...statements. But even that may not be sufficient. Perhaps we want to require ... But then the whole process is not well-founded---we can never get ...
... risky business to believe, or not to believe, a truth one doesn't know, I...know. We cannot identify any particular truths that are unknown (apart from "...), because by doing so the unknown truth identified would contradictorily become known. Not really so. Formal reasoning allows 2 kinds ... without contradiction is that there are unknown truths, without having to identify any one of ...
... Daniel T. wrote: Not all conjectures have truth-values. "An undetectable ... in my garage" has no truth value, it can never be ...my crow. As Pauli reportedly said, "not even wrong." In order for .../whether/ it is true or not. Fine, what do you need?... that *all* conjectures have a truth value... Show that the conjecture ... to tell which conjectures have truth value and which don't....
... "Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote: Daniel T. wrote: Not all conjectures have truth-values. "An undetectable elephant lives in my garage" has no truth value, it can never be either true ... eat my crow. As Pauli reportedly said, "not even wrong." In order for me to be ..., I needn't be able to know /whether/ it is true or not. #PH
...cam.ac.uk> wrote: Of course conjectures have truth-values before we establish them one way or the other: we just don't know what the truth-values are. Not all conjectures have truth-values. ...elephant lives in my garage" has no truth value, it can never be either true ...happily eat my crow. As Pauli reportedly said, "not even wrong." -- There are two things that ...
...what is the case/is true and what is known to be the case/true. What is known to be the case/true is the case/ true, but it simply doesn't follow that what is not known to be the case/true is not the case/true. This is a formal fallacy! #PH
